Present: All the Justices
JENNIFER BING
v. Record No. 102270 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
March 2, 2012
TERESA W. HAYWOOD, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY
R. Bruce Long, Judge
In this appeal, we consider whether the Circuit Court for
Middlesex County (the "trial court") erred when it granted,
pursuant to Code § 8.01-243.2, the special plea of the statute
of limitations filed by Teresa W. Haywood ("Haywood"), Teddy
Bagby ("Bagby"), and Mary M. Hodges ("Hodges").
I. Facts and Proceedings Below
On May 28, 2008, Jennifer Bing ("Bing") was arrested by
Deputy Christopher W. Rhoades ("Deputy Rhoades") of the Mathews
County Sheriff's Department on suspicion of drug possession and
distribution. Police found narcotics and paraphernalia in the
car in which Bing had been riding as a passenger and on the
seat of Deputy Rhoades' police cruiser after Bing had been
placed in the vehicle. After her arrest, Bing was transported
to the Middle Peninsula Regional Security Center (the "Security
Center").
Deputy Rhoades told the staff at the Security Center that
Bing "might be hiding narcotics on or in her person." Bing
alleged that, at the direction of shift commander Bagby,
Haywood, the medical supervisor, and Hodges, a lieutenant,
"conducted a full cavity search on Bing . . . searching her
anus, vagina and other body parts without a court order and
without the search being performed by a medically trained
person who was on duty at the time of the search."
On May 21, 2010, almost two years later, Bing filed a
complaint against Haywood, Bagby, and Hodges (collectively,
"the defendants") in the trial court. In her three-count
complaint, Bing alleged that she suffered an assault and
battery by Haywood, Bagby, and Hodges; the search authorized by
Babgy and performed by Haywood and Hodges was illegal; and the
actions of Deputy Rhoades, * Haywood, Bagby, and Hodges
constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. Bing
sought $250,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in
punitive damages, alleging that the defendants "acted
consciously in an unjustifiable, willful, wanton and reckless
disregard of [Bing's] rights."
In response, the defendants filed an answer raising
several affirmative defenses including probable cause to search
Bing and consent by Bing to the search. Also, the defendants
filed a demurrer and a plea of the statute of limitations. The
defendants demurred as to count three, arguing that Bing failed
to allege facts necessary to support a cause of action for
*
Deputy Rhoades was not named as a defendant.
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intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the plea of
the statute of limitations, the defendants argued that Bing's
claim was based upon the conditions of her confinement; "Code
§ 8.01-243.2 prescribes a one-year statute of limitations for
inmate claims based on conditions of confinement"; and Bing's
claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
The trial court held a hearing on the defendants' demurrer
and plea of the statute of limitations. We need not address
the demurrer because the trial court did not decide that
question. Rather, the trial court sustained the plea of the
statute of limitations and dismissed the complaint.
Bing timely filed her petition for appeal, and we granted
Bing's appeal on the following assignment of error:
1. The trial judge erred by sustaining Defendants'
Special Pleas, by holding that Plaintiff's claim was
barred by the statute of limitations and by
dismissing with prejudice the instant cause of
action.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Well-settled principles of statutory review guide our
analysis in this case.
[A]n issue of statutory interpretation is a pure
question of law which we review de novo. When
the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are
bound by the plain meaning of that language.
Furthermore, we must give effect to the
legislature's intention as expressed by the
language used unless a literal interpretation of
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the language would result in a manifest
absurdity. If a statute is subject to more than
one interpretation, we must apply the
interpretation that will carry out the
legislative intent behind the statute.
Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96,
104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007) (citations omitted).
B. Statute of Limitations
On appeal, Bing contends that the trial court erred in
granting the defendants' plea of the statute of limitations and
dismissing her case with prejudice because the trial court
improperly applied the one-year statute of limitations in Code
§ 8.01-243.2 instead of the two-year statute of limitations
prescribed by Code § 8.01-243. Specifically, Bing argues that
she was not "confined" within the meaning of Code § 8.01-243.2
and that "her complaint did not relate to the conditions of her
confinement." We disagree.
Code § 8.01-243.2 provides that,
No person confined in a state or local
correctional facility shall bring or have
brought on his behalf any personal action
relating to the conditions of his confinement
until all available administrative remedies are
exhausted. Such action shall be brought by or
on behalf of such person within one year after
cause of action accrues or within six months
after all administrative remedies are exhausted,
whichever occurs later.
(Emphasis added.) For the one-year provision in Code § 8.01-
243.2 to apply, the plaintiff must have been "confined" at the
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time the cause of action accrued, and the cause of action must
relate to plaintiff's "conditions of confinement." Code
§ 8.01-243.2.
While we have not yet addressed whether the one-year
provision in Code § 8.01-243.2 applies to a pre-trial detainee
such as Bing, we have interpreted Code § 8.01-243.2 in the
context of a post-conviction inmate on two prior occasions.
Billups v. Carter, 268 Va. 701, 604 S.E.2d 414 (2004); Ogunde
v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 639, 628 S.E.2d 370 (2006). Billups
and Ogunde were serving prison terms in state correctional
centers when their respective causes of actions accrued.
Billups, 268 Va. at 705, 604 S.E.2d at 416; Ogunde, 271 Va. at
641, 628 S.E.2d at 371.
Billups, a prisoner at a correctional center, brought an
action under 42 U.S.C § 1983 against the Virginia Department of
Corrections and a correctional center employee. Billups, 268
Va. at 705, 604 S.E.2d at 416. The claim against the
correctional center employee included a count for assault and
battery. Id. Billups' complaint was filed more than one year
but less than two years after the occurrence of the incident
giving rise to the lawsuit. Id. at 705, 604 S.E.2d at 416-17.
The trial court held "that the statute of limitations
applicable to § 1983 actions was one year, as prescribed by
Code § 8.01-243.2, which governs personal actions brought by
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inmates of correctional institutions relating to the conditions
of their confinement." Id. at 710, 604 S.E.2d at 419. We
reversed and held that: (1) "§ 1983 actions brought in Virginia
courts are governed by the two-year limitation prescribed" in
Code § 8.01-243(A); and (2) Billups' assault and battery claim,
based on an alleged sexual assault, was governed by the one-
year statute of limitations provision prescribed in Code
§ 8.01-243.2. Id.
Ogunde was a prisoner at a state correctional center who
filed a complaint under the Virginia Tort Claims Act alleging
"that the Commonwealth's employees negligently assigned him to
an upper bunk bed and, in December 2002, ordered him to climb
down from the bed for roll call when they knew, or should have
known, that he had an injured knee and could fall." Ogunde,
271 Va. at 641, 628 S.E.2d at 371. The Tort Claims Act's
statute of limitations, Code § 8.01-195.7, requires a claimant
to file a notice of claim within one year of the accrual of the
cause of action, and the claimant must commence the suit within
eighteen months of filing the notice of claim. Id. at 642, 628
S.E.2d at 371-72. We concluded that Ogunde's cause of action
was related to the conditions of his confinement; however, we
held that the Tort Claims Act's statute of limitations applied
to Ogunde's action because "[t]he Act is self-contained,
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incorporating its own statute of limitations, which likewise is
self-contained." Id. at 643-44, 628 S.E.2d at 372-73.
Our holdings in Billups and Ogunde are not directly on
point with the present case. Bing stipulated that her
complaint "sets forth state-law causes of action only, and does
not purport to set forth a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983"; whereas, Billups asserted a federal claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Billups, 268 Va. at 705, 604 S.E.2d at 416.
However, Bing's case is similar to Billups in that both Bing
and Billups alleged a count of common-law assault and battery.
Id. Bing's case is distinguished from Ogunde because Bing's
complaint was not brought under the Tort Claims Act. Ogunde,
271 Va. at 641, 628 S.E.2d at 371.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia has held that the one-year statute of limitations
provision in Code § 8.01-243.2 applied to a pre-trial
detainee's common-law assault and battery claim. Harris v.
Commonwealth, No. 3:07CV701, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33834, at
*16 (E.D. Va. Apr. 24, 2008). Irrespective of Harris' status
as a pre-trial detainee, the court concluded that our holding
in Billups "is applicable to the facts of [the] instant case,"
and the court held that Harris' common-law assault and battery
claim is "subject to [Code] § 8.01-243.2's one-year period of
limitations." Harris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33834, at *17.
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For the one-year statute of limitations to apply, Bing
must have: (1) been a "person confined in a state or local
correctional facility"; and (2) "brought on [her] behalf [a]
personal action relating to the conditions of [her]
confinement." Code § 8.01-243.2. The word "confine" is
defined as "the state of being imprisoned or restrained."
Black's Law Dictionary 318 (9th ed. 2009). The statute further
provides that such confinement must be in a state or local
correctional facility. Code § 8.01-243.2. The Security Center
is clearly such a facility, and it was there that she was
clearly confined. Her status as a pre-trial detainee is
immaterial to this determination.
Each claim in Bing's three-count complaint was based upon
the body cavity search. Because she was confined at the time
of the body cavity search, the question remains whether the
search related to the conditions of Bing's confinement.
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
"it is reasonable to search [a] person to prevent the
introduction of weapons or contraband into [a] jail facility
and to inventory the personal effects found on [a] suspect."
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 258 n.7 (1973).
Without question, governmental officials operating jails,
detention centers, and prisons have a compelling interest in
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maintaining a drug free, contraband free, and weapon free
environment in their facilities.
Additionally, Code §§ 53.1-30 and -127, respectively,
provide that any person entering a correctional facility "shall
be subject to a search," and the search shall be "reasonable
under the circumstances." As a result, searching a prisoner
prior to placing the prisoner within a prison population to
prevent contraband, whether drugs, weapons, or other
substances, from entering the facility is related to the
conditions of confinement. We express no opinion whether the
body cavity search was done properly. In this case we are
concerned only with the issue of the statute of limitations for
her claim.
III. Conclusion
We hold that the trial court did not err when it granted
defendants' plea of the statute of limitations because Bing was
"confined" within the meaning of Code § 8.01-243.2, and the
body cavity search related to the conditions of her
confinement. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
Affirmed.
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