In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-2698
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
E DWARD V. H ORN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:09-cr-00822-1—Milton I. Shadur, Judge.
A RGUED JANUARY 25, 2011—D ECIDED M ARCH 14, 2011
Before K ANNE, E VANS, and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
E VANS, Circuit Judge. Edward Horn pleaded guilty to
one count of mail fraud. Before being sentenced, how-
ever, Horn violated the conditions of his pretrial re-
lease. Based on the violations and some disturbing addi-
tional conduct, the district court declined to grant
Horn’s request for an acceptance of responsibility ad-
justment to his guideline range. He was sentenced to
a term of 51 months. On this appeal, Horn argues that
the district court erred when it denied his request.
2 No. 10-2698
Horn pleaded guilty to a one-count indictment
charging mail fraud. The basis for the charge was a
scheme that took more than a little bit of chutzpah to try
and pull off: Horn was the beneficiary under his wife’s
$500,000 life insurance policy with the Lincoln National
Life Insurance Company, and he submitted a claim to the
money (using the mail) based upon her death. There
was one problem—she was alive and well. Lincoln Na-
tional smelled a rat, and it was ultimately discovered
that Horn used a certified copy of his mother-in-law’s
death certificate (she died in Michigan in 2007) to fake
a claim that his wife 1 had gone to the great beyond. As
it turned out, this was not Horn’s first brush with the
law; he previously was convicted of mail fraud in
another scam on an insurance company, and he was
under investigation for submitting fraudulent claims
to three other insurance companies.
After pleading guilty to the charge, but before being
sentenced, Horn struck up an Internet relationship with
a woman in St. Louis. And he continued to work the
grift. In a rather brazen display of moxie, Horn repre-
sented himself as a millionaire who would care for her
by, among other things, purchasing a house in St. Louis
for her to live in. In violation of his pretrial release,
Horn traveled to St. Louis, where he met with the woman.
1
According to the presentence report, Horn’s wife, Priscilla,
was not involved in the scam. She testified before the grand
jury and said she “had no knowledge of the false claim on
her life insurance policy until after it was submitted.”
No. 10-2698 3
While there, Horn entered into a fraudulent residential
sales contract for a $2.6 million home; during sub-
sequent e-mail communications with the realtor, Horn
assumed the identity of an attorney who had represented
him 10 years earlier.
After the details of his scam came to the attention of
law enforcement, the district court revoked Horn’s
pretrial release. At the revocation hearing, Horn did not
deny the government’s allegations or evidence, and the
district court warned defense counsel that Horn’s viola-
tions of his pretrial release could affect any reduction
under the guidelines for acceptance of responsibility.
Thereafter, the probation officer supplemented the
presentence report to incorporate Horn’s violation of
his pretrial release and, in doing so, withdrew the three-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility that
had been previously proposed.
At sentencing Horn objected to the withdrawal of the
proposed reduction on the basis that he had promptly
pleaded guilty, complied with other conditions of his
release, and did not engage in conduct resulting in a
criminal prosecution. On balance, Horn asserted, the
violations of his pretrial release did not outweigh his
positive behavior that warranted the reduction.
The district court rejected this contention, concluding
that Horn’s pattern of behavior was “not acceptable in
terms of acceptance of responsibility.” The court explained
that any characterization of Horn’s conduct as merely
improper was a “euphemism,” because the conduct
qualified as “incipient criminal charges” and reflected
4 No. 10-2698
Horn’s failure to terminate his criminal conduct. The
district court accepted the guideline calculations pro-
posed in the supplemental presentence report (a range
of 46 to 57 months, up from 30 to 37 months) and sen-
tenced Horn to 51 months.
On appeal Horn argues that the district court erred by
denying him a three-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility because his entry into a prompt guilty
plea outweighed the violations of his pretrial release
(he says his actions may have been “shameful and regret-
table” but they were not “criminal”). The district court,
however, properly determined that his prompt guilty
plea did not entitle him to a reduction for acceptance
of responsibility. A timely guilty plea is a giant step
toward getting the benefit of the reduction, but it can be
outweighed by conduct inconsistent with acceptance of
responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.3; United States v.
Sellers, 595 F.3d 791, 793 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v.
McDonald, 22 F.3d 139, 144 (7th Cir. 1994). Horn’s
conduct here clearly forfeited his right to the benefit, as
his actions were much more than merely “shameful.” See
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(b) (stating that a determination
regarding acceptance of responsibility may consider a
defendant’s “voluntary termination or withdrawal from
criminal conduct or associations”); Sellers, 595 F.3d at
793; McDonald, 22 F.3d at 144.
Horn disputes the district court’s conclusion that
travel to St. Louis and negotiation of the real estate
contract constitutes the continuation of “criminal conduct
or association.” See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(b). Horn
No. 10-2698 5
suggests, without citation to any authority, that his con-
duct was not “inherently” criminal. This suggestion is
frivolous. As the district court correctly concluded,
Horn’s violation of his bond was a continuation of his
criminal conduct and association for purposes of accep-
tance of responsibility. See United States v. McLaughlin,
378 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Kirkland,
28 F.3d 49, 51 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hooten,
942 F.2d 878, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1991).
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court
is A FFIRMED.
3-14-11