Filed 1/21/14 In re D.F. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re D.F., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E058277
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. SWJ1200427)
v. OPINION
K.F.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John M. Monterosso,
Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Michelle L. Jarvis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
K.F. (mother) appeals from an order of the juvenile court authorizing the
administration of a psychotropic drug to her daughter, D.F. Mother contends she was
denied due process because D.F. was given the drug months before mother was given
proper notice and before the juvenile court approved it. We conclude the appeal is moot
because the order has expired by its own terms.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
D.F. was detained in foster care in June 2012. At the jurisdiction hearing, the
juvenile court found true the allegation under Welfare and Institutions Code 1 section 300,
subdivision (b) that the child had suffered or was at risk of suffering serious physical
harm or illness as a result of mother’s failure or inability to supervise or protect her
adequately, mother’s failure to protect her from the conduct of a custodian, and because
of the mother’s inability to provide regular care for the child because of the mother’s
mental illness, developmental disability or substance abuse. The supporting facts were
alleged to be that “[t]he child has disclosed that the mother continues to call the child
derogatory names”; mother “fails to protect the child from the mother’s boyfriend in that
he calls the child derogatory names and she fails to intervene on the child’s behalf; such
conditions place the child at risk from suffering serious emotional harm”; and “[t]he
mother suffers from emotional distress due to a parent-child conflict; such conditions
place the child at risk of serious harm.”
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.
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D.F. was referred for counseling, and the Riverside County Department of Public
Social Services (Department) requested that she receive a psychological evaluation. The
Department’s case plan service objectives for D.F. included the following:
“3. Psychotropic Med [¶] Eval/Monitoring [¶] Description [¶] The family member
shall follow with the recommendations and prescription medications prescribed by the
psychiatrist.” The juvenile court approved the case plan as written.
The Department filed a six-month review report on January 18, 2013. Dr. Suiter
had conducted a psychological evaluation of D.F. in September and October 2012. He
reported that she experienced heightened depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic patterns
consistent with her descriptions of severe physical and sexual abuse when she was with
mother. D.F. was extremely fearful of returning to mother, and she was often suicidal
and thought of running away. Dr. Suiter suggested evaluating her to determine if she
would benefit from psychotropic medications.
On November 29, 2012, D.F. visited Dr. Nayar because she felt anxious all the
time and had trouble sleeping. Dr. Nayar prescribed Zoloft. The social worker’s log for
that day stated that the foster mother had left a message that D.F. “saw Dr. today and they
need a copy of Dr. Suiter’s Psychological Evaluation, the Court Case # as the office
needs to submit a request to the Court so that [D.F.] can start the medication that was
prescribed to her: ZOLOFT. Fax over all this information to Dr.’s office.”
The social worker’s log for December 4, 2012, stated: “I called Med. Eval.
Program and I spoke to Daisy. She reports that Dr. needs the following: 1) Dr. Suiter’s
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psychological evaluation on [D.F.]. 2) The last Court’s minute order. 3) The
medications that were prescribed for [D.F.] was [sic] ZOLOFT (12.5 mg).”
On December 10, 2012, D.F. told the social worker the Zoloft had helped decrease
her anxiety but was causing nausea and an upset stomach. D.F. continued to attend
counseling, and the therapist diagnosed her with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
and probable physical and sexual abuse.
Mother filed a declaration on January 22, 2013, stating that D.F. was taking Zoloft
for depression, but D.F. had no history of depression, and mother did not believe Zoloft
was an appropriate drug for depression in a 12-year-old child. Mother attached a copy of
relevant pages from the PDR Pocket Guide to Prescription Drugs.
The juvenile court held a six-month review hearing on January 31, 2013. The
court continued services for mother and read and considered mother’s declaration, but
mother’s counsel did not raise the medication issue at the hearing, and the juvenile court
did not address the issue.
The social worker’s log note dated January 31, 2013, stated that D.F. reported she
no longer had the stomach uneasiness she had first experienced when taking Zoloft, but
she felt the medication was no longer helping her.
On February 11, 2013, Dr. Nayar submitted an application regarding psychotropic
medication to the juvenile court. The application stated that D.F. had ongoing symptoms
of PTSD and depressed mood, which interfered with her school performance and social
functioning. Mother was given notice of the application by mail.
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Mother filed an opposition to the application on February 20, 2013. She pointed
out, among other things, that Dr. Nayar had evaluated D.F. on November 29, 2012, but
the form was not filed until February 11, 2013.
The juvenile court signed an order granting the application on February 27, 2013.
The court stated it had considered mother’s opposition, and it ordered that the duration of
the treatment not exceed six months.
III. DISCUSSION
Only the juvenile court has authority to make an order regarding the
administration of psychotropic medication to a child who has been adjudged a dependent
of the court under section 300 and who has been removed from the physical custody of
parents under section 361. (§ 369.5, subd. (a).) Such authorization “shall be based on a
request from a physician, indicating the reasons for the request, a description of the
child’s diagnosis and behavior, the expected results of the medication, and a description
of any side effects of the medication.” (§ 369.5, subd. (a).) However, such medications
may be administered without court authorization in defined emergency situations. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.640(g)(1).) In such an emergency situation, “Court authorization
must be sought as soon as practical but in no case more than two court days after the
emergency administration of the psychotropic medication.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.640(g)(2).) It is undisputed that Zoloft is a psychotropic medication within the
statutory definitions.
The Department concedes that juvenile court authorization was sought much
longer than two days after administration of the medication, and that a due process
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violation occurred when mother did not receive timely notice. Here, however, the
juvenile court ordered on February 27, 2013, that the duration of D.F.’s treatment not
exceed six months. The treatment began on November 29, 2012; thus, the treatment
order has long expired by its own terms. This appeal is therefore moot because the court
cannot grant defendant any effectual relief. Mother nonetheless requests that the matter
be remanded with instructions to the juvenile court to ensure that mother is provided with
sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard before any psychotropic medication is
administered to D.F. and before the court acts on an application for the administration of
any psychotropic medication. In our view, such an order is unnecessary; the record
provides no basis for a conclusion that the delays in the present case were deliberate or
systematic. We will therefore order the appeal dismissed.
IV. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P.J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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