UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4283
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
FLORENTINO CASTANEDA-PELAEZ, a/k/a Florentino Castanada-
Palaez, a/k/a Alejandro Mendoza-Rivielo,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:12-cr-00390-NCT-1)
Submitted: October 28, 2013 Decided: November 8, 2013
Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Clark Fischer, RANDOLPH & FISCHER, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Kyle D. Pousson, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Florentino Castaneda-Pelaez, a native and citizen of
Mexico, appeals his 24-month sentence imposed upon his guilty
plea to re-entering the United States after previously being
deported, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006). Castaneda-Pelaez argues that
his above-Guidelines sentence was unreasonable. We disagree and
affirm his sentence.
Castaneda-Pelaez was first deported from the United
States in April 1993, following a state court conviction for
assault. Castaneda-Pelaez subsequently returned to the United
States and was convicted of three separate violent offenses
involving family members. In 1998, Castaneda-Pelaez was
convicted of illegal re-entry of a deported alien and sentenced
to 10 months’ imprisonment. He again returned to the United
States and was again convicted of illegal re-entry and received
a sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment. Castaneda-Pelaez was
deported for a third time in February 2010. He was arrested in
North Carolina in September 2011 on unrelated charges, using an
alias. After he was identified using a fingerprint database,
Castaneda-Pelaez was again charged with illegal re-entry by a
previously deported alien. He pled guilty pursuant to a written
plea agreement.
Based on a total offense level of 10 and a criminal
history category of III, Castaneda-Pelaez’s advisory Guidelines
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range was 10 to 16 months’ imprisonment. However, the district
court granted the Government’s request for an upward variance,
sentencing Castaneda-Pelaez to 24 months’ imprisonment.
We review sentences for reasonableness “under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). This review entails
appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In determining
procedural reasonableness, this court considers whether the
district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory
Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for
an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id.
at 49-51. If the sentence is free of significant procedural
error, this Court reviews it for substantive reasonableness,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
at 51.
“When rendering a sentence, the district court must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented,”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted), and must
“adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful
appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
sentencing.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. An extensive explanation is
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not required as long as the appellate court is satisfied “‘that
[the district court] has considered the parties’ arguments and
has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal
decisionmaking authority.’” United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d
495, 500 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). When a district court imposes a sentence
that falls outside of the applicable Guidelines range, this
Court considers “whether the sentencing court acted reasonably
both with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and
with respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing
range.” United States v. Hernandez–Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118,
123 (4th Cir. 2007). In conducting this review, this court
“must give due deference to the district court’s decision that
the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the
variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
Our review of the record discloses that the district
court provided an adequate explanation for the variant sentence
imposed. Considered in the context of the entire sentencing
hearing, the district court’s statements provide a sufficient
explanation to satisfy this Court that it had “considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its]
own legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Boulware,
604 F.3d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita v. United
States, 552 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Specifically, the court
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identified Castaneda-Pelaez’s violent criminal history as well
as his prior incarcerations for the identical offense, noting
that “the 36 months he got back in 2007 for re-entering without
permission didn’t dissuade his return.” We find that the
district court adequately explained the above-Guidelines
sentence and committed no other error. Accordingly, we affirm.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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