Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and
Keenan, JJ., and Cochran, Retired Justice
FAIRFAX COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
v. Record No. 950827
March 1, 1996
FELICIA L. DONALD
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that, under the facts of this case, the
trial court had the authority to award attorney's fees.
The proceedings and relevant facts are undisputed. On
October 23, 1991, the Fairfax County Department of Human
Development (the County) filed a petition in the Fairfax County
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, alleging that
Felicia L. Donald "abused and/or neglected" her two minor
children. Following an ore tenus hearing, the district court, by
order entered November 18, 1991, dismissed the petition with
prejudice.
On December 20, 1991, the County appealed the case to the
Circuit Court of Fairfax County for a de novo hearing. Following
an extensive trial, the circuit court, by order entered July 8,
1993, ruled that the County's appeal was untimely and dismissed
the petition. By the same order, the circuit court also denied
Donald's request for attorney's fees, reasoning that an award of
fees was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Donald appealed the denial of attorney's fees to the Court
of Appeals, and, on August 23, 1994, a three-judge panel of the
Court of Appeals, by memorandum opinion, affirmed the circuit
court's judgment. The Court of Appeals granted a rehearing en
banc and, thereafter, reversed the circuit court's judgment and
remanded the case to the circuit court "for a determination of
reasonable attorney fees to be fixed together with costs."
Donald v. Fairfax County, 20 Va. App. 155, 162, 455 S.E.2d 740,
744 (1995). We awarded the County an appeal, having determined
that the decision of the Court of Appeals involves matters of
significant precedential value. Code § 17-116.07(B).
The jurisdiction, practice, and procedure of juvenile and
domestic relations district courts are wholly statutory and are
set forth in Title 16.1, Chapter 11 of the Code (Code § 16.1-226
et seq.). Walker v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 223 Va. 557, 562,
290 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1982). An appeal from a district court to a
circuit court may be taken within ten days from the entry of a
final judgment or order of the district court, Code §§ 16.1-132
and -296, and shall be heard de novo in the circuit court, Code
§§ 16.1-136 and -296. The circuit court, in all such cases on
appeal, shall have all the powers and authority granted by
Chapter 11 to the district court. Code § 16.1-296.
In 1991, the General Assembly specifically addressed
district courts' authority to award attorney's fees. Acts 1991,
c. 534. Code § 16.1-278.19 provides that, "[i]n any matter
properly before the [district] court, the court may award
attorneys' fees and costs on behalf of any party as the court
deems appropriate based on the relative financial ability of the
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parties." This Code section is the sole authority granted to
district courts for awarding attorney's fees. 1
Circuit courts have those powers and authority that are
granted to district courts, but district courts are empowered to
award attorney's fees only in matters "properly before [them]."
We read the statutes to apply the same jurisdictional
prerequisite to a circuit court's authority to award attorney's
fees as applies to a district court's authority to award fees. A
matter may not be properly before a circuit court, and thus
ineligible for an award of attorney's fees, even though it
originally was properly before the district court.
In the present case, the appeal was not taken within ten
days from the district court's final order; therefore, the
circuit court was without jurisdiction, and the matter was not
"properly before" the circuit court. Thus, the circuit court
lacked authority to award attorney's fees. Consequently, we hold
that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the circuit court's
judgment and in remanding the case to the circuit court for an
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award of reasonable attorney's fees.
1
Donald relies on Code § 16.1-296 as authority for awarding
attorney's fees. That section states that "[c]osts, taxes and
fees on appealed cases shall be assessed only in those cases in
which a trial fee could have been assessed in juvenile and
domestic relations court and shall be collected in the circuit
court." Donald's reliance is misplaced because Code § 16.1-296
does not relate to attorney's fees.
2
In view of the decision we reach, we express no opinion
with respect to the circuit court's reliance upon the doctrine of
sovereign immunity for its refusal to award attorney's fees.
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Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and enter final judgment in favor of the County.
Reversed and final judgment.
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