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United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 24, 2003 Decided June 29, 2004
No. 02-1261
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE UTILITY
CONSUMER ADVOCATES,
PETITIONER
v.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
RESPONDENTS
BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., ET AL.,
INTERVENORS
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Federal Communications Commission
Billy J. Gregg argued the cause for petitioner. On the
brief was Michael J. Travieso.
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.
The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out
of time.
2
Laurence N. Bourne, Counsel, Federal Communications
Commission, argued the cause for respondents. With him on
the brief were R. Hewitt Pate, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, U.S. Department of Justice, Robert B. Nicholson
and Robert J. Wiggers, Attorneys, John A. Rogovin, General
Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, and John E.
Ingle, Deputy Associate General Counsel.
Michael K. Kellogg argued the cause for intervenors Bell-
South Telecommunications, Inc., et al. With him on the brief
were Aaron M. Panner, Scott H. Angstreich, Gary L. Phil-
lips, Jeffry A. Brueggeman, H. Richard Juhnke, Jay C.
Keithley, Michael E. Glover, Edward Shakin, Joseph DiBel-
la, and Robert B. McKenna.
Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and ROGERS,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.
GINSBURG, Chief Judge: The National Association of State
Utility Consumer Advocates (NASUCA) petitions for review
of an order of the Federal Communications Commission
adjusting the manner in which Local Exchange Carriers
(LECs) may recover the fixed costs they incur in providing
service to residential and single-line business customers.
NASUCA claims the approach adopted by the Commission
violates the ‘‘universal service’’ provisions of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996, results in rates that are unjust and
unreasonable, and is arbitrary and capricious, in violation of
the Administrative Procedure Act. We hold the Commission
acted reasonably and in conformity with the 1996 Act and,
accordingly, we deny NASUCA’s petition for review.
I. Background
This case challenges the Commission’s latest attempt to
phase out certain ‘‘implicit subsidies’’ resulting from the
access fee the LECs charge interexchange carriers (IXCs) in
order to recover the expenses the LECs incur to build and
operate local loops — the part of the telecommunications
network that runs from the LEC’s switch to the customer’s
3
premises (a/k/a ‘‘the last mile’’). These implicit subsidies are
the means by which the Commission assures the provision of
universal service, for without the subsidies many customers in
sparsely populated areas would be unwilling to pay the high
rates necessary to cover the LECs’ cost of serving them. As
detailed more fully below, and in accordance with the policy of
the 1996 Act, the Commission has been attempting to make
the subsidies transparent by replacing implicit subsidies with
explicit subsidies. See 47 U.S.C. § 254. The order here
under review is intended to be a step in that direction.
When AT&T was broken up in 1984, the Commission first
issued rules governing the access charges IXCs were to pay
LECs for originating and terminating long-distance calls.
See generally Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v.
FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Those charges did not,
however, cover the cost of the local loop, which the LECs
instead recovered directly from end users through a flat fee
per line called the Subscriber Line Charge (SLC); it is flat
because the LEC’s cost of providing the local loop is not
traffic-sensitive. See In the Matter of Access Charge Reform;
Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers;
Transport Rate Structure and Pricing End User Common
Line Charges (Access Charge Reform Order) ¶ 24, 12 FCC
Rcd 15,982, 15,998-99 (1997). Recovering the cost of the loop
from end users, however, raised the prospect that customers
in outlying regions, where the cost per line could be quite
high, would drop their telephone service and thus compromise
the objective of universal service. The Commission therefore
decreed that some of the cost of the local loop would be
recovered through a per-minute-use charge, known as the
Carrier Common Line (CCL) charge, that IXCs would pay
LECs for handling their traffic. Access Charge Reform
Order ¶¶ 37, 38, at 15,998-16,000.
The Commission initially capped the SLC at $3.50 per line.
Because that was significantly below the average fixed cost of
the local loop, a substantial portion of the cost had to be
recovered through the CCL charge, which worked a large,
albeit implicit, subsidy from high- to low-volume long-distance
callers.
4
The implicit subsidies inherent in the Commission’s rate
structure helped to assure access to affordable telecommuni-
cation service in rural areas, but they were incompatible with
another goal of the 1996 Act, namely, opening local telecom-
munication markets to competition. Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 ¶ 5, 11 FCC Rcd 15,499, 15,506-07 (1996). To that end
the Act required incumbent LECs to share their networks
with rival telecommunications providers. Id. ¶ 4, at 15,506.
A rival telecommunications carrier that leases elements of the
incumbent LEC’s network has a significant advantage in
competing for customers the incumbent must charge above
cost in order to subsidize others. Id. ¶ 5, at 15,506-07.
Indeed, this pattern of subsidization could not persist if
incumbent LECs were to compete against new entrants.
In 1997 the Commission took a step toward ‘‘[r]ationalizing’’
its rate structure by ‘‘eliminat[ing] significant implicit subsi-
dies in the access charge system.’’ Access Charge Reform
Order ¶ 36, at 15,998. This it did by allowing greater recov-
ery of fixed costs through flat (as opposed to traffic-sensitive)
fees. The Commission did not, however, allow further recov-
ery through the SLC, which remained capped at $3.50 per
line, because it was concerned that a higher price for the
basic dial tone could cause rural customers to discontinue
service — ‘‘contrary to [the Commission’s] mandate to ensure
universal service.’’ Id. ¶ 38, at 15,999. Rather than impose
an additional charge upon the end user, therefore, the Com-
mission settled upon a ‘‘flat, per-line charge assessed on the
IXC to whom [sic] the access line is presubscribed,’’ id.,
known as the presubscribed interexchange carrier charge
(PICC).
Not long after introducing the PICC, the Commission
realized it was not a complete solution: ‘‘Because IXCs have
recovered the residential PICCs on a per-account basis, resi-
dential customers with only one line pay the same as those
with two or more lines, and so pay more than the costs IXCs
have incurred for providing them service.’’ In the Matter of
Access Charge Reform; Price Cap Performance Review for
Local Exchange Carriers; Low-Volume Long Distance
5
Users; Federal-State Joint Board On Universal Service
(CALLS I) ¶ 19, 15 FCC Rcd 12,962, 12,970 (2000). In order
to offset that newly-introduced cross-subsidy, the Commission
scheduled incremental increases in the cap on the SLC that
LECs charge end users — from $3.50 per line to $4.35 in
2000, to $5.00 in 2001, to $6.00 in 2002, and to $6.50 in 2003.*
Id. ¶ 70, at 12,988-89. Well, not necessarily. Recovery via
the SLC was not to exceed the ‘‘average TTT common line,
marketing[,] and transport interconnection charge revenue’’
(‘‘CMT Revenue’’) in any unbundled network element (UNE)
zone. Id. In other words, the maximum allowable recovery
via the SLC, CCL charge, and PICC combined is equal to the
amount the LEC would be allowed to recover under price cap
regulation, which is based upon the LEC’s historical cost of
providing the local loop. Accordingly, if the SLC cap exceeds
that amount, the LEC may recover up to, but no more than,
its CMT Revenue via those three rate elements.
Because a LEC recovers its local loop costs in a ‘‘cascading
fashion’’ — first through the SLC, then the PICC, and finally
the CCL charge — an increase in the SLC cap reduces by
the same amount what the LEC may recover through the
CCL charge and the PICC — the Commission’s goal being to
minimize and then to eliminate those charges. See In the
Matter of Cost Review Proceeding for Residential and Sin-
gle-Line Business Subscriber Line Charge (SLC) Caps; Ac-
cess Charge Reform; Price Cap Performance Review for
Local Exchange Carriers (CALLS II) ¶ 15, 17 FCC Rcd
10,868, at 10,875-76. When they are eliminated, the LEC is
permitted to ‘‘deaverage’’ the SLC in up to four UNE zones,
CALLS I ¶ 73, at 12,989-90, that is, to calculate the average
cost for each zone rather than for all zones combined. Calcu-
lating average costs in this manner ‘‘enhances the efficiency
of the local telephone market by allowing prices to be tailored
more easily and more accurately to reflect cost.’’ Id. ¶ 113, at
13,007.
* ‘‘O what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to TTT’’
relieve. With apology to Sir Walter Scott, Marmion, Canto vi,
Stanza 17 (1808).
6
In CALLS I the Commission also established the Universal
Service Fund, an ‘‘explicit interstate universal service support
mechanism,’’ in order to help offset the reduction in the
implicit subsidies; it is to be funded with $650 million raised
through a new element in the rate that LECs charge sub-
scribers. Id. ¶¶ 195, 218, at 13,043, 13,057; see also 47 U.S.C.
§§ 214(e), 254. The Fund was set up as ‘‘a five-year transi-
tional plan designed to provide explicit subsidies to poor and
rural end-users.’’ Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel (TOPUC)
v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313, 327 (5th Cir. 2001).
Finally, in CALLS I the Commission undertook to ‘‘review
any increases to residential and single-line business SLC caps
above $5.00 to verify that any such increases are appropriate
and reflect higher costs where they are to be applied.’’ ¶ 83,
at 12,994. In doing that review, the Commission said it would
examine ‘‘forward-looking cost information’’ to be provided by
the LECs. Id.
The Commission completed its review in September 2001
and issued its findings in June 2002. See CALLS II. This is
what the Commission found:
[E]ven the most conservative estimate of forward-looking
costs [i.e., NASUCA’s] shows that a substantial number
of lines exceed both the current $5.00 SLC cap, and the
ultimate $6.50 SLC cap. Thus, we determine that rais-
ing the SLC cap to the levels set forth in [CALLS I] is
justified by the record in this proceeding. We also find
that those increases to the SLC cap are necessary to
achieve our access charge reform goals, as stated in
[CALLS I], of removing implicit subsidies by moving to a
more cost-causative rate structure and enabling greater
opportunities for SLC deaveraging.
Id. ¶ 5, at 10,871. The Commission also pointed out that it
had previously found a SLC cap of $6.50 is ‘‘affordable’’ for
residential and single-line business customers, which finding
was upheld in TOPUC, 265 F.3d at 323. Hence, the Commis-
sion concluded, ‘‘to achieve the benefits of removing implicit
subsidies and allowing SLC deaveraging, while maintaining
affordable residential and single-line business rates for con-
7
sumers,’’ it would allow the SLC cap to increase as scheduled
in CALLS I. CALLS II ¶ 5, at 10,871-72.
NASUCA petitions this court for review of the Commis-
sion’s decision in CALLS II.
II. Analysis
NASUCA argues the Commission’s decision in CALLS II
violates several provisions of the 1996 Act and is ‘‘arbitrary
and capricious,’’ in violation of the APA. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A).
A. 1996 Act Claims
NASUCA first argues the Commission failed to ‘‘give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,’’ Chev-
ron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984), to remove implicit subsidies and to replace
them with explicit subsidies, as expressed in §§ 254(b)(5) and
254(e) of the 1996 Act. NASUCA supports the factual predi-
cate of this claim by pointing to its own cost study, which
showed nearly 75% of residential and single-line business
customers have forward-looking costs less than $5.00 and 86%
of those lines have forward-looking costs less than $6.50.
NASUCA views any SLC charge exceeding forward-looking
costs as an ‘‘implicit subsid[y] running from customers with
lower cost lines to customers with higher cost lines.’’
The Commission responds that an implicit subsidy from
lower cost to higher cost lines was not immediately ruled out
by the 1996 Act and under CALLS I is only to be phased out
over time; in fact, some subsidization is ‘‘inevitable’’ as long
as there is any rate averaging. According to the Commission,
the issue in this case, properly understood, is whether its
approach is ‘‘an improvement over the pre-existing situation
and will provide a transition to less subsidization.’’ We agree.
Although the Act charges the Commission with devising
‘‘specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and State mecha-
nisms to preserve and advance universal service,’’ 47 U.S.C.
§ 254(b)(5), it does not decree an immediate revolution; as
we have said before, ‘‘there is no time limit on realization of
8
the reform,’’ Competitive Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 309 F.3d
8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis in the original). The Com-
mission in CALLS I put in place a reasonable timetable, id.,
recognizing that only by proceeding in steps may all implicit
subsidies be eliminated without compromising universal ser-
vice.
In CALLS II the Commission explained that an increase in
the SLC cap would help LECs eliminate the PICC, ¶¶ 40-42,
at 10,886-87, which the Commission had previously found to
be an inefficient method of recovering the LECs’ fixed costs:
By eliminating the residential and single-line business
PICCs, the CALLS Proposal establishes a straightfor-
ward, economically rational pricing structure which en-
ables consumers to make a choice among competing
providers through head-to-head comparisons and better
promotes competition by sending potential entrants eco-
nomically correct entry incentives.
CALLS I ¶ 78, at 12,991. Again, an increase in the SLC cap
does not increase the LEC’s revenue; rather, it merely shifts
the source of the LEC’s CMT Revenue away from the CCL
charge and the PICC. CALLS II ¶¶ 5, 15, at 10,871-72,
10,875-76. Moreover, eliminating those charges is a precondi-
tion to the LEC being able to deaverage rates across UNE
zones. Deaveraging was made an important objective in
CALLS I, ¶¶ 113-28, at 13,007-14, and the method the Com-
mission chose to accomplish that objective — namely, raising
the SLC cap based upon the cost studies conducted for
CALLS II, after having determined that doing so would not
jeopardize universal service, see id. ¶ 85, at 12,995; TOPUC,
265 F.3d at 323 — was eminently reasonable.
NASUCA next argues the increase in the SLC cap allows
LECs to charge SLC rates that are not ‘‘just and reason-
able,’’ in violation of 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b) and 254(b)(1). It
acknowledges that CALLS II does not alter the Commission’s
price-cap regime for setting rates, which has been in place
since 1991 and has been upheld by this court. See Nat’l
Rural Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 10 F.3d 892 (D.C. Cir.
9
1993). Rather, it claims the increases in the SLC cap under
CALLS II violate the ‘‘regulatory framework’’ of CALLS I,
under which, according to NASUCA, the Commission must
set rates based upon forward-looking costs. The Commission
responds by pointing out that in CALLS II it changed only
the SLC cap; it did nothing to change the method it uses to
set the underlying SLC rates. See CALLS II ¶ 26, at 10,879.
The Commission is clearly correct. Nothing in CALLS I
committed the Commission to the sea change in rate-setting
urged by NASUCA, that is, immediately basing all LECs’
rates solely upon forward-looking costs. On the contrary, the
Commission stated in CALLS I that it was ‘‘extending for five
years’’ its existing approach, which would over time bring
rates ‘‘toward forward-looking economic cost.’’ ¶ 60, at 12,-
984-85. As the Commission reasonably observed in the order
under review, the CALLS proceedings were ‘‘not designed to
change the existing method of setting SLC rates, which relies
on the application of the price cap formula to CMT revenues.’’
CALLS II ¶ 26, at 10,879 (emphasis in original). That ap-
proach, as mentioned above, is based upon historical, not
forward-looking, cost.
Finally, both in arguing the Commission violated the 1996
Act and in arguing its decision is arbitrary and capricious (see
Part II.B, below), NASUCA claims no further increase in the
SLC cap was necessary due to the ‘‘explicit’’ support provided
by the $650 million Universal Service Fund. That Fund,
however, is only one part of the Commission’s overall ap-
proach to eliminating implicit subsidies. Neither in CALLS I
nor in CALLS II did the Commission indicate the Universal
Service Fund alone would be sufficient to achieve the Com-
mission’s ultimate goal of eliminating all implicit subsidies.
Accordingly, NASUCA’s invocation of the Fund does nothing
to call into question the reasonableness of the Commission’s
decision.
B. APA Claims
NASUCA argues the Commission’s decision in CALLS II is
‘‘arbitrary and capricious’’ because it: (1) ‘‘runs counter to the
evidence’’ in the record; (2) ‘‘failed to articulate any explana-
10
tion’’ for its conclusion; (3) departed from precedent upon the
basis of irrelevant factors; and (4) failed to explain why it
departed from prior FCC policy. For the most part, NASU-
CA here simply repackages its claims under the 1996 Act as
claims the Commission’s decision violates the Administrative
Procedure Act. We find the Commission’s decision no less
reasonable when viewed through the lens of the APA. As we
have seen, the agency adequately explained its reason for
increasing the SLC cap above $5.00, namely, to help eliminate
the CCL charge and the PICC and thereby facilitate deaver-
aging and more efficient pricing. Id. ¶¶ 27, 40-42, at 10,879-
80, 10,886-87. All that remains is NASUCA’s objection to the
factual basis for the Commission’s decision.
In claiming the Commission’s decision is not supported by
evidence in the record, NASUCA belittles the Commission’s
finding that 33 million residential and small business lines,
30% of all such lines, have forward-looking costs in excess of
$5.00. Pointing out that 78 million such lines (or 70%) must
have costs at or below $5.00, NASUCA claims the Commis-
sion had no valid reason for raising the SLC cap.
The Commission explained, however, that increases in the
SLC cap are appropriate if a ‘‘substantial number of lines
[have] forward looking costs that exceed the current $5.00
SLC cap and the ultimate $6.50 SLC cap.’’ Id. ¶ 27, at
10,879. The ‘‘most conservative estimate’’ in the record,
which was based upon NASUCA’s own study, was that 33
million residential and small business lines had costs above
$5.00, and 20 million of those lines had costs above $6.50, id.
at 10,880; see also id., Attachment A, numbers the Commis-
sion deemed ‘‘substantial.’’
NASUCA maintains the Commission’s determination that
33 million lines is a ‘‘substantial’’ number is not entitled to
deference from the court; this line-drawing exercise, it says,
is ‘‘quite straightforward,’’ calling upon the agency for neither
expertise nor discretion. That is just not correct.
In deciding to raise the SLC cap, the Commission first had
to determine how much confidence to place in the various
studies of forward-looking costs. Id. ¶¶ 30-38, at 10,881-85.
11
It then had to strike a balance between the ‘‘removal of
implicit subsidies and ensuring affordability’’ and hence uni-
versal service. Id. ¶ 27, at 10,879–80. In so doing, the
Commission deemed the number of lines with costs above the
SLC caps ‘‘substantial’’ because they were numerous enough
that increasing the caps as scheduled would significantly
reduce the inefficient, implicit subsidies and in some areas
facilitate deaveraging by eliminating the subsidies altogether.
The Commission is necessarily entitled to substantial defer-
ence when it must draw numerical lines in order to balance
two congressional policies that cannot both be fully achieved.
See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 162
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (setting minimum number of station owners
in market to strike balance between ‘‘efficiencies of television
duopolies’’ and ‘‘robust level of diversity’’ is ‘‘quintessentially
[a] matter[ ] of line drawing invoking the Commission’s exper-
tise’’); see also Cassell v. FCC, 154 F.3d 478, 485 (D.C. Cir.
1998), quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 60
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (court generally ‘‘unwilling to review line-
drawing performed by the Commission unless a petitioner can
demonstrate that lines drawn TTT are patently unreasonable,
having no relationship to the underlying regulatory prob-
lem’’).
In sum, NASUCA’s claim that the Commission’s decision to
raise the SLC cap was arbitrary and capricious simply ig-
nores the Commission’s reasoning in CALLS II and the facts
upon which that decision is based. The Commission’s deci-
sion striking a balance between competing congressional di-
rectives — reducing implicit subsidies and maintaining uni-
versal service — was reasonable and was supported by
substantial evidence in the record.*
* NASUCA also claims the Commission violated 47 U.S.C.
§ 254(k) by permitting recovery of traffic-sensitive loop costs
through the SLC, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by declin-
ing to evaluate the SLC caps upon the basis of the alternate ‘‘run’’
of NASUCA’s study, which purported to exclude traffic-sensitive
costs. We have considered and rejected these claims, which do not
warrant treatment in a published opinion.
12
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, NASUCA’s petition for review
is
Denied.