UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-2390
J. DOUGLAS BRADLEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ARLINGTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA; EDWARD P.
PLAUGHER,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, District
Judge. (CA-05-84-1)
Submitted: May 9, 2006 Decided: May 24, 2006
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Victor M. Glasberg, Paul Gowder, VICTOR M. GLASBERG & ASSOCIATES,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Ara L. Tramblian, OFFICE OF
THE COUNTY ATTORNEY, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff J. Douglas Bradley appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment rejecting his discrimination claim under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq. (2000). We affirm.
I.
In 2002, J. Douglas Bradley applied for the position of fire
fighter/emergency medical technician (FF/EMT) with Arlington
County, Virginia. Bradley received an offer of employment in
August 2002, conditioned on his passing, inter alia, a mental
health examination. The county had contracted with the Law
Enforcement Assessment Center (LEAC) to conduct psychological
analysis of applicants and give opinions on their mental status.
During Bradley’s mental examination, he informed a LEAC
psychologist that he had suffered from obsessive-compulsive
disorder and depression throughout much of his life. LEAC
ultimately recommended Bradley with reservations.
After reviewing the LEAC report and talking with LEAC
officials, Dr. Linda Hedlund, a county physician, noted that
Bradley might not be able to adequately undertake some of the
specific duties required of an FF/EMT. Edward Plaugher, the
county’s fire chief vested with the final hiring decision, believed
it was not in the county’s interest to hire Bradley as an FF/EMT.
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He thus rejected Bradley for this position. Bradley reapplied in
2003, but the county again refused to hire him as an FF/EMT for
similar reasons.
On January 31, 2005, Bradley brought suit against the county
and Plaugher. He asserted, inter alia, that they discriminated
against him based on his disability, in violation of the ADA.
Bradley voluntarily dismissed Plaugher from this lawsuit. The
district court subsequently granted the county’s motion for summary
judgment, holding that Bradley was not disabled under the ADA.
Bradley filed a timely appeal.
II.
An individual qualifies as disabled under the ADA if he (1)
suffers from “a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of [his] major life activities,” (2) has “a
record of such an impairment,” or (3) is “regarded as having such
an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). Bradley contends
that, while his mental impairments did not themselves limit any
major life activity, the county regarded him as substantially
limited in his ability to work.* To succeed on this claim, Bradley
must show that the county “perceived [him] to be significantly
restricted in [the] ability to perform either a class of jobs or a
*
We will assume, without deciding, that working is a major
life activity. See, e.g., Taylor v. Fed. Express Corp., 429 F.3d
461, 463 (4th Cir. 2005).
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broad range of jobs in various classes.” Rohan v. Networks
Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 277 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted). If he can only prove that the county
found him unfit to undertake a specialized or particular type of
job, his claim will fall short. See id.
Bradley has failed to proffer sufficient evidence that the
county viewed him as unable to perform a broad range of jobs or a
class of jobs. The evidence only establishes that it may have
regarded him as unable to undertake the duties of an FF/EMT.
Plaugher, the ultimate decisionmaker, never considered Bradley for
any position other than FF/EMT, and Dr. Hedlund expressed concern
that Bradley might not be able to fulfill several specific FF/EMT
responsibilities. Bradley suggests that the county regarded him as
unfit for other public safety jobs, such as police officer, because
these jobs employ similar mental health standards and screening.
But this is largely speculative. The county’s ultimate
determination on Bradley’s ability to perform as an FF/EMT
necessarily depended upon the unique duties of that job, and we
cannot conjecture how county officials might evaluate his fitness
for another public safety job were he to apply for one.
III.
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
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are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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