United States v. Miffin

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  Plaintiff-Appellee, v.  No. 01-4306 TRON MIFFIN, Defendant-Appellant.  Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (CR-01-20-F) Submitted: September 18, 2001 Decided: September 27, 2001 Before WILLIAMS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. COUNSEL Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Car- olina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Jennifer May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel- lee. 2 UNITED STATES v. MIFFIN Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). OPINION PER CURIAM: Tron Miffin appeals his sentence imposed upon a violation of his term of supervised release from his previous conviction on various drug-related charges. Miffin was sentenced to ninety-four months’ imprisonment for the underlying conviction, which sentence was reduced by the district court twice based upon Miffin’s substantial assistance. Miffin ultimately was sentenced to seventy-nine months, which he served with the federal Bureau of Prisons. He challenges the district court’s imposition of a sentence of sixty months’ imprison- ment for his admitted violation of the terms of his supervised release. According to the undisputed facts, Miffin was released from cus- tody on the underlying drug conviction and his term of supervised release began on June 30, 2000. On September 21, 2000, Miffin was charged with and ultimately pled guilty in state court to manufactur- ing cocaine, possession of up to one-half ounce of marijuana, posses- sion of drug paraphernalia, and resisting a public officer. He was sentenced in state court to six to eight months in prison. Miffin’s fed- eral probation officer thereafter filed a motion to revoke Miffin’s supervised release, based upon the state drug conviction. Miffin admitted to the charged violation, and the district court revoked Mif- fin’s supervised release and sentenced him to sixty months in prison, the maximum sentence allowed by law. On appeal, Miffin contends specifically that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sixty-month imprisonment term when the applicable sentencing guidelines policy statement suggested a sentence of thirty-seven to forty-six months. He further claims that because his criminal conduct resulted in a state sentence of only six to eight months in prison, the district court’s sentence based upon the same conduct was unreasonable. UNITED STATES v. MIFFIN 3 This Court reviews a sentence imposed by a district court as a con- sequence of a supervised release violation for abuse of discretion. United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642-43 (4th Cir. 1995). The sen- tencing ranges provided by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4, p.s., are purely advisory and do not bind the sentencing court. Davis, 53 F.3d at 642; United States v. Denard, 24 F.3d 599, 602 (4th Cir. 1994). In addition, the guidelines commentary estab- lishes the propriety of a sentence above the recommended range where, as here, the original sentence was the result of a downward departure. USSG § 7B1.4, comment. (n.4). We find, given that the total incarceration sentence Miffin received was within his original guideline sentencing range, and the supervised release violation was another serious drug-related event which occurred less than three months following Miffin’s release from cus- tody, the district court’s imposition of a sixty-month sentence for the supervised release revocation does not constitute an abuse of discre- tion. Moreover, we find the fact that Miffin’s federal sentence was substantially longer than his state sentence to be neither relevant nor significant. Accordingly, we affirm Miffin’s conviction and sentence. We dis- pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED