IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
TRACY MEADOWS HENRY, )
Plaintiff/Appellant )
VS.
)
)
FILED
DAVIDSON CIRCUIT NO. 95C-3415
) APPEAL NO. 01A01-9804-CV-00208
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT ) May 13, 1999
OF NASHVILLE, DAVIDSON COUNTY)
D/B/A ST. LUKES PUBLIC HEALTH ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
CLINIC ) Appellate Court Clerk
Defendants/Appellees )
____________________________________)
Edward L. Hiland, BPR #5778
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
214 Second Avenue North
Suite 105
Nashville, TN 37201
Daniel D. Warlick, BPR #10310
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
611 Commerce Street
Suite 2712, The Tower
Nashville, TN 37219
John L. Kennedy, BPR #9109
Shayna Abrams, BPR #16702
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
204 Metro Courthouse
Public Square
Nashville, TN 37201
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
TRACY MEADOWS HENRY, )
Plaintiff/Appellant )
)
VS. )
) No.
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT )
OF NASHVILLE, DAVIDSON COUNTY)
D/B/A ST. LUKES PUBLIC HEALTH )
CLINIC )
Defendants/Appellees )
____________________________________)
OPINION
Plaintiff/Appellant Tracy Meadows Henry has Appealed for the Judgement of Trial Court
granting Defendant’s, Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson County Tennessee d/b/a St.
Lukes Public Health Clinic ( Metro) Motion for Summary Judgement and Dismissal of her
Complaint.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Metro, through its operation of St. Lukes, violated
the relevant standard of care by failing to timely inform her of the laboratory results of her 1993 pap
smear. Plaintiff also alleged that Metro was negligent in that it failed to properly maintain patient
records at St. Lukes and that this negligence led to the failure of Metro to inform Plaintiff that the
1993 pap smear was positive for cancer.
On appeal Plaintiff presents two issues, the first of which is:
1. Did the [trial] court err in granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement based
upon a finding that Plaintiff could show no compensible physical injury.
Plaintiff correctly argues that the results of the pap smear should have been brought to the
attention of the nurses at the clinic and the Plaintiff should have been informed of the results of her
test in July 1993. Defendants do not deny this allegation. Following the subsequent pap smear in
October 1994, Plaintiff was operated on for the removal of the cancer and the procedure in 1994 was
the same as it would have been if the operation had been performed in 1993, a year earlier when the
report results of the first pap smear were erroneously filed.
The undisputed testimony is that there was no medical reason to find that Plaintiff suffered
any greater physical pain because the surgery was delayed. There is no evidence of recurrence of
Plaintiff’s cancer as of the filing of the brief some four years subsequent to the surgery. Plaintiff’s
physician Dr. Charles W. Harlan testified there was only a slight possibility that the delay of surgery
from July 1993 from November 1994 will increase a chance Plaintiff will develop cancer in the
future. There is no evidence in this record that as a result of Metros negligence Plaintiff suffered any
physical injury or pain.
The record taken as a whole shows no genuine issue as to any material fact. The defendants
are therefore entitled to judgement as a matter of law. Berry vs. Whitworth (576 S.W. 2d 351, 352
Tenn 1978) see also T.R.C.P. 56.
Dr. Harlan testified there was only a possibility not a probability that the delay in the
treatment in Plaintiff’s cancer increased a possibility of a recurrence.
Metro argues that there are no material facts to be determined and argues that from the record
it is clear that:
1. Plaintiff’s pap smear taken in July 1993 was positive for cervical cancer, in situ , but
due to clerical error, results were not communicated to her until October 1994.
2. The surgery performed on November 1, 1994 was the same procedure that would have
been performed in 1993.
3. The surgery performed in 1994 was apparently successful because Plaintiff has had no
sign of a recurrence of cancer since the 1994 operation. The record shows that at the present there
is only a 3% “possibility” but not a probability (emphasis is ours) that the delay in treatment could
cause cancer to redevelop.
The material facts taken as a whole leads to but one conclusion; the Plaintiff has not claim
for physical damages. Kilpatrick vs. Bryan (868 S.W. 2d 594, 603 Tenn 1993).
The Judgement of the Trial Court is affirmed, with cost of appeal assessed to Plaintiff
Appellant.
Samuel L. Lewis, Special Judge
Houston Goddard P.J.
Don McMurry, Judge