In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 12-‐‑3868
SCOTT IAN RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff-‐‑Appellant,
v.
THE KOCH LAW FIRM, P.C.,
Defendant-‐‑Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:12-‐‑cv-‐‑00631-‐‑JMS-‐‑TAB — Jane Magnus-‐‑Stinson, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 22, 2014 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 26, 2014
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and SYKES,
Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Scott Richardson incurred an
educational debt in 1988 but did not pay. Indiana University,
the creditor, filed suit in May 1998, in state court, and a trial
was scheduled for September 7, 2000. Richardson filed a
bankruptcy petition on September 1 but did not tell the state
court, the University, or The Koch Law Firm, P.C., its coun-‐‑
sel. Nor did he appear for trial. The state judge entered a de-‐‑
2 No. 12-‐‑3868
fault judgment, which the Law Firm tried unsuccessfully to
collect. Now Richardson says that the Law Firm should pay
him for violating two sections of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f, by trying to enforce a
judgment that had been entered in violation of the automatic
stay under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §362.
After learning about the bankruptcy, the Law Firm
stopped trying to collect the judgment. The bankruptcy end-‐‑
ed in June 2001, and the Law Firm went back to work, rely-‐‑
ing on 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8), which makes most educational
debts nondischargeable. Richardson filed a second bank-‐‑
ruptcy proceeding in January 2002. It lasted until April 2007.
Once again the Law Firm desisted during the bankruptcy’s
duration and tried to collect after its end. Those post-‐‑2007
efforts form the basis of Richardson’s current claim.
The district court treated this suit as a collateral attack on
the state court’s judgment and dismissed it for want of juris-‐‑
diction, invoking the Rooker-‐‑Feldman doctrine. 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 167064 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2012). See Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). These decisions hold
that the Supreme Court of the United States is the only fed-‐‑
eral court that may review judgments entered by state courts
in civil litigation. The Rooker-‐‑Feldman doctrine applies when
the state court’s judgment is the source of the injury of
which plaintiffs complain in federal court. See Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005);
GASH Associates v. Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir.
1993). Richardson maintained that the source of his injury is
the Law Firm’s effort to collect the judgment, not the judg-‐‑
ment’s bare existence, but the district judge saw this as a se-‐‑
No. 12-‐‑3868 3
mantic difference only and wrote that a claim “inextricably
intertwined” with a state court’s judgment remains covered
by Rooker-‐‑Feldman.
We are skeptical about the wisdom of asking whether
something is “intertwined” (“inextricably” or extricably)
with a state court’s judgment. Lower courts in both Saudi
Basic Industries and Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006), add-‐‑
ed an “inextricably intertwined” rider to the Rooker-‐‑Feldman
doctrine and were reversed for their troubles. Courts should
stick with the doctrine as stated in Saudi Basic Industries. But
we need not pursue this matter, because legal activity con-‐‑
tinued after the district court’s decision.
Richardson asked the bankruptcy court to reopen the
2000 bankruptcy proceeding and declare the state court’s
judgment “void.” The bankruptcy judge granted the motion
to reopen and stated that the judgment is “invalid” (though
not “void”) but did not enjoin its enforcement or award
damages under 11 U.S.C. §362(k)(1). See 497 B.R. 546 (Bankr.
S.D. Ind. 2013). Instead the judge concluded that any claim
for damages based on efforts to enforce the judgment be-‐‑
longs to a trustee in bankruptcy, for the benefit of Richard-‐‑
son’s creditors. Observing that Richardson had failed to de-‐‑
clare any monetary claim based on the state-‐‑court judgment
as an asset in the 2002 bankruptcy, the judge concluded that
estoppel prevents Richardson from trying to collect for his
own benefit. See Cannon-‐‑Stokes v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446 (7th
Cir. 2006). Richardson did not appeal to a district judge.
After the bankruptcy judge’s decision, Indiana Universi-‐‑
ty asked the state court to vacate its own judgment. On Jan-‐‑
uary 28, 2014, the state court obliged. As a result, the basis
4 No. 12-‐‑3868
for the district court’s dismissal under Rooker-‐‑Feldman no
longer exists.
Demonstrating appalling judgment, neither side brought
this development to our attention, although both sides filed
their appellate briefs after the state court vacated its judg-‐‑
ment. Because that step affects subject-‐‑matter jurisdiction,
counsel for both sides—Ruberry, Stalmack & Garvey, LLC,
representing the Law Firm, and Richardson, a member of the
bar representing himself—had an ethical duty to alert the
court. Yet until the judges asked pointed questions at oral
argument, neither side was forthcoming. Richardson even
professed not to know the status of the state judgment to
which he was a party. That assertion is hard to credit, for the
state court’s order shows that it was sent to Richardson. But
apportioning blame gets us nowhere. What matters now is
that the rug has been pulled out from under the district
court’s decision.
In addition to relying on a state-‐‑court judgment that, by
the time of briefing, no longer existed, the Law Firm asked
us to affirm on the bankruptcy judge’s ground—that any
claim belongs to the estate in bankruptcy for the benefit of
Richardson’s creditors, not to Richardson personally. The
Law Firm made this argument to the district court too, but
the court did not reach it given its reliance on the Rooker-‐‑
Feldman doctrine. A prevailing party is entitled to defend its
judgment on any ground preserved in the district court. See
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Ludwig, 426 U.S.
479 (1976). Richardson did not bother to file a reply brief,
and it became apparent at oral argument that he is unaware
of the rule stated in Ludwig—a rule that Morley Construction
Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 300 U.S. 185, 191 (1937), called
No. 12-‐‑3868 5
“inveterate and certain”. Richardson thus forfeited his op-‐‑
portunity to contest this issue.
Richardson did not pay his debt when it was due in 1988
(and still has not done so, although it has not been dis-‐‑
charged); he did not alert the Law Firm (or the state court) to
his bankruptcy petition in 2000; he did not appear for trial;
he filed a motion to vacate the state judgment and lost be-‐‑
cause he did not show up to argue when it was scheduled
for presentation; he did not appeal the bankruptcy court’s
decision of August 2013; he did not file a reply brief; he did
not tell us about the vacatur of the state court’s judgment. It
is hard to see how someone so deficient in the defense of his
own interests could be an effective advocate for the interests
of clients. And it turns out that he has not been; Indiana has
suspended Richardson from practice at least three times. See
In re Richardson, 875 N.E.2d 700 (Ind. 2007) (suspension for
abandoning clients; recounting earlier discipline); In re Rich-‐‑
ardson, 792 N.E.2d 871 (Ind. 2003) (suspension for lying in
discovery, hiding assets, and abuse of legal process). Rich-‐‑
ardson is on notice: misfeasance or nonfeasance in federal
litigation will lead to professional discipline. See Fed. R.
App. P. 46(c).
The judgment of the district court is modified to be on
the merits, rather than for lack of subject-‐‑matter jurisdiction,
and as modified is affirmed.