FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 11 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM RADCLIFFE, III, No. 12-55088
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:11-cv-00945-ODW-
DTB
v.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA and MEMORANDUM*
PROFESSIONAL RECOVERY
SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 5, 2014**
Pasadena, California
Before: BYBEE and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and ZILLY, Senior District Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Thomas S. Zilly, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
William Radcliffe appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for relief
from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Radcliffe’s motion
for relief from final judgment on the ground of excusable neglect. We reject
Radcliffe’s argument that the district court failed to analyze the reason for the
delay, the third factor set forth in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick
Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 385 (1993), and Briones v. Riviera
Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997). The district court cited each of
the four factors set forth in these cases and stated that Radcliffe’s “failure to
comply with the rules of this Court on several occasions renders Pioneer factors
three and four heavily in Defendants’ favor.” Nor was the district court’s analysis
of the remaining Pioneer-Briones factors “illogical, implausible, or without
support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” United
States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Counsel’s
repeated failure to comply with the local rules supported the district court’s
discretionary determination.
AFFIRMED.
2
FILED
MAR 11 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
William Radcliffe III v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Professional Recovery
Services, Inc., et al., No.12-55088
IKUTA, J., dissenting:
Because the district court failed to discuss one of the applicable factors set
forth in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership,
507 U.S. 380, 385 (1993), and Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379,
381 (9th Cir. 1997), and committed legal error in its analysis of another, I
respectfully dissent.
Although Radcliffe violated the local rules by failing to file his amended
complaint manually, the district court gave him an opportunity to file his complaint
by August 22, 2011. It was Radcliffe’s failure to comply with that deadline—not
his initial failure to follow the local rules—that led to the dismissal. Radcliffe
presented a colorable reason for his failure to meet the August 22 deadline: he
placed the complaint in the mail, but it was never delivered. The district court
failed to mention this reason and therefore abused its discretion. Lemoge v. United
States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2009); Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 231
F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2000).
The district court also committed legal error in its analysis of the prejudice
1
prong by stating that defendants would suffer prejudice because “if relief from
judgment is granted, Defendants will have to continue defending the allegations
that are potentially meritless.” But we have held that a defendant’s obligation to
continue litigating a case is not prejudicial. See Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc.,
624 F.3d 1253, 1262 (9th Cir. 2010); Bateman, 231 F.3d at 1224–25.
Given these legal errors, I would reverse and remand for the district court to
reevaluate Radcliffe’s motion under the correct legal standard.
2