FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 19, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES COBURN,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 07-5127
v. (D.C. No. 05-CV-0647-CVE-FHM)
(N.D. Okla.)
BRUCE HOWARD, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Charles Coburn, appearing pro se, seeks a certificate
of appealability (COA) allowing him to appeal from the district court’s denial of
his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because Mr. Coburn has failed to make a
“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” see id. § 2253(c)(2);
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000), we deny a COA and dismiss the
appeal.
Mr. Coburn pleaded guilty to one count of obtaining money by false
pretense after former conviction of two or more felonies. The state court
sentenced him to six years imprisonment. Mr. Coburn applied for post-conviction
relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and an excessive sentence, which
was denied by the state trial court and affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals (OCCA). R. Doc. 13, Ex. 2–3. Mr. Coburn then filed his
federal petition raising the same two issues. R. Doc. 1 at 5–6. The district court
determined that both issues had been exhausted, and denied the petition holding
that the state courts’ resolution of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was
not unreasonable, and that Mr. Coburn could not overcome the state procedural
bar on his excessive sentence claim. Coburn v. Howard, No. 05-0647, 2007 WL
2111216, *4–*5 (N.D. Okla. July 19, 2007). Seeking a COA, Mr. Coburn raises
three issues: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) due process violations; and
(3) denial of a fair trial because no counsel was present. We only address the first
issue, because the other issues were not raised in his petition. Tele-
Communications, Inc. v. Comm’r, 104 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 1997).
A petitioner may obtain federal habeas relief only if the state court decision
was contrary to or “involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). State court
factual findings are presumed correct; the presumption yields only based on clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The district court determined that the OCCA’s adjudication of the
ineffective assistance claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of
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Supreme Court precedent. Coburn, 2007 WL 2111216, *4. First, construing Mr.
Coburn’s argument as a factual argument, Mr. Coburn argues that he never met or
communicated with his attorney, Richard Clark, and his attorney did not attend
pre-trial hearings or sentencing. The record shows that Mr. Clark attended
sentencing, R. Doc. 13, Ex. 5 at 3, and that Mr. Coburn indicated on a form filed
with the state court, “Findings of Fact - Acceptance of Plea,” that he talked with
his lawyer Richard Clark, R. Doc. 13, Ex. 6 at 2. Mr. Coburn presents no
evidence to the contrary.
Second, construing Mr. Coburn’s argument as a legal argument, a petitioner
must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the petitioner was
prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To
show prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, a petitioner “must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Applying these standards, the district court noted that Mr.
Coburn does not allege any prejudice from the claimed deficient performance,
only that being counseled by a legal intern was improper. The district court
concluded that this prejudice is insufficient to meet the second prong of the
Strickland test and was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
precedent by the OCCA. Coburn, 2007 WL 2111216, *4. We conclude that the
district court’s application of § 2254(d) to petitioner’s constitutional claims was
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not reasonably debatable among jurists. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
336 (2003).
We DENY the motion for a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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