allegations, Pratt's amended complaint included claims for (1) negligent
supervision, (2) declaratory relief, and (3) breach of implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
CCDA moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that
Pratt was a member of the union and failed to exhaust his contractual
grievance remedies under the operative collective bargaining agreement
(CBA). CCDA pointed to the language in Pratt's amended complaint,
which stated that his layoff was implemented "in violation of existing
policies and procedures and contrary to Nevada law," to argue that his
claims clearly alleged that CCDA violated the CBA. Pratt responded by
arguing that his specific bad faith claims did not fall within the scope of
the CBA.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that
Pratt was subject to the terms of the CBA between the union and CCDA,
and that pursuant to the CBA, Pratt was required to submit a timely
grievance regarding any discipline or layoff disputes and, if unresolved, to
then submit those disputes to binding arbitration. As a result, the district
court found that Pratt had not properly asserted that he had exhausted
his contractual remedies and dismissed Pratt's amended complaint. Pratt
now appeals.
The district court did not err in finding that Pratt was required to exhaust
his remedies provided within the CBA
As a preliminary matter, CCDA's motion to dismiss was
supported by a copy of the CBA governing the employment relationship
between the CCDA and the union, along with an affidavit from a CCDA
labor management analyst. "If, on a motion [to dismiss], matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, [the motion]
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shall be treated as one for summary judgment. . . ." Lumbermen's
Underwriting Alliance v. RCR Plumbing, Inc., 114 Nev. 1231, 1234, 969
P.2d 301, 303 (1998) (internal quotations omitted); NRCP 12(b). Because
the district court order relies on the dispute resolution and grievance
provisions in the CBA, we must review the district court's dismissal as an
order granting summary judgment. See Lumbermen's, 114 Nev. at 1234,
969 P.2d at 303.
Pratt argues on appeal that he was not required to file a
grievance under the CBA because his claims were outside the scope of the
CBA grievance provisions.'
Standard of review
"This court reviews a district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo." Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d
1026, 1029 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate when, after viewing
the evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Id. "The nonmoving party must, by affidavit or otherwise, set
forth specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial
'Pratt's opening brief is confusing because he claims that he chose to
appeal this case "for a determination on whether a bad faith claim is
covered by the [Employee Management Relations Board] (EMRB) process
or not." However, in dismissing Pratt's complaint, the district court relied
upon Pratt's failure to follow the grievance process under the CBA, and
did not evaluate the EMRB issue or the failure to state a claim issue.
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or have summary judgment entered against him." Id. at 732, 121 P.3d at
1031 (internal quotations omitted).
The district court did not err in finding that CCDA was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because Pratt was required to exhaust
his grievance remedies provided in the CBA
Pratt argues that (1) "he did not suffer any form of discipline
as defined by Article 11" of the CBA; and (2) Article 13, regarding layoffs,
only addresses the procedure CCDA must follow, not which types of
substantive claims are within the scope of Article 13. As a result, Pratt
argues that his bad faith claim was not subject to the CBA's grievance
remedies. We disagree.
This court has followed the United States Supreme Court
precedent in encouraging labor grievance procedures. Reynolds Elec. &
Eng'g Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union
1780, 81 Nev. 199, 206-08, 401 P.2d 60, 63-65 (1965) (citing Republic Steel
Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965)). In Reynolds, this court noted
that "[c]ontract grievance procedures are expressly approved by Congress
as a preferred method for settling disputes." 81 Nev. at 206, 401 P.2d at
64. This court analyzed Supreme Court precedent, and concluded that the
caselaw 'reveals the Supreme Court's intention to preclude court
intervention into the merits of a labor dispute where grievance and
arbitration procedures have been contractually provided for." Id. at 207-
08, 401 P.2d at 64-65 ("An order to arbitrate the particular grievance
should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that
the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers
the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.")
(internal quotations omitted). After analyzing the language of the CBA,
this court concluded that none of the clauses specifically excluded the
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disputes at issue from resolution by the grievance and arbitration process.
Id. at 212, 401 P.2d at 67. Therefore, this court concluded that the
disputes were "within the scope of the grievance and arbitration clauses of
. . . the collective bargaining agreement[]." Id. at 213, 401 P.2d at 68; see
also NRS 288.150(2)(o) (requiring governments and unions to bargain over
"[g]rievance and arbitration procedures for resolution of disputes relating
to interpretation or application of collective bargaining agreements").
Here, Article 11 of the CBA states that "[a] grievance is
defined as a filed dispute between the [u]nion, on behalf of an employee(s),
and the [c]ounty over the interpretation and/or application of the express
terms of this [a]greement or a dispute over the issuance of discipline as
defined herein." Discipline is defined as "an employee's [w]ritten
[r]eprimand, [f]inal [w]ritten [w]arning, [d]emotion, or [i]nvoluntary
[t]ermination . . . ." Further, "[a]ll written reprimands . . . and involuntary
termination appeals of employees covered by this [a]greement shall be
handled solely in accordance with the procedure set forth in this [s]ection."
Grievances relating to discipline must be submitted in writing within ten
working days of receiving the discipline. 2
Additionally, Article 13 includes procedures for disputes
involving an employee layoff. Article 13 defines layoff as "any involuntary
separation wherein management eliminates a position without prejudice
to the incumbent." Article 13 lays out an extensive layoff procedural
Additionally, the CBA states that "[a] grievance shall be considered
2
abandoned if not filed and processed by the union on behalf of the
employee, where indicated in accordance with the time limitations."
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process, in which CCDA would layoff temporary employees first, and then
regular employees based on seniority. Any appeals regarding an
employee's layoff would then be considered by the layoff review committee.
Article 13 specifically addresses procedural issues and "whether the
procedure was appropriately followed." Pratt argues that Article 13 does
not apply here because it only applies to procedural issues, not whether
the entire process was implemented in bad faith. Essentially, Pratt
argues that his claim is not a procedural claim, but more of a substantive
claim regarding CCDA's motivations surrounding his discipline and layoff.
Based on the language in Article 11, Section 2 and Article 13,
Section 3, we conclude that Pratt was required to file a grievance through
the union. Regarding the initial discipline, the CBA clearly requires an
employee to submit any dispute related to a claim of either improper
discipline or that CCDA incorrectly interpreted or misapplied a provision
of the CBA via the CBA's grievance procedures. Pratt claims that he has
asserted a "bad faith" claim that falls outside the scope of the CBA and
that "he did not suffer any form of discipline as defined by Article 11";
however Pratt's amended complaint was based on two primary facts: that
he was subject to improper discipline, and his layoff was improper. The
record is devoid of any facts that would remove Pratt's claim from the
scope of the CBA, and we therefore conclude that the facts surrounding his
amended complaint fall within the "[w]ritten [r]eprimand . or
[i]nvoluntary [t]ermination" definition of discipline in the CBA. See
Reynolds, 81 Nev. at 207-08, 401 P.2d at 64-65.
Additionally, regarding the CBA layoff provisions, Pratt's
amended complaint asserts that "the procedures and circumstances
related to that process [surrounding his layoff] [were] implemented by
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[CCDA] in bad faith, without good cause, in violation of existing policies
and procedures and contrary to Nevada law." This allegation falls within
the scope of Article 13 because it claims that CCDA failed to follow the
correct layoff procedures. Thus, taking Pratt's allegations in the light
most favorable to him, the district court did not err in finding that Pratt
was required to submit his dispute through the CBA grievance process
because his allegations involve discipline and CCDA's interpretation and
application of the CBA's discipline and layoff provisions. As a result, we
conclude that the district court properly found that there were no genuine
issues of material fact and CCDA was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Accordingly, we 3
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
c-CciAA-Lac J.
Hardesty
, J.
3 We have considered the parties' remaining arguments, including
Pratt's argument that his claim is a form of "a substantive due process
type claim," and conclude that they are without merit.
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cc: Hon. Joanna Kishner, District Judge
Thomas J. Tanksley, Settlement Judge
Kirk T. Kennedy
Fisher & Phillips LLP
Eighth District Court Clerk
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