UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4472
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RASHARD KIMAKO WAGNER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.
(CR-04-853)
Submitted: October 28, 2005 Decided: November 15, 2005
Before MICHAEL, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan S. Gasser, Acting United
States Attorney, Alston C. Badger, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Rashard Kimako Wagner appeals his conviction and
262-month sentence following his plea of guilty for possession with
intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841 (2000); possession of a firearm in the furtherance of
drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2000); and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 (2000). Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Wagner first claims on appeal that the district court
erred in applying the career offender provision of the sentencing
guidelines. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2004).
A district court violates the Sixth Amendment when, acting pursuant
to the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines, it imposes a
sentence greater than the maximum authorized by the facts found by
the jury or admitted by the defendant. United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738, 746, 750 (2005). The fact of a prior conviction,
however, is an exception to this general rule and need not be
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 233-36, 243-44
(1998); see also Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756 (“Any fact (other than
a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence . . .
must be proved to a jury”); United States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349,
352-53 (4th Cir. 2005) (rejecting challenge to validity of
Almendarez-Torres). Because application of the career offender
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enhancement does not implicate the Sixth Amendment, we deny relief
on this claim.
Wagner also claims the sentence imposed by the district
court was unreasonable. We have reviewed the record and the
factors considered by the district court pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553 (2000), and find no evidence suggesting the sentence is
unreasonable. Accordingly, this claim merits no relief.
We affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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