UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-5151
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DELTON RIGGINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (5:06-cr-00227-D-1)
Submitted: October 22, 2008 Decided: November 6, 2008
Before KING, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William Woodward Webb, THE EDMISTEN & WEBB LAW FIRM, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States
Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, William M. Gilmore, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
After a jury trial, Delton Riggins was convicted of
conspiring to knowingly make false statements to a licensed
firearms dealer in connection with the purchase of firearms, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000), and four counts of aiding and
abetting the knowing making of false and fictitious statements in
connection with the acquisition of firearms, in violation of 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 922(a)(6), 924 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2 (2000). The district court sentenced him to a total of
seventy-eight months of imprisonment. Riggins appeals, contending
that the district court erred in sustaining the jury’s verdict
because the evidence was insufficient to convict him and thus, the
court erred by denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion. Finding no
error, we affirm.
A jury’s verdict “must be sustained if there is
substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the
Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
80 (1942). This court has “defined ‘substantial evidence’ as
‘evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate
and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209,
216 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849,
862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). This court “must consider
circumstantial as well as direct evidence, and allow the government
2
the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to
those sought to be established.” United States v. Tresvant, 677
F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982). In evaluating the sufficiency of
the evidence, this court does not review the credibility of the
witnesses and assumes that the jury resolved all contradictions in
the testimony in favor of the government. United States v. Kelly,
510 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1917
(2008). Moreover, “the uncorroborated testimony of one witness or
of an accomplice may be sufficient to sustain a conviction . . . .”
United States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d 1185, 1190 (4th Cir. 1997). This
court “can reverse a conviction on insufficiency grounds only when
the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Moye, 454
F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
To prove that Riggins violated § 371, “the government
must prove an agreement between two or more persons to act together
in committing an offense and an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy.” United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 109 (4th Cir.
1990). To sustain the aiding and abetting conviction, the
government was required to prove that Riggins “knowingly associated
himself with and participated in the criminal venture.” Burgos, 94
F.3d at 873 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This
court has held that “[t]o be convicted of aiding and abetting,
participation in every stage of an illegal venture is not required,
3
only participation at some stage accompanied by knowledge of the
result and intent to bring about that result.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). To prove a violation of
§ 922(a)(6) for making false statements in connection with the
acquisition of firearms, the government had to show that: (1)
Riggins attempted to acquire the firearms from a federally licensed
firearms dealer; (2) in doing so, he knowingly made a false or
fictitious statement; and (3) the subject of his false statement
was material to the lawfulness of the sale. See United States v.
Rahman, 83 F.3d 89, 92 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing elements in
connection with challenge to jury instructions).
With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the trial
transcript, and our review convinces us that the evidence was
sufficient to convict Riggins on all counts. To the extent Riggins
challenges the credibility of a key government witness, Mona
Boakye, the jury clearly found Boakye to be a credible witness.
Such a credibility determination is not reviewable on appeal. See
Kelly, 510 F.3d at 440.
Accordingly, we affirm Riggins’ convictions. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4