Quigley v. Winter

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
___________

No. 08-3630/3752
___________

Jaymie Quigley, *
*
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, *
* Appeals from the United States
v. * District Court for the
* Northern District of Iowa.
Dale Winter, *
*
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. *
___________

Submitted: October 20, 2009
Filed: March 16, 2010
___________

Before RILEY, HANSEN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Jaymie Quigley brought claims against her landlord, Dale Winter, pursuant to
the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act
(ICRA), Iowa Code ch. 216, alleging (1) sexual harassment; (2) sex discrimination;
and (3) coercion, intimidation, threat, and interference with Quigley’s enjoyment of
her housing rights. A jury found in favor of Quigley on all claims and awarded her
$13,685.00 in compensatory damages and $250,000.00 in punitive damages.1 Quigley

1
Quigley also asserted a breach of contract claim against Winter, for which she
was awarded $400.00 by the jury.
sought attorney fees and costs in the amount of $118,654.38. The district court
reduced the punitive damages award to $20,527.50 and awarded Quigley $20,000.00
in attorney fees and $1,587.88 in costs.

Quigley appeals the district court’s judgment, contending the district court erred
in (1) reducing her punitive damages award, and (2) awarding her a reduced amount
of attorney fees without conducting the proper analysis. Winter cross-appeals and
asserts the district court committed various trial errors and erred in awarding any
punitive damages to Quigley. We affirm the district court’s judgment with respect to
Winter’s claims on cross-appeal, and we reverse with respect to Quigley’s claims on
appeal.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background2
Winter owned more than twenty rental homes in Sioux City, Iowa. Many of
Winter’s tenants were low-income women who received Section 8 housing vouchers
(housing vouchers) from the Sioux City Housing Authority (SCHA) to help pay their
rent. In 2000, Quigley, along with her then-husband and her four children, rented a
home from Winter. Quigley used a housing voucher to pay her rent.

In 2002, Quigley informed Winter she was eligible to move into a larger home.
Winter drove Quigley in his car to one of Winter’s other properties. Quigley
inspected the property, and when she returned to the car, Winter rubbed his hand
down Quigley’s arm and said, “[W]ell, how do you like it?” Quigley recalled this
incident made her feel “[s]cared” and “yucky.” Quigley, her boyfriend, and her
children moved into a different rental property owned by Winter, using a housing
voucher to pay the rent.

2
We recite the relevant facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.

-2-
 In 2004, Quigley’s boyfriend moved to Louisiana to visit his ill father. After
Quigley’s boyfriend moved out of the house, Winter behaved inappropriately toward
Quigley on several other occasions. First, Quigley learned from a neighbor that
Winter had been inside Quigley’s house without prior notice when Quigley was not
at home. When Quigley went to her bedroom, she noticed her housecoat, which had
been hanging on the back of the bedroom door when she left, was now lying on her
bed. Quigley confronted Winter about entering the home without giving prior notice,
and Winter claimed he had to replace the screen on Quigley’s bedroom window.
Quigley’s screen was not damaged and had not been replaced.

One evening, Winter came to inspect Quigley’s house while she was making
dinner for her children. On that occasion, Winter stood very close to Quigley and
rubbed his genital area. Another time, Winter came to Quigley’s house for an
inspection at 9:30 or 10:00 in the evening without giving Quigley prior notice.
Quigley’s fourteen year-old sister was staying the night with her, and they were in
their pajamas getting ready for bed. While conducting his inspection, Winter followed
Quigley and her sister into a bedroom and then a bathroom, which made them feel
uncomfortable. Quigley and her sister were watching television, and Winter lay down
on Quigley’s sectional couch after he completed the inspection. Winter stayed on the
couch for five or ten minutes until Quigley said, “Hey, Dale, we’re going to bed.”
Quigley had to tell Winter to leave “at least three times” before he left. Quigley also
reported receiving phone calls from Winter at inappropriate times, sometimes as late
as 2:30 or 3:00 in the morning. Winter sounded intoxicated when he called, and the
phone calls made Quigley feel scared and worried about protecting her children and
younger sister.

Quigley wanted to move out of the house because of Winter’s conduct, but she
would have lost her housing voucher if she broke the lease. Quigley met with her
SCHA worker and reported Winter’s inappropriate actions. Quigley asked if she
could change the locks on her rental home, but the housing worker told her she could

-3-
not change the locks unless she gave Winter a key. The housing worker told Quigley
she could get out of the lease without losing her housing voucher if Winter agreed to
rescind the lease. When Quigley asked Winter to release her from the lease, Winter
refused. Thereafter, Quigley changed the locks on her door without giving Winter a
key.

About a month and a half before Quigley’s lease ended, Winter showed up at
her house while Quigley, her sister, and Quigley’s friend were outside lying in the
sun. Quigley approached Winter’s vehicle and inquired whether she would be getting
her deposit back. Winter fluttered his hand against Quigley’s stomach and said, “My
eagle eyes have not seen everything yet.” Winter followed Quigley to the porch.
Quigley observed Winter staring at Quigley’s sister’s chest. Quigley’s sister was
wearing shorts and a sport bra, so Quigley told her sister to “go get something on.”
Winter said to Quigley’s sister, “You’re really mature. How old are you?” When
Quigley said her sister was “only 14,” Winter said, “Well, she looks a lot more mature
than you.” Quigley’s friend went to her car to get a cigarette, and Winter noticed the
friend had a scar on her back. Winter traced the scar with his finger, without consent,
pulling the friend’s pants downward to see where the scar ended. Quigley moved out
of the rental home, and Winter did not return her deposit.

Quigley filed a complaint with the Sioux City Human Rights Commission
(SCHRC). The investigator who handled Quigley’s complaint testified other single,
female tenants of Winter’s who were receiving housing assistance, corroborated
Quigley’s claims.

B. Procedural Background
In June 2006, Quigley filed a complaint against Winter in the district court,
alleging sexual harassment; sex discrimination; and coercion, intimidation, threats,
and interference with Quigley’s rights, in violation of the FHA and the ICRA.
Quigley also asserted a breach of contract claim against Winter based upon Winter’s

-4-
failure to return Quigley’s deposit. Winter brought a breach of contract counterclaim
against Quigley, insisting Quigley owed him unpaid rent and failed to leave the rental
home “in a clean and satisfactory condition.”

A five-day jury trial began in April 2008. At the end of the trial, the district
court instructed the jury to consider whether: (1) Winter discriminated against Quigley
on the basis of her sex; (2) Winter sexually harassed Quigley; (3) Winter coerced,
intimidated, or interfered with Quigley’s exercise or enjoyment of her housing rights;
(4) Winter breached his contract with Quigley by failing to return her deposit; and
(5) Quigley breached her contract with Winter by failing to leave the rental property
in a clean and satisfactory condition. The jury found in favor of Quigley, and against
Winter, on Winter’s counterclaim and each of Quigley’s claims, and awarded Quigley
$13,685.00 in compensatory damages for the housing claims, $400.00 for Quigley’s
breach of contract claim, and $250,000.00 in punitive damages.

After the district court entered judgment, Winter filed a renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law, a motion for a new trial, and a motion to alter or amend
the judgment, in part objecting to the award of punitive damages. Quigley moved for
an award of attorney fees and costs in the amount of $118,654.38. Following a
hearing on the motions, the district court entered an order (1) denying Winter’s
motions for a new trial and judgment as a matter of law, (2) reducing the award of
punitive damages from $250,000.00 to $20,527.50, and (3) awarding Quigley
$20,000.00 in attorney fees and $1,587.88 in costs. Quigley appeals the district
court’s judgment with respect to the amount of punitive damages and attorney fees.
Winter cross-appeals, asserting various errors at trial and objecting to any award of
punitive damages.

-5-
II. DISCUSSION
A. Winter’s Claims on Cross-Appeal
We first address Winter’s claims on cross-appeal. Winter maintains the district
court erred in submitting to the jury, and in denying Winter’s post-trial motions
related to, the following claims: (1) hostile housing environment caused by sexual
harassment; (2) “quid pro quo” sexual harassment; (3) sex discrimination; and
(4) coercion, intimidation, and interference with housing rights. Winter next insists
the district court made the following evidentiary errors: (1) admitting “me too”
testimony from three of Winter’s former female tenants; (2) admitting the SCHRC’s
probable cause determination and testimony from a SCHRC investigator; and
(3) excluding medical records and testimony from a physician’s assistant at Siouxland
Mental Health related to Quigley’s mental health.3

1. Standards of Review
“We review a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law
de novo.” Heaton v. The Weitz Co., 534 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted). “We ‘must affirm the jury’s verdict unless, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to [Quigley], we conclude that no reasonable jury could have
found in [her] favor.’” Id. (quoting Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 819, 824 (8th
Cir. 2002)). “We ‘will not set aside a jury verdict unless there is a complete absence
of probative facts to support the verdict.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Brinker Int’l, Inc.,
382 F.3d 765, 769 (8th Cir. 2004)).

A district court’s decision to admit or exclude testimony is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., US Salt, Inc. v. Broken Arrow, Inc., 563 F.3d 687, 689
(8th Cir. 2009). “A district court enjoys wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility
of proffered evidence, and evidentiary rulings should only be overturned if there was

3
We address Winter’s claims concerning punitive damages and attorney fees in
conjunction with our discussion of Quigley’s claims on appeal.

-6-
a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.” Id. at 689-90 (internal marks and
quotations omitted).

2. Hostile Housing Environment Created by Sexual Harassment
As a preliminary matter, Winter questions whether a claim for hostile housing
environment created by sexual harassment is actionable under the FHA. We conclude
it is. See Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2003)
(recognizing a cause of action under the FHA for hostile housing environment created
by disability harassment and citing, with approval, cases from other jurisdictions
recognizing an FHA claim for hostile housing environment created by sexual
harassment); see also DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing an FHA claim for hostile housing environment created by sexual
harassment); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1089-90 (10th Cir. 1993) (same).4

Next, Winter insists there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict
in favor of Quigley on her hostile housing environment created by sexual harassment
claim. In this case, there was sufficient evidence to support a hostile housing
environment claim if a reasonable jury could find Quigley proved by a preponderance
of the evidence Winter subjected her to unwelcome sexual harassment, and the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with or deprive
Quigley of her right to use or enjoy her home. See DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008
(“Applied to the housing context, a claim [of hostile housing environment caused by
sexual harassment] is actionable ‘when the offensive behavior unreasonably interferes
with use and enjoyment of the premises.’” (quoting Honce, 1 F.3d at 1090) (“The
harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
housing arrangement.”))). Cf. Neudecker, 351 F.3d at 364-65 (setting forth the
elements of a hostile housing environment disability harassment claim).

4
Winter all but conceded this issue at oral argument.

-7-
 Winter denies he subjected Quigley to sexual advances or requests for sexual
favors, and, alternatively, any sexual harassment Quigley experienced was not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to support the jury’s verdict. Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to Quigley, we conclude Quigley presented sufficient
evidence of numerous unwanted interactions of a sexual nature that interfered with
Quigley’s use and enjoyment of her home. Quigley testified Winter subjected her to
unwanted touching on two occasions, made sexually suggestive comments, rubbed his
genitals in front of her, placed several middle of the night phone calls to her home,
made repeated unannounced visits, and, on one occasion, while Winter lay on
Quigley’s couch, had to be told to leave her home at least three times before he
complied. We emphasize that Winter subjected Quigley to these unwanted
interactions in her own home, a place where Quigley was entitled to feel safe and
secure and need not flee, which makes Winter’s conduct even more egregious.

In order to set aside the jury’s verdict in favor of Quigley, Winter must show
“a complete absence of probative facts” support the jury’s verdict and no reasonable
jury could have found in Quigley’s favor. Heaton, 534 F.3d at 887. Winter simply
cannot meet this high threshold for setting aside the jury’s verdict.

3. “Quid Pro Quo” Sexual Harassment
Winter next contends the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment
as a matter of law on Quigley’s “quid pro quo” sexual harassment claim. “‘Quid pro
quo’ harassment occurs when housing benefits are explicitly or implicitly conditioned
on sexual favors.” Honce, 1 F.3d at 1089; cf. Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d
999, 1006 n.8 (8th Cir. 2000) (“To prevail on her [employment discrimination] quid
pro quo claim, [plaintiff] needed to prove (1) she was a member of a protected class;
(2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment in the form of sexual advances or
requests for sexual favors; (3) the harassment was based on sex; and (4) her
submission to the unwelcome advances was an express or implied condition for

-8-
receiving job benefits or her refusal to submit resulted in a tangible job detriment.”
(citation omitted)).

In reviewing the district court’s denial of Winter’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law, we must view all facts in the light most favorable to Quigley and afford
her all reasonable inferences . See HOK Sport, Inc. v. FC Des Moines, L.C., 495 F.3d
927, 934 (8th Cir. 2007). “‘[W]here conflicting inferences reasonably can be drawn
from evidence, it is the function of the jury to determine what inference shall be
drawn.’” Id. (quoting Canny v. Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Group, Inc., 439 F.3d
894, 900 (8th Cir. 2006)).

While the evidence of “quid pro quo” harassment was not overwhelming, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Quigley, we conclude there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Specifically, when Quigley inquired
about the likelihood of receiving her deposit back from Winter, Winter fluttered his
hand against Quigley’s stomach and said, “My eagle eyes have not seen everything
yet.” The jury could reasonably infer Winter was telling Quigley the return of her
deposit was conditioned upon Winter seeing more of Quigley’s body or even
receiving a sexual favor, which would amount to “quid pro quo” sexual harassment.
We will not disturb the jury’s verdict.

4. Coercion, Intimidation, or Interference with Housing Rights
Winter maintains the district court should not have denied Winter’s post-trial
motion on Quigley’s coercion, intimidation, and interference claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 3617. Winter contends Quigley’s claim was “essentially a retaliation claim” and
Quigley failed to prove retaliation.

Section 3617 states:

-9-
 It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any
person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having
exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged
any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or
protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.

In addition, 24 C.F.R. § 100.400 gives the following examples of conduct prohibited
by 42 U.S.C. § 3617:

(1) Coercing a person, either orally, in writing, or by other means, to
deny or limit the benefits provided that person in connection with
the sale or rental of a dwelling . . . because of . . . sex . . . .

(2) Threatening, intimidating or interfering with persons in their
enjoyment of a dwelling because of the . . . sex . . . of such
persons, or of visitors or associates of such persons.

....

(5) Retaliating against any person because that person has made a
complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in a
proceeding under the Fair Housing Act.

In arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, Winter
focuses solely on the retaliation aspect of 42 U.S.C. § 3617. As Quigley points out,
retaliation is only one form of conduct prohibited under § 3617. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Quigley, we conclude there was more than
sufficient evidence of coercion, intimidation, and interference with Quigley’s
enjoyment of her housing rights, other than retaliation, to support the jury’s verdict.

5. Discriminatory Housing Practices
Winter also takes issue with the district court’s denial of his motion for
judgment as a matter of law on Quigley’s discriminatory housing practices claim.

-10-
Winter complains the district court erred in instructing the jury and the jury’s verdict
was not supported by sufficient evidence.

With respect to discriminatory housing practices, the district court instructed
the jury as follows in Instruction No. 8A:

The plaintiff must prove by the preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant engaged in a discriminatory housing practice. The
following are considered discriminatory housing practices prohibited by
the present laws:

First, it is unlawful under the Fair Housing Act for a landlord to
refuse to rent, or otherwise make unavailable houses or apartments or
dwellings because of the tenant or applicant’s sex.

Second, it is unlawful under the Fair Housing Act for a landlord
to impose different terms, conditions or privileges related to the rental of
a house or apartment or dwelling, or to deny or limit the terms,
conditions, or privileges of the rental of an apartment or house or
dwelling because of sex.

Third, it is unlawful under the Fair Housing Act to make
statements with respect to the rental of a house, apartment or dwelling
that indicate any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on sex,
or that indicate any intention to make such a preference, limitation or
discrimination.

Fourth, it is unlawful under the Fair Housing Act to coerce,
intimidate, or interfere with any person in the exercise and enjoyment of
rights granted and protected by the Fair Housing Act.

If you find that the plaintiff has shown one or more of these acts
or practices by the preponderance of the evidence, you must find that the
plaintiff has shown that the defendant committed a discriminatory
housing practice.

-11-
 If the plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant has committed one of the above listed acts,
then your verdict must be for the defendant.

The next jury instruction provided,

The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
sex was a motivating factor in defendant’s commission of any
discriminatory housing practice.

The plaintiff is not required to show that her sex was the sole
reason for the defendant’s action; the plaintiff is only required to show
that sex was one motivating factor behind the challenged conduct.

The corresponding question on the verdict form, Question No. 2, asked the jury, “Do
you find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant discriminated against
plaintiff on the basis of sex in violation of the present laws?”5

Winter maintains Instruction No. 8A was erroneous because Quigley presented
no evidence (1) Winter “refused to rent or otherwise made unavailable dwellings to
her because of her sex”; (2) Quigley’s “rental agreement was any different than those
of [Winter’s] other tenants, . . . her rent was raised or lowered, [or] any act was taken
with respect to the above matters at all, let alone because of [Quigley’s] sex”; or
(3) Winter “made a statement with respect to rental of his property that indicated a
preference, limitation, or discrimination based on sex.” Winter also protests
Instruction No. 8A’s inclusion of the following language: “[I]t is unlawful under the
[FHA] to coerce, intimidate, or interfere with any person in the exercise and

5
Quigley suggests Question No. 2 on the verdict form was not directly tied to
Instruction No. 8A. We reject Quigley’s position. While Question No. 2 may not
have explicitly referenced Instruction No. 8A, there was no other instruction
explaining what would constitute discriminatory housing practices or sex
discrimination.

-12-
enjoyment of rights granted and protected by the [FHA],” because another jury
instruction and question on the verdict form addressed Quigley’s claim of coercion,
intimidation, and interference with housing rights. Because there was only one blank
on the verdict form for the jury to fill in the amount of compensatory damages for all
three of Quigley’s FHA claims, Winter raises the possibility Quigley recovered
damages twice under the same theory of recovery. Winter claims these alleged errors
in the jury instructions and verdict form entitle him to a new trial.

Before trial, Winter submitted proposed jury instructions and a proposed verdict
form to the district court. Winter’s proposed jury instructions included an instruction
on unlawful discriminatory practices under the FHA which was similar to Instruction
No. 8A. Winter’s proposed instruction stated it was unlawful under the FHA to
“[t]hreaten, intimidate or interfere with persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling
because of the sex of such persons, or of visitors or associates of such persons.”
Winter’s proposed verdict form also included only one blank for the jury to award
compensatory damages for Quigley’s FHA and ICRA claims. Later, during the jury
instruction conference, Winter made a general objection to the inclusion of Instruction
No. 8A, and he made some specific objections to the initial version of Instruction No.
8A. Winter did not dispute the statement of the law, only contesting whether any
evidence existed for each violation and preferring a simple instruction on sexual
harassment. Winter did not object to the portion of the instruction concerning
coercion, intimidation and interference with FHA rights, nor did Winter object to the
final form of Instruction No. 8A. Winter likewise did not object to having only one
line on the verdict form for compensatory damages.

In order to preserve for appeal an objection to a jury instruction or verdict form,
“appellants must raise specific objections to the form or content of” the instruction or
verdict form before the district court. Horstmyer v. Black & Decker, (U.S.), Inc., 151
F.3d 765, 770 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1) (“A
party who objects to an instruction . . . must do so on the record, stating distinctly the

-13-
matter objected to and the grounds for the objection.”). Absent a specific objection,
we will review only for plain error. See Horstmyer, 151 F.3d at 770. Winter did not
properly preserve the objections he now makes to Instruction No. 8A and the verdict
form. We thus review his claims for plain error.

“‘Plain error is a stringently limited standard of review,’ especially in the civil
context, and must result in a miscarriage of justice in order to compel reversal.” Id.
at 771 (quoting Rush v. Smith, 56 F.3d 918, 925 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc)). Jury
instructions must fairly and adequately state the law, but “we will not find error in
instructions simply because they are technically imperfect or are not a model of
clarity.” Hastings v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 975 F.2d 506, 510 (8th Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted). Having reviewed the jury instructions in their entirety, we
conclude Winter has not shown there was plain error in either the form or content of
the instructions and verdict form.

Moreover, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Quigley, we
conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict in favor of
Quigley on her sex discrimination claim. Winter’s contention that he had a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for any discriminatory behavior fails because the jury’s
verdict demonstrates the jury did not believe Winter. Because we find the district
court sufficiently submitted each claim to the jury, we find no error in the district
court’s use of only one space for compensatory damages on the verdict form.

6. Evidentiary Issues
We now turn to Winter’s claim that the district court made improper evidentiary
rulings regarding the admission of testimony at trial. “A district court enjoys wide
discretion in ruling on the admissibility of proffered evidence, and evidentiary rulings
should only be overturned if there was a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.”
US Salt, 563 F.3d at 689-90 (internal marks and quotations omitted). “The reason for
[our] extremely deferential standard of review is obvious: A Rule 403 ruling—as

-14-
much as any type of determination made by a district court—depends on factors that
are uniquely accessible to the trial judge who is present in the courtroom and uniquely
inaccessible to an appellate judge who must take the case on a cold record.” Olson v.
Ford Motor Co., 481 F.3d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 2007).

Winter first claims the district court erred in admitting the testimony of
Winter’s former tenants, Lisa Scofield, Kayla Mobley, and Holly Cook. These three
women testified Winter also subjected them to sexual harassment while they were
Winter’s tenants. Winter claims the testimony of these three women was irrelevant
because there was no evidence Quigley knew the women or observed any of the
events to which they testified.

In Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (2008), the Supreme
Court considered the admissibility of so-called “me too” evidence in an employment
discrimination case. The Court determined such evidence was neither per se
admissible nor per se inadmissible. See id. at 386-88. Rather, “[t]he question whether
evidence of discrimination [against other employees] by other supervisors is relevant
in an individual ADEA case is fact based and depends on many factors, including how
closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case.”
Id. at 388. The Court also observed, “In deference to a district court’s familiarity with
the details of the case and its greater experience in evidentiary matters, courts of
appeals afford broad discretion to a district court’s evidentiary rulings.” Id. at 384.

Our review of the trial transcript reveals the district court carefully analyzed the
admissibility of each witness’s testimony. The district court refused to permit Mary
Davis, another former tenant of Winter, to testify after hearing her proposed testimony
outside the presence of the jury. The district court excluded this testimony because
Davis had last rented from Winter in 1994, and the district court found her testimony
was too remote. Affording the district court broad discretion, we hold the district

-15-
court properly performed its gatekeeping function and did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence of Winter’s three former tenants.

Winter next takes issue with the district court’s decision to admit the testimony
of Patricia Johnson (Johnson), a SCHRC investigator, and the SCHRC’s probable
cause determination. Winter suggests “Johnson’s testimony regarding the [SCHRC
probable cause] determination and how it was made was . . . prejudicial and usurped
the role of the jury.” Winter also maintains “Johnson’s testimony as a whole was
littered with hearsay and irrelevant evidence that was unfairly prejudicial to [Winter]
and should have been excluded in its entirety.”

“In an employment discrimination case, the decision whether to admit or
exclude administrative findings, such as EEOC investigation matters, is properly left
to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Doss v. Frontenac, 14 F.3d 1313, 1318 (8th
Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). In this case, the district court instructed the jury
regarding the probable cause determination and the testimony concerning the probable
cause determination. The instruction stated:

You have heard evidence about an investigation performed by the
[SCHRC] and that organization’s finding of “probable cause” regarding
the issues in this case. You may consider this finding by the [SCHRC]
as evidence as set out in Exhibit 4. The “probable cause” finding by the
[SCHRC] is not a finding you are bound by. It is just a step in procedure
and is not a finding by a preponderance of the evidence. You, as a jury,
not the [SCHRC], are the ones to decide whether or not the issues
presented for your consideration have been proved or not.

Even if the admission were indeed an error, any possible prejudice was cured by the
above instruction. See Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th
Cir. 1984) (“To admit the report under these circumstances would amount to admitting
the opinion of an expert witness as to what conclusions the jury should draw[.]”).
With regard to Johnson’s testimony as a whole, Winter makes only general

-16-
accusations of irrelevancy and prejudice, but he fails to cite any specific examples.
Under the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
admission of Johnson’s testimony.

Finally, Winter argues the district court improperly excluded Quigley’s records
from Siouxland Mental Health (Siouxland) and the testimony of Siouxland
physician’s assistant Dawn Nolan (Nolan). Before trial, Quigley moved in limine to
exclude “any evidence, comment or argument” related to Quigley’s Siouxland mental
health records and her history of, and treatment for, mental health conditions. The
district court granted the motion, excluding admission of Quigley’s records, except
for a portion to which the parties stipulated. The parties stipulated to the following
jury instruction: “The plaintiff has a history of depression and anxiety prior to
January, 2004.”

During her trial testimony, Johnson of the SCHRC reported Quigley had
received counseling services at Siouxland for depression caused by the sexual
harassment. This testimony was elicited by Winter’s attorney during cross-
examination. Winter then sought to introduce Nolan’s testimony to prove Quigley did
not report sexual harassment to Nolan and lied to Johnson when she said she had.
Quigley objected to Nolan testifying, arguing Nolan’s testimony would violate the
psychiatrist-patient or physician-client privilege. The district court heard Nolan’s
proposed testimony outside the presence of the jury. The district court determined
Nolan’s testimony was inadmissible because Winter failed to prove Quigley did not
tell anyone at Siouxland about the sexual harassment. We find no abuse of discretion
in the district court’s exclusion of Quigley’s medical records and Nolan’s testimony.

-17-
 B. Quigley’s Claims on Appeal
Having found no reversible trial error, we turn to Quigley’s claims on appeal.
Quigley claims the district court (1) improperly reduced the jury’s punitive damage
award from $250,000.00 to $20,527.50, and (2) failed to conduct a proper analysis of
Quigley’s entitlement to attorney fees and awarded an insufficient amount of attorney
fees to Quigley. Conversely, Winter claims the district court erred in submitting
punitive damages to the jury and in awarding any amount of punitive damages or
attorney fees to Quigley.

1. Punitive Damages
a. Punitive Damages Jury Instruction
We first address Winter’s contention that the district court erred in allowing the
jury to consider punitive damages. “The [FHA] provides for the recovery of punitive
damages by victims of discriminatory housing practices.” Badami v. Flood, 214 F.3d
994, 997 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (1994)). We apply the same
standard for punitive damages in [FHA] cases as we do in employment discrimination
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights cases. Id. at 997 (referencing Kolstad v. Am. Dental
Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999)). “Punitive damages are appropriate in a federal civil
rights action ‘when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive
or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected
rights of others.’” Id. at 997 (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). In
Kolstad, a gender discrimination case, the Supreme Court held “[t]he terms ‘malice’
and ‘reckless [indifference]’ ultimately focus on the actor’s state of mind.” Kolstad,
527 U.S. at 535 (citations omitted). They “pertain to the [defendant’s] knowledge that
[he] may be acting in violation of federal law, not [his] awareness that [he] is engaging
in discrimination.” Badami, 214 F.3d at 997 (quoting Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 535).
Thus, “it is sufficient that a defendant ‘discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that
[his] actions will violate federal law to be liable in punitive damages.’” Id. (quoting
Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536).

-18-
 The district court determined Quigley had presented sufficient evidence to
justify instructing the jury on punitive damages, because Winter admitted at trial he
knew sexual harassment was unlawful, he had been a landlord for many years and
managed many properties, he had worked with various governmental agencies to
provide subsidized housing, and his lease agreement with Quigley stated he, as the
landlord, was not to discriminate on the basis of sex. We agree with the district court.
The district court did not err in submitting punitive damages for the jury’s
consideration.

b. Reasonableness of the Punitive Damages Award
The jury found Quigley was entitled to punitive damages in the amount of
$250,000.00, and the district court entered judgment. Winter then filed a motion to
amend the judgment to reduce the punitive damages award. The district court noted
the punitive damages award was more than eighteen times the compensatory damages
award ($13,685.00) and found the award was excessive and did not comport with due
process. The district court reduced the award to $20,527.50, which amounted to one
and a half times the compensatory damages award, “for the simple reason that
[Winter’s] conduct . . . can be considered only as to what he said and did directly to
[Quigley].”

Quigley challenges the district court’s analysis, arguing the jury’s punitive
damages award complied with due process and the original award should be
reinstated. “We review a district court’s legal conclusions regarding punitive damages
de novo.” Henderson v. Simmons Foods, Inc., 217 F.3d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted). We also review the proportionality determination de novo. See
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001)
(citation omitted).

The factual findings made by the district courts in conducting the
excessiveness inquiry, of course, must be accepted unless clearly

-19-
 erroneous. . . . But the question whether a [punitive damages award] is
constitutionally excessive calls for the application of a constitutional
standard to the facts of a particular case, and in this context de novo
review of that question is appropriate.

Id. (internal marks and citation omitted).

To assess the reasonableness or excessiveness of a punitive damages award, we
consider: (1) “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct,” (2) the ratio
between punitive damages and actual harm (compensatory damages), and (3) “the
civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct.” BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575, 580-81, 583 (1996).

i. Reprehensibility
In Gore, the Supreme Court declared the degree of reprehensibility was
“[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award.” Id. at 575. In assessing the degree of reprehensibility, we must consider
whether

the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health
or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability;
the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and
the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere
accident.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (citing Gore,
517 U.S. at 576-77).

The district court determined Winter’s conduct was not sufficiently
reprehensible to justify the jury’s punitive damages award. The district court may
have based this finding on an assumption the jury considered Winter’s conduct toward

-20-
other tenants, and not just the conduct directed toward Quigley, in arriving at the
punitive damages amount. However, as Quigley notes, the jury instruction on punitive
damages clearly stated the jury was to consider “[Winter]’s conduct only as against
[Quigley]” in assessing punitive damages. We have no reason to believe the jury
disregarded the district court’s instructions.

Winter’s conduct was reprehensible. Quigley lived alone with small children
at the time of Winter’s harassment, and she had few, if any, alternative housing
options. Quigley’s financial vulnerability was evidenced by her need for Section 8
housing vouchers. Winter held a certain level of power over Quigley and her family.
Winter repeatedly subjected Quigley to inappropriate conduct during Quigley’s
tenancy, and Winter’s conduct was unquestionably intentional and more than churlish.
Most significant, Winter’s conduct intruded upon Quigley’s sense of security in her
own home. However, as we explain below, we do not believe the degree of
reprehensibility of Winter’s conduct justifies the jury’s large punitive damages award.

ii. Ratio Between Punitive Damages and Actual Harm
The second Gore factor, the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages,
is the “most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive
damages award.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 580. Punitive “damages must bear a ‘reasonable
relationship’ to compensatory damages.” Id. What constitutes a “reasonable
relationship” varies from case to case. The Supreme Court “ha[s] consistently rejected
the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula,
even one that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive award.” Id. at
582 (citation omitted). The Court explained,

low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher
ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.
A higher ratio may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard

-21-
 to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been
difficult to determine.

Id.

Yet, later, in Campbell, the Court declared, “Our jurisprudence and the
principles it has now established demonstrate . . . few awards exceeding a single-digit
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy
due process.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. The Court continued, “Single-digit
multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the
State’s goals of deterrence and retribution.” Id. The Court reiterated there was “a
long legislative history, dating back over 700 years and going forward to today,
providing for sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish.”
Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 581 n.33). The district court then declared, “While these
ratios are not binding, they are instructive.” Id.

In Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 563 F.3d 357, 359, 362 (8th Cir. 2009), a
retaliation case, our court found a punitive damages award, which was “approximately
sixteen times greater than all of the actual damages combined” was excessive. Citing
Campbell, we reasoned, because the jury’s award of $30,000 in actual damages was
not a nominal amount, “a single-digit multiple should be the outer limit on [the
punitive damages] award.” Id. at 362. We observed, the Supreme Court found a
punitive damages award “‘more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages
. . . close to the line’” of constitutionality. Id. at 363 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-4 (1991)). Based on the Court’s guidance in Campbell and
Haslip, we found “a four-to-one ratio” was an appropriate ratio. Id.

Recognizing we are not bound by a rigid mathematical formula, we
nevertheless, are persuaded a single digit multiplier is appropriate in the present case.
We take our guidance from the Supreme Court’s assessment of single-digit

-22-
multipliers. Quigley was awarded $13,685.00 in compensatory damages, which is not
a nominal amount. We find the circumstances of this case and due process do not
justify a punitive damages award eighteen times greater than the compensatory
damages and, agreeing with the district court, conclude the jury’s punitive damage
award was excessive.

iii. Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct
We turn then to the final Gore factor, a comparison between the punitive
damages award and the civil and criminal penalties available for comparable
misconduct. “[A] reviewing court engaged in determining whether an award of
punitive damages is excessive should ‘accord “substantial deference” to legislative
judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.’” Gore, 517 U.S.
at 583 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 282, 301(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

Quigley points out 42 U.S.C. § 3614 permits the Attorney General to commence
a civil action against “any person . . . engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to
the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by the [FHA].” Section 3614(d)(1)(C),
as adjusted by the Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-410, § 5(a)(4),
104 Stat. 891, and 29 C.F.R. § 85.3(b)(3), states a court may grant relief for a first
violation in an amount not exceeding $55,000.

While we agree with the district court that the jury’s punitive damage award
was excessive, we disagree with the district court’s assessment that $20,527.50, which
is one and a half times the compensatory award, sufficiently reflects the
reprehensibility of Winter’s conduct. We conclude an appropriate punitive damages
award in this case is $54,750. This amount is four times greater than Quigley’s
compensatory damages ($13,685.00), which we find is an appropriate ratio under the
circumstances of this case. This amount comports with due process, while achieving

-23-
the statutory and regulatory goals of retribution and deterrence. See Campbell, 538
U.S. at 425.

2. Attorney Fees
Finally, Quigley contests the district court’s judgment with respect to the
attorney fee award. The district court granted Quigley’s motion for attorney fees, but
only awarded her $20,000.00 of the $117,066.50 Quigley requested. “‘We review the
district court’s award of attorney fees for abuse of discretion.’” Heaton, 534 F.3d at
887 (quoting Ollis v. HearthStone Homes, Inc., 495 F.3d 570, 576 (8th Cir. 2007)).

a. Entitlement to Attorney Fees
“The prevailing party in FHA litigation may be awarded costs and a reasonable
attorney’s fee.” Oxford House-A v. City of Univ. City, 87 F.3d 1022, 1024 (8th Cir.
1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2)). Winter does not contest Quigley was a
prevailing party; however, Winter suggests Quigley may not be entitled to attorney
fees because she had a contingency fee agreement with her attorneys. Quigley’s
attorney stated, “[W]e have agreed with [Quigley] . . . that we would take a
contingency fee amount, which is 33 1/3 [%], or what the court would grant us in
statutorily granted attorney fees. That’s an either/or. We don’t get both.”

Winter cites two 1986 cases from outside our circuit in support of his
proposition that the existence of a contingency agreement bars an award of attorney
fees. See Tolliver v. Amici, 800 F.2d 149, 152 (7th Cir. 1986); Keith v. Volpe, 644
F. Supp. 1317, 1319 (C.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988). We
consider Tolliver and Keith inapplicable and not contrary to our decision. As Quigley
notes, these two cases were decided before the 1988 amendments to the FHA. Before
the amendments, an award of attorney fees under the FHA was only available to “a
prevailing plaintiff [who was] not financially able to assume said attorney fees.” See
Tolliver, 800 F.2d at 152 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1986)). The current version of
the FHA does not limit attorney fees to plaintiffs or to those who are not financially

-24-
able to assume the fees; rather, “the prevailing party, other than the United States,
[may recover] a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (emphasis added).
“The attorney’s fees provided for in a contingent-fee agreement is not a ceiling upon
the fees recoverable.” Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989) (addressing
attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988). The district court did not err in finding
Quigley was entitled to attorney fees.

b. Amount of Attorney Fees
We now consider whether the district court erred in its manner of calculation
or in the amount of attorney fees awarded to Quigley. The Supreme Court has stated,

The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a
reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation
provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the
value of a lawyer’s services. The party seeking an award of fees should
submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. Where
the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce
the award accordingly.

The district court also should exclude from this initial fee
calculation hours that were not “reasonably expended.” Cases may be
overstaffed, and the skill and experience of lawyers vary widely.
Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good-faith effort to
exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is
obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.

-25-
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983) (internal citations omitted).6 See
also Hanig v. Lee, 415 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The starting point in
determining attorney fees is the lodestar, which is calculated by multiplying the
number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rates.” (quoting Fish
v. St. Cloud State Univ., 295 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 2002)).

The district court’s explanation for its award of attorney fees is puzzling. The
court stated, “There is no need to discuss the lodestar calculations or the skill and
experience of the plaintiff’s lawyers.” Instead, the district court relied upon the
“Kloberdanz theory.” This Kloberdanz theory apparently came from an unpublished
district court case, United States v. Kloberdanz, No. CR 76-2013 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 30,
1976) (McManus, J.), which did not address the issue of attorney fees. According to
the district court, Kloberdanz involved the criminal prosecution of a postal employee
for theft, and the Kloberdanz court found there was no need for an excessive fine
because, in the district court’s words, “it was a two bit case and he was going to
receive a two bit fine.” The district court then noted Quigley’s case “is not a two bit
case . . . [but] there is still a matter of justice, there is still a matter of basic fairness,
there is still a matter of equity.” The district court declared its belief that it was
“appropriate to determine or consider the effect on [Winter], whether he can pay [the
attorney fees] or not.” The district court concluded, “[W]hile they certainly are good
lawyers and they certainly did a good job, . . . attorney fees in the sum of $20,000.00
are appropriate.”

The district court’s failure, under the circumstances here, to analyze Quigley’s
entitlement to attorney fees under the lodestar approach was an abuse of discretion.
See De Jesús Nazario v. Morris Rodríguez, 554 F.3d 196, 207 (1st Cir. 2009)

6
While Hensley involved an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the
Hensley Court made clear “[t]he standards set forth in [the] opinion are generally
applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a
‘prevailing party.’” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 n.7.

-26-
(“Normally, a district court begins with a lodestar analysis, because failure to conduct
such an undertaking ‘creates a substantial burden upon the district court to account for
its actions.’” (quoting Coutin v. Young & Rubicam P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 331, 338 (1st
Cir. 1997))); Moton v. Nathan & Nathan, P.C., 297 F. App’x 930, 932 (11th Cir.
2008) (“Although the district court admittedly has wide discretion in this arena, we
nonetheless are constrained to hold that the district court abused its discretion by
failing to perform any ‘lodestar’ calculation at all.” (citation omitted)); Pa. Envt’l.
Defense Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 232-33, 235 (3d Cir.
1998) (reversing and remanding based on the district court’s failure to use the lodestar
method in awarding attorney fees); Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363-
64, 365 (9th Cir. 1996) (same).

Furthermore, we find the district court erred in its consideration of Winter’s
ability to pay. Even if a defendant’s ability to pay could be an appropriate
consideration in awarding attorney fees, the record in this case adequately supports
Winter is a substantial owner of real estate, and Winter did not submit any evidence
of his financial situation or his net worth to address any issue of his inability to pay
a substantial fee award.

In lieu of remanding the case to the district court, Quigley requests us to
conduct a lodestar calculation and award the appropriate amount of attorney fees.
Quigley insists a remand to the district court would create a “serious risk of substantial
continued litigation,” because, based on the district court’s previous decision, Quigley
believes “another appeal to [our court] may be necessary if the issue is remanded.”

“A request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted this command to
authorize circuit courts to “determine for ourselves, once we conclude that the district
court has abused its discretion, how many hours were reasonably spent in litigation.”
Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 213 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation

-27-
omitted). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (providing circuit courts of appeals the power to
“direct the entry of such appropriate judgment . . . as may be just.”); Gay Officers
Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 299 (1st Cir. 2001) (foregoing a remand
and imposing an award of punitive damages where the district court erred in its
attorney fees calculation). We have not located any cases from our circuit where we
have foregone a remand under these circumstances. Cf. In re Kujawa, 270 F.3d 578,
(8th Cir. 2001); Thomlinson v. City of Omaha, 63 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 1995); Rydder
v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 1995); Allen v. Higgins, 902 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.
1990). However, like the First and Eleventh Circuits, we believe the record before us
is clear, remand would be inefficient, and it is necessary for us to determine an
appropriate attorney fees award in this case in order to comply with the Supreme
Court’s command that “[a] request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second
major litigation,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.7

While we agree with Quigley that the district court abused its discretion in
significantly reducing Quigley’s requested attorney fees without conducting the
proper analysis and in basing its decision on unsupported considerations, we do agree
with the district court’s determination that Quigley’s attorney fees request was
excessive. We have reviewed in depth Quigley’s supporting documentation.
According to one of Quigley’s attorneys, Scott Moore, the preparation of Quigley’s
case involved 437.7 hours of work performed by six attorneys and two paralegals
from Baird Holm, LLP, an Omaha, Nebraska, law firm. These lawyers and their firm
are deservedly highly respected, and their success in this case is commendable.
Although we do not question the ethics or abilities of these attorneys, in our view, the

7
We do not argue with the dissent that the usual procedure is to remand any
further consideration of an attorney fee award to the district court because the district
court typically is “in a better position to perform this time-consuming and fact-
intensive task.” However, based on the circumstances and record of this case, we
believe it is more efficient and appropriate for our court to decide the attorney fee
award now.

-28-
complexity of the issues in this case simply did not warrant the requested amount of
“lawyering.” We also conclude there was a significant amount of duplicative work,
in part caused by transitions in the attorneys of record. For those reasons, we
determine it is reasonable and appropriate to reduce the hours expended by each of the
attorneys and paralegals by one-third, while leaving their hourly rates undisturbed.
See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (“Cases may be overstaffed.”).

Using the adjusted number of hours, and multiplying by the respective hourly
rates, we arrive at the following lodestar calculation.

Attorneys Reasonable Fees

Scott P. Moore $44,110.00
Kirk S. Blecha $ 189.00
Christopher R. Hedican $21,641.00
Allison D. Balus $ 4,935.00
Alison A. Dempsey $ 3,819.33
Mark P.A. Hudson $ 2,060.00

Paralegals

Kris P. Kimball $ 1,045.00
Sharada A. Rajappa $ 245.00

Total: $78,044.33

“The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the
inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust
the fee upward or downward, including the important factor of the ‘results obtained.’”
Hensley, 461 at 434. Quigley obtained excellent results, as the jury found in her favor
on all claims. We conclude no other upward or downward adjustments are mandated
in this case. We thus conclude a reasonable attorney fee award in this case is
$78,044.33.

-29-
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the district court’s judgment
with respect to Winter’s claims on cross-appeal. With respect to Quigley’s claims on
appeal, we reverse and remand the case to the district court with instructions to award
Quigley $54,750.00 in punitive damages and $78,044.33 in attorney fees, together
with $1,587.88 in non-taxable costs.8

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join all of the Court’s opinion with the exception of the decision to forego a
remand to the district court for a proper calculation of the attorneys’ fee award. I do
not interpret the Supreme Court’s statement in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424
(1983), about avoiding a “second major litigation” to encourage courts of appeals to
usurp the traditional role of district courts in determining the proper fee award.
Rather, I read Hensley to suggest that it is the deferential standard of review, not our
ability to calculate a fee award de novo, that alleviates the Supreme Court’s efficiency
concerns, including “avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual
matters.” See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437; see also id. at 430 n.3 (listing twelve factors
to consider in calculating a fee award). We review the amount of an award using the
deferential abuse of discretion standard precisely because “of the district court’s
superior understanding of the litigation.” See id. at 437.

The Court today declares that because “the record before us is clear” and
“remand would be inefficient,” it is “necessary” for us to determine the appropriate
attorneys’ fee award. Ante, at 28. Because the same can be said for most, if not all,
attorneys’ fee disputes that are appealed, it will henceforth become necessary for us
to calculate the proper attorneys’ fee award as a matter of course, whenever we find
an abuse of discretion. District courts are in a far better position to perform this time-

8
Winter does not contest Quigley’s costs.

-30-
consuming and fact-intensive task. As a result, I would adhere to our previous cases
in which we have uniformly remanded for the district court to re-calculate the proper
attorneys’ fee award. See, e.g., Lash v. Hollis, 525 F.3d 636, 643 (8th Cir. 2008);
ante, at 27-28 (collecting cases); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 809
(2002) (similarly remanding for a new award calculation); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440
(same). On this issue alone, I respectfully dissent.
______________________________

-31-