United States v. Tyson

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________

No. 09-3487 & 09-3699
_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant in 09-3699

v.

SHAWN TYSON,
Appellant in 09-3487
_____________

On Appeal from the District Court
of the United States Virgin Islands
District Court No. 3-08-cr-00049-001
District Judge: The Honorable Curtis V. Gómez

Argued December 14, 2010

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES and SMITH,
Circuit Judges

(Filed: August 3, 2011 )
Kim L. Chisholm, Esq.
Ishmael A. Meyers, Jr., Esq.
St. Clair Theodore, Esq.
Office of United States Attorney
5500 Veterans Building, Suite 260
United States Courthouse
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, VI 00802

John M. Pellettieri, Esq. (argued)
United States Department of Justice
Appellate Section
Room 1264
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
Counsel for Appellee

Leonard B. Francis, Jr., Esq. (argued)
4A Dronningens
P.O. Box 8838
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, VI 000801
Counsel for Appellant

_____________________

OPINION
_____________________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

A jury in the District of the Virgin Islands convicted
defendant Shawn Tyson of numerous federal firearms
offenses, including twelve counts of transporting a firearm in

2
the course of dealing firearms without a license, one count of
transporting a firearm with knowledge or reasonable cause to
believe that it would be used to commit a crime, one count of
transferring a firearm to an out-of-state resident, and one
count of conspiring to unlawfully transport firearms. The
jury also found Tyson guilty of ten counts of unauthorized
possession of a firearm under Virgin Islands law. Following
pronouncement of the verdict, the District Court granted
Tyson a judgment of acquittal on each of the federal counts.
Such relief was denied with respect to the convictions
charging violations of the Virgin Islands Code.

We are presented with cross appeals from the final
judgment entered by the District Court. Tyson challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence introduced in support of the
counts arising under local law, while the government
contends that we should reinstate the jury‘s verdict on the
federal firearms counts. For the reasons set forth below, we
conclude that Tyson‘s appeal is without merit. We also
conclude that the District Court was correct to enter judgment
of acquittal on the conspiracy count sounding in federal law.
With respect to the remaining federal counts, however, we
agree with the government‘s contention that the District Court
erred by granting Tyson Rule 29 relief. Accordingly, we will
reverse the judgment in part and remand the matter with
instructions to reinstate the jury verdict on each of the federal
counts save that charging Tyson with conspiracy to transport
firearms in violation of federal law.

I

It is not difficult to acquire a firearm legally in the
state of Tennessee. A firearms license is not required to buy
most guns. Rather, an interested purchaser need only pass an

3
instant background check,1 required by state law, and
complete a Form 4473, required by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).2 Virgin Islands
law is more stringent. An interested buyer must obtain a
firearms license from the Virgin Islands Police
Commissioner. 23 V.I.C. § 455. Only a Virgin Islands
resident may obtain such a license, 23 V.I.C. § 456(a)(2), and
the Commissioner is empowered to deny a license request for,
inter alia, prior felony conviction, mental incompetence,
habitual drunkenness, or for being an ―improper person‖
(whatever that means), 23 V.I.C. § 458(a). Each firearm
purchased in or imported into the Virgin Islands must be
registered with the police. 23 V.I.C. § 470.

Tyson apparently looked at the Islands‘ regulated gun
market and saw an arbitrage opportunity. To capitalize on
this, he began purchasing a significant quantity of firearms in
his home state of Tennessee, where procurement was easy,
and then transporting those weapons to the Virgin Islands for
resale. The scheme began in earnest in late 2007. On
December 1, Tyson bought two semiautomatic rifles from a
pawn shop near his home in Bristol, Tennessee. He
purchased a semiautomatic pistol from a gun store in
neighboring Jonesboro the following day.3 On December 11,

1
The instant background check ensures the potential purchaser is
not a convicted felon and is not the subject of an active restraining
order.
2
Form 4473 records a purchaser‘s identification information and
the firearm‘s make, model, and serial number. The purchaser must
also sign a short affidavit stating that he or she is eligible under
federal law to purchase firearms.
3
Tyson acquired these weapons legally; prior to each transaction,
he passed the instant background check required by the state of

4
2007, Tyson flew from Tennessee to St. Thomas—his first of
four trips over the course of the next seven months. He
returned to Tennessee on January 10, 2008. Within three
weeks, Tyson had purchased eight more semiautomatic
weapons. Two of these were rifles; six were handguns.

Tyson made a second trip to the Virgin Islands on
February 6. Delta Airlines ticketing agent Dudley Breeding
assisted Tyson with his luggage and recalled that Tyson
checked a large, black rectangular suitcase that contained
firearms.4 Tyson told Breeding he was an antique gun
collector and intended to sell the weapons when he reached
St. Thomas. However, Tyson was not licensed to sell or
possess firearms in the Virgin Islands.5 Nor was he licensed
under federal law to sell or transport firearms for sale in
interstate commerce.6 Tyson also failed to register the
weapons with the Virgin Islands police when he arrived in St.
Thomas.

Tennessee and completed Form 4473. Indeed, Tyson complied
with these requirements each time he purchased a firearm in
Tennessee.
4
Federal regulations allow airline passengers to transport firearms
provided they are checked for in-flight storage and packed in a
locked, hard-side container. 49 C.F.R. § 1544.203(f). In addition,
a passenger must complete a declaration form at the ticketing
counter stating that each firearm contained in his or her baggage is
unloaded. See id. § 1544.203(f)(2)(i). Tyson complied with these
requirements each time he flew to the Virgin Islands.
5
With certain exceptions not applicable here, see 23 V.I.C. § 453,
Virgin Islands law makes it unlawful to possess a firearm without a
license, 23 V.I.C. § 454; 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a).
6
Federal law states that only a licensed importer, manufacturer, or
dealer may import, manufacture, or deal firearms in interstate
commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922.

5
 Tyson returned from the Virgin Islands on February
13, accompanied by an individual named Kelroy Morrell.
The following day, Tyson purchased seven semiautomatic
firearms from local merchants in and around Bristol,
Tennessee. Later that evening, local law enforcement
received reports that someone was firing a gun from the front
porch of Tyson‘s residence. When Bristol police officers
arrived, they confronted the owner of the home, Sherry
Wagner. She feigned ignorance but allowed the officers to
enter the home so they could speak with Tyson.

Officers encountered Tyson and Morrell when they
entered the residence. A 9mm pistol sat in plain view atop a
nearby coffee table. Wagner and Tyson stated that they were
unsure if there were more guns in the house. Officers found
several when they entered Tyson‘s bedroom: two rifles were
propped against the wall; several smaller firearms were
hidden underneath Tyson‘s mattress; empty boxes, which
once packaged firearms, littered the bedroom floor. A
consensual search of the premises also produced receipts for
multiple firearms purchases, ammunition, magazines for
ammunition, and business cards belonging to sundry local
gun merchants. Ultimately, however, this incident led to no
arrests, for the guns had been purchased legally and none of
the items discovered in Tyson‘s home are considered
contraband under state or federal law.

Tyson continued to acquire guns. He bought one
semiautomatic rifle and two semiautomatic pistols from
Tull‘s Store in Selmer, Tennessee on February 16. He
purchased an additional semiautomatic pistol from the same
dealer the next day. On February 18, Tyson bought two more
pistols from a merchant in Kingsport. He acquired another
semiautomatic handgun on February 19. In sum, Tyson

6
purchased fourteen semiautomatic firearms between February
13, when he returned from the Virgin Islands with Morrell,
and February 19.

On February 20, Tyson and Morrell arrived at the Tri-
Cities Regional Airport. Each was toting a hard plastic
suitcase full of guns. Their destination was St. Thomas.
Delta ticketing agent Breeding assisted both men with their
luggage. During the course of casual conversation, Tyson
again told Breeding that he had a buyer for the weapons in the
Virgin Islands. None of the weapons were registered with the
Virgin Islands police when Tyson arrived at his destination.

On February 23, Tyson returned to Bristol without
Morrell. He entered active duty service with the Tennessee
Army National Guard three days later. There Tyson would
remain until July 3, 2008, when he graduated as a private
second class and was discharged home.

Tyson was but a few days removed from National
Guard training before he was again buying firearms in
sizeable quantities. He bought one pistol on July 12, five
more on July 24, and two on July 28. On July 31, he set off
on his fourth trip to the Virgin Islands. This time, federal law
enforcement officers were waiting for him. Customs and
Border Patrol notified ATF agent Jamie Jenkins that Tyson
had checked in for a flight and was carrying eleven firearms
in a hard plastic suitcase. He also had a significant quantity
of ammunition in a separate black duffel bag. Agent Jenkins
then contacted Penny Stricklin, an ATF agent stationed in the
Virgin Islands. He told Stricklin that Tyson was destined for
St. Thomas, firearms in tow. Apparently, Tyson‘s island
visits had not gone unnoticed.

7
 Stricklin determined that Tyson had neither a license
to possess or distribute firearms in the Virgin Islands nor a
federal license to import or deal firearms in the territories of
the United States. She therefore obtained a warrant to search
Tyson‘s luggage. She also arranged for federal and local law
enforcement to intercept Tyson when he exited the airport.

Morrell and a second individual, Curtiss Thomas, were
waiting outside the airport in Morrell‘s parked car when
Tyson landed. Morrell stayed in the vehicle for several
minutes before exiting the car and entering the airport.
Deputy United States Marshal Brian Biermann, who was
watching from a nearby vantage point, recalled that Tyson
eventually exited the airport and, along with Morrell, ―they
had a red cap help[] with some baggage into the trunk of the
vehicle.‖ Tyson then closed the trunk and entered the
vehicle‘s back seat.

Once Tyson was inside the car, Morrell began to drive
toward the airport exit. He did not get far before Virgin
Islands police and federal agents stopped the vehicle.
Stricklin opened Morrell‘s trunk and seized the hard plastic
suitcase and black duffel bag that Tyson had checked in
Tennessee. This baggage contained a total of eleven firearms,
500 rounds of ammunition, and several ammunition
magazines. Tyson, Morrell, and Thomas were arrested and
Virgin Islands police impounded Morrell‘s car. Morrell later
consented to a vehicle search, whereupon agents discovered
an additional handgun hidden beneath the passenger seat.7

7
The handgun belonged to Thomas. He was tried separately on
charges of unlawfully transporting a firearm in interstate
commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n), and unauthorized

8
Meanwhile, Tyson told Stricklin that he was visiting St.
Thomas in order to see his mother. When Stricklin asked him
about the guns, Tyson stated that he intended to register them
with the local police. Stricklin told Tyson she thought he was
lying. At this point, Tyson decided to say no more.

II

On October 2, 2008, a grand jury indicted Tyson and
Morrell on one count of conspiracy to unlawfully transport
firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One); twelve
counts of transporting a firearm in the course of dealing
firearms without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(a)(1)(A) (Counts Two through Thirteen); eleven counts
of unauthorized possession of a firearm, in violation of 14
V.I.C. § 2253(a) (Counts Fourteen through Twenty-Four);
one count of transporting a firearm with knowledge or
reasonable cause to believe it would be used to commit a
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) (Count Twenty-
Five); and one count of transferring a firearm to an out-of-
state resident, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5) (Count
Twenty-Six). Tyson and Morrell were tried jointly on all
charges.8 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18

possession of a firearm under 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a). Thomas was
acquitted by a jury of both charges.
8
Tyson filed a pretrial motion to suppress ―all evidence gathered
in this case, starting from the initial contact on February 14, 2008,
in Tennessee.‖ The District Court denied the motion after an
evidentiary hearing. In his opening brief, Tyson identifies the
Court‘s suppression order as one of three issues he is contesting on
appeal. Tyson does not, however, single out any error in the
District Court‘s ruling, nor does he substantively address the
search(es) whose constitutionality he now assails. Tyson has
therefore waived the issue for purposes of appeal. See Kach v.

9
U.S.C. § 3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612.

During its case-in-chief, the government presented
evidence that Tyson purchased a total of thirty-five firearms
between December 1, 2007 and July 28, 2008. Only twelve
of those weapons were recovered. Eleven were seized during
the July 31 traffic stop in St. Thomas. The twelfth was
recovered on June 30, 2008 when Virgin Islands police
apprehended an individual named Jelani LaTorre. LaTorre
was carrying narcotics and a Hi-Point 9mm handgun whose
serial number had been obliterated. Forensics experts traced
the firearm and determined that Tyson had purchased the
weapon in Tennessee for $139 on February 16, 2008, four
days before making his third trip to St. Thomas. Two weeks
prior to this acquisition, LaTorre wired Tyson $330 from St.
Thomas.

The evidence of firearm trafficking did not end there.
Bristol police searched Tyson‘s residence one week after his
arrest. Among other items, they recovered a document that
appeared to depict a kind of code. At the top of the
document, the following notations were written:
―CARSHOW = GUNSHOW‖; ―RIMS = GUNS‖; ―TIRES =
AMMO.‖ Eleven ―RIMS‖ were then listed on the page.
Beside each ―RIM,‖ a number was written. According to
ATF agent Jenkins, these numbers corresponded to the caliber
of a firearm model or a type of ammunition. Thus, for
example, beside ―RIM #1909‖ the notation ―9MM‖ was
written. The number ―.40‖ appeared adjacent to ―RIM

Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 642 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that ―a passing
reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before th[e]
court‖ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United
States v. Demichael, 461 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2006).

10
#1540.‖ Other entries were even less veiled. ―12ga –
SHOTGUN‖ was written next to ―RIM #1112.‖ Another
entry read, ―RIM #1762 = 7.62X39 – AK47/SKS.‖

Officers also recovered a notepad containing a
handwritten list of firearms. A number was written next to
each firearm. To illustrate: the number ―664.41‖ was written
beside ―Glock 40.‖ Agent Jenkins testified that these
numbers appeared to represent each firearm‘s cash value. On
another page of the notepad, someone had written the letters
―AK‖ and ―AR.‖9 Next to each notation were two columns
labeled ―Spent‖ and ―Profit.‖ With respect to AK: the
number ―500‖ was written below ―Spent,‖ while ―2000‖ was
written below ―Profit.‖ With respect to AR: the number
―600‖ appeared under ―Spent‖ and ―1900‖ under ―Profit.‖

At the close of the government‘s evidence, Tyson filed
a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 29(a). The District Court reserved
ruling on the motion and proceeded with trial.10 Tyson
presented no evidence in his defense; Morrell testified on his
own behalf. The jury acquitted Morrell on all charges.
Tyson, however, was convicted on all counts except one

9
Agent Jenkins explained that the AK-47 and the AR-15 assault
rifle are well-known firearms whose names begin with the letters
appearing on the notepad.
10
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(b), the district
court ―may reserve decision on the motion, proceed with trial
(where the motion is made before the close of all the evidence),
submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion either before the
jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is
discharged without having returned a verdict.‖ Fed. R. Crim. P.
29(b).

11
count of unauthorized possession of a firearm under local
law.11

Tyson renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal
after the jury returned its verdict. In a written order dated
August 12, 2009, the District Court granted Tyson‘s motion
as it pertained to each of the federal firearms counts (Counts
One through Thirteen and Twenty-Five through Twenty-Six).
The Court denied the motion with respect to the counts
charging unauthorized possession of a firearm under Virgin
Islands law (Counts Fourteen through Twenty-Three).

The parties filed timely cross appeals. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III

On a motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29(a), the court ―must enter a judgment of acquittal
of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain
a conviction.‖ Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). The evidence is
insufficient to sustain a conviction if a rational trier of fact
could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir.
2005). We review the district court‘s disposition of a Rule 29
motion de novo, applying the same standard the district court
was required to apply. United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d
78, 83 (3d Cir. 2011). We will ―sustain the verdict if there is
11
Tyson was acquitted of Count Twenty-Four of the indictment.
According to special agent Jay Quabius of the ATF, the firearm
named in this count, which was one of the eleven seized on July
31, 2008, was inoperable. A conviction for unauthorized
possession of a firearm under 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) requires that the
firearm at issue be operable. See 14 V.I.C. § 451(d).

12
substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
government, to uphold the jury‘s decision.‖ United States v.
Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 169–70 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Under this deferential standard of review, an appellate court
―‗must be ever vigilant . . . not to usurp the role of the jury by
weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence, or
by substituting [the court‘s] judgment for that of the jury.‘‖
United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Brodie, 403 F.3d at 133). A finding of insufficiency
should be reserved for those situations in which ―the
prosecution‘s failure is clear.‖ United States v. Mercado, 610
F.3d 841, 845 (3d Cir. 2010).

Tyson moved for Rule 29 relief at the conclusion of
the government‘s case-in-chief. The District Court reserved
decision on the motion and Tyson presented no evidence in
his defense. Under Rule 29(b), ―[i]f the court reserves
decision, it must decide the motion on the basis of the
evidence at the time the ruling was reserved.‖ Fed. R. Crim.
P. 29(b). Accordingly, our review of the evidence is limited
to that which was presented during the government‘s case-in-
chief, ―including evidence elicited on cross-examination of
the government witnesses.‖ Brodie, 403 F.3d at 134; see also
United States v. Moore, 504 F.3d 1345, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007)
(explaining that Rule 29 entitles the defendant ―to a snapshot
of the evidence at the point that the court reserves its ruling‖).

Having set forth the appropriate standard of review, we
now proceed to the specific counts of conviction. We begin
with the counts charging violation of federal law before
proceeding to the counts arising under the Virgin Islands
Code.

13
A Transporting a Firearm in the Course of Dealing
Firearms Without a License

Tyson was charged and convicted on twelve counts of
transporting a firearm in the course of dealing firearms
without a license—a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A).12
Section 922(a)(1)(A) states that it is unlawful for any person

except a licensed importer, licensed
manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to engage in
the business of importing, manufacturing, or
dealing in firearms, or in the course of such
business to ship, transport, or receive any
firearm in interstate or foreign commerce[.]

To obtain a conviction under this provision, the government
must show that the defendant (1) engaged in the business of
dealing in firearms; (2) was not a federally licensed firearms
dealer; and (3) acted willfully. United States v. Palmieri, 21
F.3d 1265, 1268–70 & n.4 (3d Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 513 U.S. 957 (1994); see also United States v.
Sanchez-Corcino, 85 F.3d 549, 554 (11th Cir. 1996); 18
U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D) (providing mens rea requirement).

The District Court held that there was sufficient
evidence to prove Tyson was not a federally licensed firearms
dealer, but insufficient evidence to demonstrate that he was
―engaged in the business of dealing in firearms.‖13 But what
12
The firearms identified in these twelve counts correspond to the
eleven firearms seized on July 31, 2008, as well as the firearm
seized from Jelani LaTorre on June 30, 2008.
13
The District Court did not address the mens rea requirement
because it found the government‘s failure to prove the first element
of the crime to be dispositive.

14
does it mean to be ―engaged in the business of dealing in
firearms‖? According to the statute, a person is so engaged
when he or she ―devotes time, attention, and labor to dealing
in firearms as a regular course of trade or business with the
principal objective of livelihood and profit through the
repetitive purchase and resale of firearms.‖ 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(21)(C). To conduct business ―‗with the principal
objective of livelihood and profit‘ means that the intent
underlying the sale or disposition of firearms is
predominantly one of obtaining livelihood and pecuniary
gain, as opposed to other intents, such as improving or
liquidating a personal firearms collection.‖ 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(22). In this vein, the statute explicitly exempts those
who ―make[] occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of
firearms for the enhancement of a personal collection or for a
hobby, or who sell[] all or part of [their] personal collection
of firearms.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C).

By the statute‘s terms, then, a defendant engages in the
business of dealing in firearms when his principal motivation
is economic (i.e., ―obtaining livelihood‖ and ―profit‖) and he
pursues this objective through the repetitive purchase and
resale of firearms. Palmieri, 21 F.3d at 1268 (stating that
―economic interests‖ are the ―principal purpose,‖ and
―repetitiveness‖ is ―the modus operandi‖). Although the
quantity and frequency of sales are obviously a central
concern, so also are (1) the location of the sales, (2) the
conditions under which the sales occurred, (3) the defendant‘s
behavior before, during, and after the sales, (4) the price
charged for the weapons and the characteristics of the
firearms sold, and (5) the intent of the seller at the time of the
sales. Id. (explaining that ―the finder of fact must examine
the intent of the actor and all circumstances surrounding the

15
acts alleged to constitute engaging in business‖). As is often
the case in such analyses, the importance of any one of these
considerations is subject to the idiosyncratic nature of the fact
pattern presented.

Here, the government presented substantial indirect
evidence of repetitive sales. Over the course of
approximately seven months, Tyson flew to the Virgin
Islands four times. Directly before each of these trips, he
purchased several firearms in Tennessee. Tyson carried some
number of these weapons on at least three of his flights and
he never registered a single gun with the local police when he
landed in St. Thomas. In total, Tyson purchased thirty-five
firearms during the relevant time period. Only twelve were
ever recovered; eleven guns were seized on July 31 and one
weapon—with its serial number obliterated—was confiscated
from Jelani LaTorre. A reasonable jury could conclude from
this evidence that Tyson sold the twenty-three unrecovered
(and unregistered) firearms during his first three trips to the
Virgin Islands. A jury could further infer that Tyson had
similar intentions for the eleven guns with which he was
apprehended on the day of his arrest.

There was also evidence that Tyson‘s repetitive sales
were driven by a pecuniary motive. In January 2008, LaTorre
wired $330 to Tyson in Tennessee. Several weeks later,
Tyson purchased a Hi-Point 9mm handgun for $139. The
jury was free to infer from this evidence that Tyson had not
only sold LaTorre the weapon, but that he did so for a
sizeable markup. Such profit-seeking behavior falls squarely
within the statutory definition of firearms dealing. See 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(22). In addition, the government introduced
a notepad seized from Tyson‘s residence in Tennessee. One
page of the pad contained the notations ―AK‖ and ―AR,‖

16
along with two columns labeled ―Spent‖ and ―Profit.‖ Agent
Jenkins testified that the AK-47 and AR-15 assault rifle were
two of the more common semiautomatic firearms available
for sale in Tennessee. Tyson bought several of each. On the
notepad, the number ―2000‖ appeared below the ―Profit‖
column next to ―AK‖; the number ―1900‖ was written in the
―Profit‖ column corresponding to ―AR.‖ The jury could well
have reasoned that the word ―Profit‖ meant exactly what it
said and that the numbers appearing in this column reflected a
positive monetary yield. What is more, the overall timing and
condition of the sales strongly suggests a pecuniary motive.
Before each trip to St. Thomas, Tyson embarked on a
purchasing spree, only to resell his newly-acquired arsenal
when he arrived in the Virgin Islands. This buy-fly-resell
pattern of behavior seems susceptible of no other explanation
than one of economic gain.

The government‘s evidence is bolstered by the fact
that Tyson himself admitted that he was traveling to the
Virgin Islands in order to buy and sell firearms. Delta
ticketing agent Breeding testified that she assisted Tyson with
his baggage prior to several of his flights. Each time, Tyson
told Breeding that he intended to sell the firearms packed in
his luggage once he arrived in the Virgin Islands. In one
instance, Tyson said ―that he was an antique gun buyer and
collector, and that he had a purchaser for all of the guns when
he got back to the islands.‖ The District Court discounted
these assertions as ―mere puffery.‖ Such a finding was
unwarranted in light of the record as a whole. Indeed, there
was ample evidence that Tyson was transporting large
numbers of firearms to the Virgin Islands in order to turn a
profit from their resale. Thus, when Tyson told Breeding that
this was exactly what he was up to, the jury had every right to

17
conclude that he was telling the truth. By minimizing
Tyson‘s assertions, the District Court overrode the jury‘s
credibility determination and substituted its own. This was
error. See United States v. McBane, 433 F.3d 344, 348 (3d
Cir. 2005) (stating that ―[w]e do not weigh evidence or
determine the credibility of witnesses‖ on sufficiency of the
evidence review (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).

For the reasons set forth above, we find that the
government put on substantial proof to show that Tyson was
engaged in the business of dealing in firearms. The record
further demonstrates that he did so with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind. A defendant must act willfully to be
criminally liable under § 922(a)(1)(A). See 18 U.S.C. §
924(a)(1)(D). A ―willful‖ action is ―one undertaken with a
‗bad purpose‘‖ or an ―evil-meaning mind.‖ Bryan v. United
States, 524 U.S. 184, 191, 193 (1998). Proof of willfulness
therefore requires evidence that ―the defendant acted with
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.‖ Id. at 192
(interpreting the term ―willfully‖ in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D))
(quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994)).

Tyson completed an ATF Form 4473 for each firearm
he purchased in Tennessee. This form contains language
printed in bold directly above the signature line that states, ―I
. . . understand that the repetitive purchase of firearms for the
purpose of resale for livelihood and profit without a Federal
firearms license is a violation of the law.‖ Each time he
signed a Form 4473, Tyson certified his knowledge of the
law. This alone is sufficient to demonstrate willfulness in the
circumstances present here. See United States v. Hayden, 64
F.3d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1995). And there was more.

18
 Tyson undertook measures to conceal his trafficking
activity. He kept coded records. He told others that he was
selling ―antique‖ guns, presumably because he knew that
―antique‖ firearms are exempted from the trafficking statute.
See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(1)(3) (defining ―firearm‖ and stating
that ―antique‖ firearms are not considered ―firearms‖ for
purposes of the trafficking statute). Similarly, Tyson called
himself a firearms ―collector,‖ which, if true, would also have
shielded him from criminal trafficking liability. See 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C) (stating that one who ―makes
occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms for the
enhancement of a personal collection or for a hobby, or who
sells all or part of his personal collection of firearms‖ is not a
―dealer in firearms‖). These were lies designed to game the
system. After all, none of the firearms purchased by Tyson
were antiques and his behavior was decidedly inconsistent
with that of a collector.14 The jury could reasonably conclude
that by calling himself a ―collector,‖ and by describing his
firearms as ―antiques,‖ Tyson crafted a falsehood with the
statute‘s exemptions in mind. Such behavior betrays
knowledge of unlawful conduct.

In sum, the District Court committed error when it set
aside Tyson‘s conviction on twelve counts of transporting a
firearm in the course of dealing firearms without a license.
We will vacate the judgment of acquittal with orders to
reinstate the jury‘s verdict on each of the twelve counts.

B Transporting a Firearm in Interstate Commerce with
the Intent to Commit a Crime

14
Nor does Tyson claim that he was a firearms ―collector‖ on
appeal.

19
 The jury convicted Tyson of one count of transporting
a firearm in interstate commerce with knowledge or
reasonable cause to believe that it would be used to commit a
crime, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(b). That section
provides:

Whoever, with intent to commit therewith an
offense punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, or with knowledge or
reasonable cause to believe that an offense
punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year is to be committed
therewith, ships, transports, or receives a
firearm or any ammunition in interstate or
foreign commerce shall be fined under this title,
or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

To be convicted under the statute, then, the defendant must
(1) transport a firearm in interstate or foreign commerce, and
(2) intend to commit a crime with the weapon, have actual
knowledge that a crime will be committed with the weapon,
or have reasonable cause to believe that a crime will be
committed with the weapon. The indictment alleged that
Tyson transported eleven firearms to the Virgin Islands on
July 31, 2008, with either knowledge or reasonable cause to
believe that the weapons would be possessed without a
locally issued license. Possession under such circumstances
is a crime in the Virgin Islands, punishable by at least one
year in prison. 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a).

There is no question that Tyson moved the eleven
firearms in interstate commerce. Our focus thus centers
exclusively upon § 924(b)‘s mens rea requirement. Proof of a
defendant‘s subjective knowledge can be difficult to

20
establish, especially when he or she has reason to obfuscate.
But Tyson was charged with, and convicted of, knowing or
having ―reasonable cause to believe‖ that the weapons would
be used to commit the predicate offense.15 The government
contends that even if it did not prove actual knowledge, it at
15
We have yet to address the meaning of ―reasonable cause to
believe‖ in the context of § 924(b) or a similar statute. In United
States v. McBane, 433 F.3d 344 (3d Cir. 2005), we were asked to
review the defendant‘s conviction for selling a stolen firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). The mens rea requirement in that
provision, like the one at issue here, imposes liability upon a
defendant who receives a firearm that he knows or has reasonable
cause to believe is stolen. We recognized that the phrase
―reasonable cause to believe‖ was undefined by statute and that it
was the subject of little decisional authority. Indeed, we observed
that ―[o]nly the Eighth Circuit has discussed the language
meaningfully.‖ McBane, 433 F.3d at 349 n.9. We then set forth
the Eighth Circuit‘s analysis of the phrase:

It may be read as requiring proof only that the
defendant [sold] a gun that the so-called ‗reasonable
person‘ would have believed was stolen in the
circumstances of the case. But the better reading,
we believe, requires proof that a defendant [sold] a
gun that it would have been reasonable for him or
her in particular, to believe was stolen.

Id. (quoting United States v. Iron Eyes, 367 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir.
2004)). In McBane, we held that there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury verdict under either interpretation of ―reasonable
cause to believe‖; thus, we declined to decide which reading of the
phrase was correct. In like fashion, we conclude that there was
substantial evidence to support Tyson‘s conviction under either
reading of the scienter requirement. We therefore leave a more
rigorous statutory analysis for another day.

21
least established that Tyson had reasonable cause to believe
the firearms would be possessed without a firearms license.
We agree.

Tyson transported as many as thirty-five firearms to
the Virgin Islands over the course of seven months. As we
explained above, a reasonable jury could conclude that Tyson
sold twenty-three of these weapons and that he intended to do
the same with the eleven he imported on July 31. He sold at
least one of these weapons at a significant markup, and there
was evidence that Tyson profited from his other sales as well.
Furthermore, in four trips to the Virgin Islands, Tyson made
no attempt to comply with the local licensing scheme; he did
not register any of the firearms he had imported prior to July
31, and he never applied for or received a license to carry a
firearm on the island. A reasonable jury could have assessed
the sum of this evidence—repetitive bootleg sales for above-
market prices—and found that Tyson flouted local licensing
requirements in order to transact business with individuals
who were themselves unlicensed. After all, Tyson‘s
customers presumably paid above-market prices because they
were unable to obtain a firearm through legitimate channels.
Tyson‘s repeated sales to individuals who were likely to be
unlicensed allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that he
acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.

The District Court‘s judgment of acquittal was
therefore in error. We will vacate that disposition with
instructions to reinstate the jury verdict.

C Transferring a Firearm to a Person the Transferor
Knows or Has Reasonable Cause to Believe is a
Resident of Another State

22
 The indictment charged Tyson with one count of
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5),16 which makes it unlawful

16
Specifically, Count Twenty-Six of the indictment reads, ―On or
about the[sic] July 31, 2008, at St. Thomas, in the District of the
Virgin Islands, the defendant, Shawn Tyson, not being a licensed
importer, manufacturer, dealer, and collector of firearms, within
the meaning of Chapter 44, Title 18, United States Code, did
attempt to willfully transfer, transport, and deliver firearms . . . to a
person, said person not being a licensed importer, manufacturer,
dealer, and collector of firearms, within the meaning of Chapter
44, Title 18, United States Code, and knowing and with reasonable
cause to believe that said person was not then residing in the state
of Tennessee, the state in which the defendant was residing at the
time of the aforesaid transfer, transportation, and delivery of the
firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5) and 924(a)(1)(D).‖
(Emphasis added.) By its terms, § 922(a)(5) does not criminalize
the attempt to transfer a firearm to an out-of-state resident. But we
do not read this count as one charging attempt. Nor do the parties
for that matter. The reason is clear enough. Count Twenty-Six
describes (by model and serial number) the eleven firearms that
Tyson placed in Morrell‘s vehicle on July 31, 2008. It cites §
922(a)(5), a provision that criminalizes the actual transfer of
firearms. It refers to ―the aforesaid transfer, transportation, and
delivery of the firearms,‖ rather than the ―aforesaid attempted
transfer, transportation, and delivery.‖ And an earlier count in the
indictment alleges that Tyson transported the same eleven firearms
(also identified by model and serial number) to the Virgin Islands
and delivered them into Morrell‘s possession. Thus, Tyson was
under no illusion as to the crime with which he was charged: the
unlawful transfer of a firearm to an out-of-state resident. See
United States v. Rawlins, 606 F.3d 73, 78–79 (3d Cir. 2010)
(explaining that an indictment is sufficient if it, inter alia, contains
the elements of the offense and sufficiently apprises the defendant
of the crime charged); see also United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d

23
 for any person (other than a licensed importer,
licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or
licensed collector) to transfer, sell, trade, give,
transport, or deliver any firearm to any person
(other than a licensed importer, licensed
manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed
collector) who the transferor knows or has
reasonable cause to believe does not reside in . .
. the State in which the transferor resides.

Proof that a defendant violated § 922(a)(5) requires
substantial evidence of three elements: (1) neither the
defendant nor the recipient of the firearm were licensed
importers, manufacturers, dealers, or collectors; (2) the
defendant willfully transferred the firearm to another person;
and (3) the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe
that the person to whom he transferred the firearm resided in
a state other than the defendant‘s state of residence. Id.; 18
U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D).

Elements one and three are not in dispute. Nor do the
parties challenge the fact that Tyson ―transferred‖ eleven
firearms to Morrell on July 31, 2008.17 The question, again,

754, 771 (3d Cir. 2005) (―‗We consider an indictment sufficient if,
when considered in its entirety, it adequately informs the defendant
of the charges against her such that she may prepare a defense and
invoke the double jeopardy clause when appropriate.‘‖ (quoting
United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2002))).
17
To ―transfer‖ a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5) means to
deliver possession of the weapon to another person. The District
Court instructed the jury that ―possession‖ may be ―constructive,
sole and joint.‖ Tyson does not question whether there was
sufficient evidence to prove Morrell ―possessed‖ the firearms by
virtue of their placement into his vehicle.

24
is whether Tyson effectuated this transfer with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind. The jury answered this query in the
affirmative, but the District Court found the evidence
insufficient to support such a result. The Court reasoned that
in order to show Tyson willfully transferred firearms to
Morrell, the government was required to establish that he had
actual knowledge of § 922(a)(5)‘s licensing provision.
Finding insufficient evidence of such proof, the Court set
aside the jury‘s verdict.

The District Court misinterpreted what it means for a
defendant to act willfully in this context. As we explained
above, to establish a willful violation of the federal firearms
trafficking statute, the government must ―prove that the
defendant acted with knowledge that the conduct was
unlawful.‖18 Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192 (quoting Ratzlaf, 510
U.S. at 137). In the context of § 922(a)(5), it was therefore
incumbent upon the government to show, not that Tyson
knew that he was subject to a particular federal licensing
scheme, but that he knew it was unlawful for him to transfer
firearms to a resident of the Virgin Islands. There is
sufficient evidence to support such a conclusion. ATF Form
4473, which Tyson executed each time he purchased a
firearm, informed him that the repetitive purchase and resale
of firearms for livelihood and profit was a federal crime. He
falsely claimed that his firearms were antiques, called himself
a firearms ―collector,‖ and coded accounting documents, all
in order to evade detection. Furthermore, Tyson disregarded
Virgin Islands registration and licensing requirements so that

18
In Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998), the Supreme
Court explicitly rejected the contention that proof of willful
misconduct requires evidence that a defendant knew of the
licensing requirements in the federal firearms statutes.

25
he could expeditiously traffic guns on the black market.19
From this evidence, and in light of the record as a whole, the
jury could reasonably infer that Tyson acted with an ―evil-
meaning mind‖; he knew that it was unlawful to transport
firearms to St. Thomas and deliver those weapons to Morrell,
an out-of-state resident. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191–93
(explaining that to prove the defendant acted willfully, the
government must show that he or she acted with ―bad
purpose‖ to disobey or disregard the law).

The District Court‘s contrary conclusion was in error.
Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of acquittal on this
count with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict.

D Conspiracy to Unlawfully Transport Firearms

In addition to the substantive trafficking counts
discussed above, Count One of the indictment charged Tyson
and Morrell, along with persons known and unknown, with
conspiracy to unlawfully transport firearms in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371. To sustain Tyson‘s conviction under this
count, the evidence must be sufficient to show that (1) the
alleged conspirators shared a common goal or purpose, viz. to
traffic firearms illegally, (2) Tyson knew of that purpose and
intended to achieve it, and (3) Tyson reached an agreement
with his alleged co-conspirators to achieve the conspiracy‘s
aims. United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir.

19
After Tyson‘s arrest, he told ATF Agent Stricklin that he had
intended to register the eleven firearms, but was stopped by the
police before he could do so. This statement shows that at the time
of his arrest, Tyson knew about the registration requirements. The
jury could reasonably infer that he knew about those requirements
throughout the duration of his trafficking scheme.

26
2006); United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir.
2001); see also Boria, 592 F.3d at 481 (explaining that the
conspiracy‘s common goal or purpose must be illegal). This
Court has characterized the third factor set forth above—an
agreement between the defendant and another individual—as
―the essence of the [conspiracy] offense.‖ Pressler, 256 F.3d
at 147. It is, in other words, the sine qua non of the crime
itself. United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir.
1999) (stating that ―‗a conspiracy requires an agreement to
commit some other crime beyond the crime constituted by the
agreement itself.‘‖ (quoting United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d
795, 808 (7th Cir. 1994))).

When a conspiracy conviction is at issue, we must
closely scrutinize the sufficiency of the evidence. United
States v. Schramm, 75 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1996) (―‗[T]he
sufficiency of the evidence in a conspiracy prosecution
requires close scrutiny.‘‖ (quoting United States v. Coleman,
811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987))). The reason is self-
evident: a defendant‘s guilt must always remain ―individual
and personal.‖ Boria, 592 F.3d at 480; United States v.
Samuels, 741 F.2d 570, 575 (3d Cir. 1984). ―‗[S]light
evidence of a defendant‘s connection with a conspiracy is
insufficient to support a guilty verdict.‘‖ Brodie, 403 F.3d at
134 (quoting Coleman, 811 F.2d at 808). Furthermore, a
conspiracy may not be proved merely ―‗by piling inference
upon inference‘ where those inferences do not logically
support the ultimate finding of guilt.‖ Id. (quoting Coleman,
811 F.2d at 808).

In the instant matter, the District Court held that there
was not substantial evidence to prove that Tyson entered into
an illicit agreement to traffic firearms with at least one other
individual. The government disputes this finding and

27
contends that a reasonable jury could have inferred that Tyson
and Morrell entered into an illegal agreement based upon
their ―unusual and suspicious activity in Tennessee and the
Virgin Islands.‖ For his part, Tyson argues that the District
Court‘s disposition should be affirmed. Moreover, he claims
that his criminal liability is foreclosed as a matter of law by
the jury‘s acquittal of Morrell—Tyson‘s only alleged co-
conspirator. To support this assertion, Tyson invokes the
common law ―rule of consistency,‖ which requires the
reversal of a conspiracy conviction when all of a defendant‘s
alleged co-conspirators are acquitted of the same conspiracy
charge in the same trial. We begin by addressing Tyson‘s
―rule of consistency‖ argument before evaluating the
sufficiency of the evidence adduced by the government in its
case-in-chief.

1 Applicability of the Rule of Consistency

The doctrine known as the ―rule of consistency‖
requires that where all possible co-conspirators are jointly
tried, and all but one are acquitted, the conviction of the
remaining co-conspirator must be set aside. United States v.
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 383 n.11 (3d Cir. 1978); United States
v. Gordon, 242 F.2d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1956); see also Gov’t
of the Virgin Islands v. Hoheb, 777 F.2d 138, 143 (3d Cir.
1985) (Garth, J., concurring). The idea, as articulated by one
of our sister courts of appeals, is ―that the acquittal of all but
one potential conspirator negates the possibility of an
agreement between the sole remaining defendant and one of
those acquitted of the conspiracy and thereby denies, by
definition, the existence of any conspiracy at all.‖ United
States v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 1980).
Application of the rule is narrow: it does not apply when
alleged co-conspirators are tried separately and only one

28
defendant is convicted. See Hoheb, 777 F.2d at 140–41. Nor
is it applicable when ―it is alleged and proven that the
defendant conspired with persons unknown.‖20 Id. (citing
cases).

The rule of consistency was at one time uniformly
followed in both federal and state courts. Chad W. Coulter,
Comment, The Unnecessary Rule of Consistency in
Conspiracy Trials, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 223, 225 (1986). But
the rule‘s viability was dealt a serious blow in the 1980s,
when the Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in
Powell v. United States, 469 U.S. 57 (1984). Powell, who
was tried alone, was found guilty of using a telephone to
facilitate the drug conspiracy for which she was acquitted.
The Court held that although this result was inconsistent, it
was not for a judge to go behind the jury‘s decision in such
circumstances. True, the verdict may have been the product
of juror error or plain irrationality. But an inconsistent
verdict may also be the product of juror lenity, which
historically has operated ―as a check against arbitrary or
oppressive exercises of power by the Executive Branch.‖ Id.
at 65. The point, according to Powell, is that a reviewing
court cannot know why the jury reached its verdict. Rather
than task courts with the responsibility to find out, the Powell
Court held that inconsistent verdicts are not reviewable
merely because they are inconsistent. Id. at 66.

20
The indictment in this case charged Tyson and Morrell of
conspiring with persons known and unknown. However, the
record does not contain substantial evidence to support a charge
based on an agreement with unindicted or unknown persons.
Furthermore, the government‘s argument on appeal is based
exclusively on Tyson‘s purported agreement with Morrell.

29
 Powell does not directly address inconsistency among
jointly tried co-conspirators, but every court of appeals to
consider the question has held that Powell‘s logic fatally
undermines the rule of consistency. See, e.g., United States v.
Morton, 412 F.3d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Nichols, 374 F.3d 959, 970–71 & n.9 (10th Cir. 2004),
vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1113 (2005); United
States v. Crayton, 357 F.3d 560, 566–67 (6th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876, 878 & n.3 (5th
Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d
593, 595–96 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Valles-Valencia,
823 F.2d 381, 382 (9th Cir. 1987). As the Sixth Circuit has
explained, under Powell, ―the acquittal of all but one co-
conspirator during the same trial does not necessarily indicate
that the jury found no agreement to act.‖ Crayton, 357 F.3d
at 565. Instead, the verdict may represent a manifestation of
lenity, which Powell clearly held was not subject to judicial
review. Id.

We have not had occasion to address the continuing
applicability of the rule of consistency in multi-defendant
conspiracy trials.21 We do so now and hold that the rule is no
longer viable in cases such as the one at bar. The jury‘s
verdict, even if it is not consistent, may reflect the decision to
exercise lenity with respect to one or more defendants. See
Powell, 469 U.S. at 65. To exercise such discretion is the
jury‘s prerogative, which we will not disturb simply to

21
In a concurring opinion some twenty-five years ago, our
colleague, Judge Garth, characterized the rule of consistency as a
―vestige of the past,‖ inapplicable in a joint conspiracy trial. Gov’t
of the Virgin Islands v. Hoheb, 777 F.2d 138, 143 (3d Cir. 1985)
(Garth, J., concurring). Judge Garth was prescient, and his view is
now the view of this Court.

30
achieve symmetry of results. See Standefer v. United States,
477 U.S. 10, 25 (1980). Tyson‘s invocation of the rule of
consistency is thus to no avail. His conviction will stand or
fall based upon the sufficiency of the government‘s evidence.

2 Sufficiency of the Evidence

The District Court concluded that the government‘s
evidence was insufficient to show that Tyson and Morrell
reached an agreement to unlawfully traffic firearms in
violation of federal law. The issue here is not whether Tyson
engaged in unilateral trafficking activity; nor is it whether
Morrell knew Tyson was so engaged. Rather, the pertinent
inquiry is whether Tyson and Morrell agreed to achieve the
conspiracy‘s ends. Conspirators, of course, rarely leave
evidence of an explicit understanding or common goal.
United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 353 (3d Cir. 2002).
Indeed, ―common sense suggests, and experience confirms,
that illegal agreements are rarely, if ever, reduced to writing
or verbalized with the precision that is characteristic of a
written contract.‖ United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 238
(3d Cir. 2007). We have therefore recognized that the
existence of a conspiratorial agreement may be proven by
circumstantial evidence alone. Brodie, 403 F.3d at 134
(stating that ―the very nature of the crime of conspiracy is
such that it often may be established only by indirect and
circumstantial evidence‖). The District Court correctly
recognized this point of law, but nonetheless found that ―the
government . . . failed to show any integration of activities
between Tyson and any other individual that could indirectly
prove the existence of a preconceived plan or common
understanding to traffic firearms.‖

The government acknowledges that it advanced no

31
direct evidence that Tyson and Morrell reached an illicit
agreement to traffic firearms. It focuses instead on what it
calls a pattern of ―unusual and suspicious activity in
Tennessee and the Virgin Islands.‖ Specifically: Tyson and
Morrell flew from the Virgin Islands to Tennessee on
February 13, 2008. Morrell stayed with Tyson in his Bristol
residence for one week. Tyson purchased fourteen
semiautomatic firearms in and around Bristol during the week
of Morrell‘s stay. On February 20, Tyson and Morrell
traveled back to the Virgin Islands. Both checked luggage
containing firearms. Finally, when Tyson flew back to St.
Thomas on July 31, Morrell was waiting at the airport to pick
him up. According to the government, this series of ―unusual
acts,‖ considered in the context of the record as a whole,
amount to substantial evidence that Tyson and Morrell
entered into the conspiratorial agreement charged in the
indictment.

We have previously explained that where several
alleged co-conspirators engage in coordinated, ―unusual
acts,‖ one may reasonably infer the existence of a tacit
agreement. For instance, in United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d
473 (3d Cir. 2002), five police officers were charged in a
criminal conspiracy to violate Earl Faison‘s civil rights. The
officers arrested Faison and beat him to death under the
mistaken belief that he had killed one of their colleagues. At
trial, the officers argued that while they might have been
subject to criminal liability for the underlying offense, there
was insufficient proof that they had agreed to engage in
coordinated illegality. The evidence, however, indicated that
during the course of events, the officers jointly contravened a
number of their department‘s operating procedures governing
the apprehension and interrogation of criminal suspects. Id.

32
at 476. For example, the officers arrested Faison and took
him to the jail for questioning instead of the county
prosecutor‘s office, where suspects were supposed to be
taken; the officers entered the jail through the south entrance
when protocol dictated that the north entrance was the
designated prisoner drop-off area; Faison was never
fingerprinted or photographed, nor was he taken to the
booking room; after Faison died from the beating
administered by his assailants, several officers submitted
consistent but false incident reports. Id. We described this
collective deviation from standard operating procedure as
―unusual‖ and explained, ―The fact that [the officers] . . .
engaged as a group in so many unusual acts could certainly
lead a reasonable juror to the conclusion that there was at
least a tacit agreement between the officers, formed at the
scene of the arrest, that Faison was to be assaulted.‖ Id. at
478–79.

By characterizing the activities of Tyson and Morrell
as ―unusual,‖ the government attempts to cast a pall of
suspicion over their week-long interaction. But applying
labels is insufficient. Unfortunately, the government makes
little attempt to explain what is so ―unusual‖ about the
conduct at issue. The government does not argue, for
instance, that the behavior of Tyson and Morrell deviated
from some baseline norm. Nor can they. Almost all of the
facts highlighted by the government focus upon lawful
conduct. What is more, we know almost nothing about
Tyson‘s interactions with Morrell or Morrell‘s stay in
Tennessee. What little we do know is for the most part
mundane: Morrell arrived on the same flight as Tyson, he was
present when police came to the residence on February 14,

33
and he departed after staying one week.22 On the day of his
departure, Morrell traveled to the airport along with Tyson.
Both men checked baggage containing firearms. They then
appear to have parted ways until July 31, 2008.

It is difficult to draw any useful inferences from the
discrete facts set forth above. The evidence certainly does not
suggest coordinated action in support of a common goal. To
constitute coordinated action, there must be some link
between the co-conspirators‘ conduct that suggests
integration or unity of purpose. Pressler, 256 F.3d at 155;
Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 200–02; United States v. Powell, 113 F.3d
464, 467 (3d Cir. 1994). Co-conspirator A may serve as a
lookout for co-conspirator B; two co-conspirators may
consult with one another to fix a sale price; co-conspirators
may communicate in code. Here, there is no link between the
two men, nor anything to show that one is facilitating the
handiwork of the other. True, Tyson and Morrell arrived at
the airport on February 20 together. But this is not evidence
that they were assisting one another.23 See Pressler, 256 F.3d
22
The evidence does show that Tyson unilaterally—and legally—
purchased multiple firearms during the week that Morrell was his
houseguest. There is no evidence, however, that Morrell assisted
Tyson in his endeavors. Several firearms merchants from the
Bristol area testified; none identified Morrell or testified to seeing
him along with Tyson.
23
In addition, the government presented no evidence from which to
reasonably infer that either Tyson or Morrell knew that what the
other was doing was illegal. Both lawfully checked their
respective firearms for flight in Tennessee; to infer that Tyson
knew Morrell was not licensed to possess a firearm in the Virgin
Islands (or vice versa) is to infer the existence of facts from
evidence that simply was not proffered. See United States v.
Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 150 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (―We may not

34
at 153 (finding insufficient evidence of a tacit agreement
when alleged co-conspirators merely traveled to Philadelphia
together to purchase narcotics). It is, at most, proof of
parallel conduct—two individuals attempting to import
firearms into the Virgin Islands. A conspiracy prosecution
requires more.

Morrell‘s role in the events of July 31 is perhaps the
sole bit of evidence indicative of ―coordinated‖ action.
Indeed, this is a significant bit of proof, but not enough. In a
sufficiency inquiry, we cannot evaluate evidence in isolation,
but must determine ―‗whether all the pieces of evidence,
taken together, make a strong enough case to let a jury find
[the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.‘‖ Brodie,
403 F.3d at 134 (quoting Coleman, 811 F.2d at 807). Here,
Tyson was engaged in trafficking activity for some seven
months before he was arrested. Morrell‘s role in this seven-
month narrative spans the length of one week. There is no
evidence that Morrell assisted Tyson during any of his first
three trips to the Virgin Islands, much less interacted with
him. Nor is there evidence that the two communicated with
each other when Tyson was stateside. Had the government
presented proof of some recurrent pattern of coordinated
conduct, then perhaps we might rethink our calculus. But the
government has offered no such thing and, in the context of
the record as a whole, Morrell‘s presence at the airport is
simply too slim a reed upon which to hang a criminal
conspiracy conviction.

The government would no doubt claim that we are
overlooking crucial circumstantial evidence that tends to

‗infer‘ the existence of evidence that was simply never
proffered.‖).

35
support its position on appeal. In particular, Morrell testified
that Tyson paid at least $800 of the cost for him to fly from
St. Thomas to Tennessee. Morrell also admitted on cross
examination that during his stay in Tennessee he (1)
accompanied Tyson to at least one gun store, (2) visited a
firing range with Tyson, and (3) posed for photographs at
Tyson‘s residence, guns in hand. But because all of this
testimony was admitted after the close of the government‘s
evidence, we cannot consider it. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b);
Brodie, 403 F.3d at 134. Under Rule 29, the government may
not rely upon testimony admitted through Morrell‘s cross
examination. Rather, the prosecution must rise or fall solely
on the basis of the government‘s proof. Tyson is, in other
words, entitled to a verdict based only upon a snapshot of the
evidence as it existed when the government concluded its
case-in-chief. Moore, 504 F.3d at 1347.

In sum, the jury lacked sufficient evidence to find that
Tyson and Morrell entered into a tacit agreement to traffic
firearms in violation of federal law. We have no doubt that
Tyson was engaged in unlawful trafficking activity and,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, it is reasonable to infer that Morrell knew about
some of Tyson‘s illicit conduct. But our conspiracy
jurisprudence does not sanction guilt by association. United
States v. Terselich, 885 F.2d 1094, 1098 (3d Cir. 1989)
(stating that ―the company an individual chooses to keep‖ is
not evidence of a conspiracy). We will therefore affirm the
ruling of the District Court granting judgment of acquittal on
the conspiracy count.

E Unauthorized Possession of a Firearm Under the
Virgin Islands Code

36
 The Virgin Islands Code makes it unlawful for any
person to have, possess, transport, or carry a firearm without a
locally-issued license to do so. 23 V.I.C. § 454; 14 V.I.C. §
2253(a). Tyson was charged with eleven counts of violating
this provision—one count for each of the firearms he
transported onto the island on July 31, 2008. The jury
convicted Tyson on ten of these counts, and the District Court
denied Tyson‘s motion for judgment of acquittal. Tyson
appeals the District Court‘s order, though he acknowledges
that the government proved he was in possession of the
eleven firearms without a license. Tyson argues, however,
that he had an affirmative defense under two separate
licensing provisions of the Virgin Islands Code: 23 V.I.C. §
460 and 23 V.I.C. § 470(b). Section 460 requires authorities
in the Virgin Islands to recognize a firearms license validly
issued by another state or territory. Section 470(b) states that
if an individual imports firearms into the Virgin Islands
without a license to do so, he or she may avoid criminal
liability by ―immediately‖ registering the imported weapons.
Tyson argues that either provision furnishes a defense for
unauthorized firearm possession.

Tyson did not request a jury instruction for either so-
called affirmative defense and the District Court did not
provide one. Tyson also did not object to the Court‘s
instructions after they were given. Where a party fails to
object to the district court‘s jury instructions, ―he waives the
issue on appeal, ‗unless the error was so fundamental and
highly prejudicial as to constitute plain error.‘‖ United States
v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1261 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(quoting Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1987));
see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d) (stating that failure to object
to the court‘s jury instructions ―precludes appellate review,

37
except as permitted under Rule 52(b)‖). To find plain error,
we must conclude that (1) there was error; (2) the error was
clear or obvious; (3) the error affected the defendant‘s
substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the legal
proceeding. United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir.
2010). If the defendant satisfies this showing, we may, but
are not required to, order correction. United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 735–36 (1993) (explaining that the discretion
conferred by plain error review ―should be employed in those
circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would
otherwise result‖ (internal quotation omitted)).

1 23 V.I.C. § 460: Reciprocal Recognition of Out-of-
State Licenses

Section 460 states, in pertinent part, that the Virgin Islands
shall recognize a firearms license validly issued by another
state or territory and ―shall allow the [licensee] to exercise all
of the privileges in connection therewith.‖ 23 V.I.C. § 460.
Courts have characterized this provision as a ―statutory
exception to the firearm license requirement‖ and
acknowledged, albeit implicitly, that it provides an
affirmative defense to a charge for unauthorized possession of
a firearm. See United States v. McKie, 112 F.3d 626, 631 (3d
Cir. 1997); Toussaint v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 301 F.
Supp. 2d 420, 423–24 (D.V.I. 2004) (holding that § 460 is an
affirmative defense to § 2253(a)).

To be entitled to an instruction on an affirmative
defense, the defendant must present sufficient evidence from
which a jury could find in his or her favor on the defense. See
United States v. Bay, 852 F.2d 702, 704 (3d Cir. 1988).
Tyson proffered no evidence to suggest that he was licensed

38
to possess or deal in firearms anywhere in the United States.
Under such circumstances, it would have served no purpose
to instruct the jury on a § 460 defense, untethered as it would
have been to the evidence of record. Accordingly, we detect
no plain error and Tyson‘s argument is without merit.

2 23 V.I.C. § 470(b): Report of Firearms Purchased
Outside or Brought into the Virgin Islands

Pursuant to 23 V.I.C. § 470(b),

Any person upon entering the Virgin Islands
bringing with him any firearm or ammunition
shall report in writing or in person to the
Commissioner immediately of his arrival,
furnishing a complete description of the firearm
or ammunition brought into the Virgin Islands.
He shall also furnish his own name, date of
birth and occupation.

We have held that this provision sets forth an affirmative
defense to an unauthorized possession of a firearm charge.
McKie, 112 F.3d at 631. We have not, however,
meaningfully discussed the contours of such a defense. Nor
need we do so here. Simply put, Tyson did not request an
instruction on a § 470(b) defense. Perhaps this was oversight.
Perhaps it was strategy. After all, although the evidence
arguably would have supported a § 470(b) instruction, Tyson
may have reasoned that to present the defense would only
serve to highlight his clear guilt under the prima facie
elements of § 2253(a). A defendant‘s strategy is his own. It
is not for the district court to sua sponte determine which

39
defenses are appropriate under the circumstances. In short, if
Tyson wished to mount a defense under § 470(b), it was
incumbent upon him to take the initiative to do so.

The order of the District Court denying Tyson‘s
motion for judgment of acquittal on the basis of § 470(b) will
therefore be affirmed.24

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse in part and
affirm in part the final order of the District Court. We will
reverse the order on the following charges: (1) twelve counts
of transporting a firearm in the course of dealing firearms
without a license (Counts Two through Thirteen); (2) one
count of transporting a firearm with knowledge or reasonable
cause to believe that it would be used to commit a crime
(Count Twenty-Five); and (3) one count of transferring a

24
Chief Judge McKee does not believe that the record here would
support the affirmative defenses set forth in 23 V.I.C. §§ 460 and
470(b) because Tyson made several trips to the Virgin Islands and
not once registered the firearms he was transporting. However,
Chief Judge McKee does not agree that those defenses can be
deemed waived because of the unique procedural posture of this
appeal. As noted, Tyson moved for a judgment of acquittal at the
close of the government‘s case-in-chief, and the District Court
reserved its ruling on that motion. Accordingly, Chief Judge
McKee notes that we must review the Court‘s ultimate denial of
the motion as the record stood at the close of the government‘s
case, and it would have been premature to request any jury
instructions then because the defense had not yet rested. See Fed.
R. Crim. P. 29(b). Since the affirmative defenses are not supported
by the record, however, Chief Judge McKee agrees that Tyson‘s
attempt to rely on those defenses now is meritless.

40
firearm to an out-of-state resident (Count Twenty-Six). We
will affirm the order of the District Court granting Rule 29
relief on the charge of conspiracy to unlawfully transport
firearms (Count One). Finally, we will affirm Tyson‘s
conviction on ten counts of unauthorized possession of a
firearm under the Virgin Islands Code. This matter is
remanded for further proceedings.

41