September 3, 1996
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-2366
CHUKWU E. AZUBUKO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
THE REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
Chukwu E. Azubuko on brief pro se.
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and Beverly R. Roby,
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellee.
Per Curiam. Appellant Chukwu Azubuko appeals from
the dismissal of his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1915(d). We agree with the district court, for the reason it
gave, that appellant cannot premise a right of action on the
criminal statutes he cited. We affirm the dismissal of the
complaint as to the rest of appellant's claims, however, on
reasons different than those relied upon by the district
court.
Appellant asserts that his driver's license was
suspended by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles without due
process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the Supreme Court addressed the
question in what circumstances a hearing is required prior to
the suspension of a driver's license. Georgia law provided
for the suspension of an uninsured motorist's driver's
license when that driver was involved in an automobile
accident and could not post security to cover the amount of
damages claimed by others in the accident report. Although a
hearing was conducted prior to the suspension, the uninsured
motorist could not raise the issue of fault. Thus, such a
motorist was required to post security or lose his or her
license even though he or she might not have been responsible
for the accident.
The Court held that once a state granted a driver's
license, it could not take it away without due process of
law. Id. at 539. It then held that since fault was an
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important factor in the decision to suspend a license, due
process required a predeprivation hearing which considered
whether there was a reasonable probability of judgments
against the driver in the amounts claimed. Id. at 540-41.
In the case before us, appellant's license was
suspended after a trial in which appellant was found liable
for the damages resulting from the automobile accident in
which he was involved. Thus, unlike Bell -- where there was
no predeprivation hearing regarding liability -- appellant
received a full, judicial adjudication regarding fault before
his license was suspended for failing to pay the judgment
rendered at the trial. Moreover, M.G.L.c. 90, 22A provides
for another, administrative hearing prior to the actual
suspension. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
found constitutional a statutory scheme similar 22A even
though it did not provide for an administrative
predeprivation hearing. See Tomai-Minogue v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1228, 1230 (4th Cir. 1985). Thus,
22A itself appears to provide all that due process requires.
Appellant also claims that the suspension of his
license impaired his fundamental right to travel and violated
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We
reject both challenges. See Ross v. Gunaris, 395 F.Supp.
623, 627-28 (D.Mass. 1975) ( 22A does not impede the right
to travel because it limits only one method of
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transportation, nor does it deny equal protection of the law
to those unable to satisfy a property damage judgment).
For these reasons, appellant's claims, as set forth
in both his complaint and amended complaint, are based on
"indisputably meritless theor[ies]." See Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). As a result, the
district court appropriately dismissed the action.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. In
so ruling, we decide only the appeal from district court case
No. 95-CV-10763. No notice of appeal was ever docketed in
No. 95-CV-11661 and, thus, the later case is not before us.
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