FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 20 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WENDY TRAVER, No. 08-15707
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:05-CV-00319-CKJ
v.
MEMORANDUM *
TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 5, 2010 **
Before: RYMER, McKEOWN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Wendy Traver appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
favor of the Tucson Unified School District in her employment action alleging
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
retaliation in violation of Title VII, the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), and the First
Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2003), and we
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Title VII and
EPA claims because Traver’s request for additional pay was not a protected
activity under either statute. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, -3 (prohibiting retaliation
for opposing employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin); 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d), 215(a)(3) (prohibiting retaliation for
complaints regarding unlawful pay practices such as paying different wages to
employees on the basis of sex); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1007 (9th Cir.
1999) (en banc) (“[N]ot all amorphous expressions of discontent related to wages
and hours constitute complaints filed within the meaning of § 215(a)(3).”).
Similarly, the district court properly granted summary judgment on the First
Amendment claim because Traver’s request for additional pay was not
constitutionally protected as it did not touch on a matter of public concern. See
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (“When employee expression cannot
be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to
the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their
2 08-15707
offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment.”).
The district court also properly granted summary judgment on these claims
because Traver failed to raise a triable issue as to whether her termination was
causally connected to filing her prior lawsuit. See Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686
F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that the decision maker’s unawareness of the
protected activity “breaks the requisite causal link”).
Traver’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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