UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4549
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TYSHIK-KEE WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,
Chief District Judge. (5:13-cr-00017-D-1)
Submitted: April 30, 2014 Decided: May 12, 2014
Before KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Bradley L. Henry, BREEDING & LODATO, LLC, Knoxville, Tennessee,
for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne Watford-McKinney, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tyshik-Kee Williams pled guilty, without a plea
agreement, to one count of possession of a firearm and
ammunition as a convicted felon and two counts of distribution
of heroin. The district court upwardly departed from Williams’
advisory Guidelines range, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 4A1.3(a)(1), p.s. (2012), and
sentenced Williams as a de facto career offender to a total of
240 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Williams argues that his
sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We
affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “an
abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). The court first reviews for “significant
procedural error,” and if the sentence is free from such error,
it then considers substantive reasonableness. Id. Procedural
error includes “improperly calculating[] the Guidelines range,
. . . failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)]
factors, . . . or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “Substantive reasonableness
examines the totality of the circumstances to see whether the
sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the
sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
2
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216
(4th Cir. 2010).
A district court may upwardly depart from an
applicable Guidelines range “[i]f reliable information indicates
that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially
under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal
history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other
crimes.” USSG § 4A1.3(a)(1), p.s. Here, the district court
explained at length its reasons for the departure. See United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (discussing
district court’s obligation to conduct “individualized
assessment” of facts). The court emphasized Williams’ extensive
record of violent conduct, his past involvement with firearms
and narcotics, and his likelihood for recidivism. 1 The district
court found that Williams was “an active gang member” (J.A. at
145), 2 who sold heroin and provided “muscle for the gang.” (J.A.
at 159). The district court also found that Williams continued
his gang activities following his incarceration, as Williams
1
Williams argues that he was classified as a de facto
career offender, based on prior North Carolina convictions for
common law robbery, in violation of United States v. Davis, 720
F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2013). This argument is meritless, as the
district court explicitly stated that it did not rely solely on
these convictions in upwardly departing. See id. at 220.
2
“J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties
on appeal.
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“talk[ed] to fellow gang members about robbing people to get
bond money and [made] threats from inside.” (Id.). Finally,
the district court highlighted Williams’ lack of education and
employment. Thus, our review of the record leads us to conclude
that the district court did not err in applying an upward
departure based on prior uncharged criminal conduct, see USSG
§ 4A1.3(a)(2), p.s., and that there is no procedural infirmity.
Further, because the district court’s determination warrants our
deference, see United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679-80
(4th Cir. 2011), we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion and that the upward departure is not
substantively unreasonable.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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