IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-50783
Summary Calendar
DONNIE EUGENE BLAYLOCK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MARK DETTMAN, Midland County Attorney; GARY PAINTER,
Sheriff of Midland County, Texas,
Defendants-Appellees.
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DONNIE EUGENE BLAYLOCK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GARY PAINTER, Sheriff of Midland County, Texas;
MARK DETTMAN, Midland County Attorney,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. MO-94-CV-209
USDC No. MO-94-CV-244
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June 3, 1997
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
No. 95-50783
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Donnie Eugene Blaylock, Texas prisoner #643199, seeks leave
to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on his appeal from the
judgment for the defendants in his consolidated civil rights
actions. Blaylock’s motion is GRANTED. The Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) requires a prisoner appealing IFP in a civil
action to pay the full amount of the filing fee, $105. As
Blaylock does not have funds for immediate payment of this fee,
he is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $11.32, in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Following payment of the
initial partial filing fee, the remainder will be deducted from
Blaylock’s prison trust-fund account until the entire filing fee
is paid. § 1915(b)(2).
IT IS ORDERED that Blaylock authorize the appropriate prison
authorities to withdraw the initial partial filing fee in
accordance with the procedures required by the prison and to
forward payment to the clerk of the District Court for the
Western District of Texas. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency
having custody of Blaylock’s inmate account shall collect the
remainder of the $105 filling fee and forward for payment, in
accordance with § 1915(b)(2), to the clerk of the District Court
of the Western District of Texas each time the amount in
Blaylock’s account exceeds $10, until the appellate filing fee is
paid.
Blaylock contends that he was deprived of his right of
47.5.4.
No. 95-50783
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access to the courts by the library-access policies of the
Midland County, Texas, jail; that the jail’s library-access
policies violated a court decree; that the magistrate judge erred
by consolidating his two cases; that he should have been allowed
to intervene in another case involving library access at the
jail; that the magistrate judge erred by declining to subpoena a
witness Blaylock desired; and that the magistrate judge erred by
denying his motion to appoint counsel. Regarding Blaylock’s
access claim, we have reviewed the record and the briefs of the
parties and we find Blaylock’s contention frivolous for
essentially the reasons relied upon by the magistrate judge.
Blaylock v. Painter, Nos. MO-94-CA-209 & MO-94-CA-244 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 2, 1995).
The consolidation of Blaylock’s cases was not an abuse of
discretion; the cases involved common questions of law and fact.
Bottazzi v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 664 F.2d 49, 50 (5th
Cir. 1981). Remedial decrees do not create or expand
constitutional rights, Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1123
(5th Cir. 1986); Blaylock’s contention based on the decree is
unavailing. Assuming that Blaylock moved in the district court
to intervene in an earlier-decided case involving access to the
law library, denial of his request was not erroneous. Edwards v.
City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 999 (5th Cir. 1996).
The magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion by
declining to subpoena Blaylock’s former criminal attorney.
No. 95-50783
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Harvey v. Andrist, 754 F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 1985). Blaylock’s
testimony at trial indicated that his petition for discretionary
review was filed late because he believed he would get a grace
period following the due date of the petition. His former
attorney’s testimony would have been irrelevant to that issue.
Denial of Blaylock’s motion for appointment of counsel was
not an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep’t, 811
F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1986). Blaylock’s appeal is frivolous
and therefore is dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED. 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.