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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAFFET MARTINEZ
Appellant No. 2522 EDA 2013
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 23, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008323-2010;
MC-51-CR-0019074-2010
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and STABILE, J.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 24, 2014
Appellant, Jaffet Martinez, appeals from the order entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his first
petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546. On February 7, 2011, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty
plea to aggravated assault by vehicle while driving under the influence,
driving under the influence, and recklessly endangering another person. The
court sentenced Appellant on March 14, 2011, to an aggregate term of forty-
eight (48) hours to six (6) months’ imprisonment, plus three and one-half
(3½) years’ probation. Appellant did not seek direct review. Appellant filed
a counseled PCRA petition on August 24, 2012, and filed an amended PCRA
petition later that day. On May 14, 2013, the court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
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notice; Appellant did not respond. The court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA
petition as untimely on July 23, 2013. Appellant timely filed a notice of
appeal on August 18, 2013. On August 21, 2013, the court ordered
Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, and Appellant complied.
The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite.
Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283 (Pa.Super. 2013). A PCRA
petition must be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment
becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final at
the conclusion of direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking
review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The three statutory exceptions to the
PCRA’s timeliness provisions allow for very limited circumstances under
which the late filing of a petition will be excused; and a petitioner asserting a
timeliness exception must file a petition within 60 days of the date the claim
could have been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), (b)(2). The
60-day rule is strictly enforced. Commonwealth v. Vega, 754 A.2d 714
(Pa.Super. 2000). Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final
on April 13, 2011, upon expiration of the time to file a notice of appeal with
this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Appellant filed the current petition on
August 24, 2012, more than one year after his judgment of sentence
became final, which is patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
Appellant now attempts to invoke the “new constitutional right” exception to
the PCRA’s time restrictions under Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), claiming Padilla
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v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) set
forth a new constitutional right, held to apply retroactively.1 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court announced Padilla on March 31, 2010. Consequently,
Appellant cannot demonstrate that Padilla set forth a “new” constitutional
right recognized by the Supreme Court after the time period provided in
Section 9545; and similarly cannot establish compliance with the statutory
60-day rule. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), (b)(2). Moreover, in
Chaidez v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013),
the Supreme Court expressly held that Padilla does not apply retroactively
to collateral review cases. Thus, the court properly dismissed Appellant’s
petition.2
Order affirmed.
____________________________________________
1
In Padilla, the Supreme Court held that counsel has an affirmative duty to
inform a defendant of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. Id.
2
Appellant also attempts to establish the “new facts” exception, claiming
Appellant did not know he could be deported until immigration initiated
removal proceedings. The record belies Appellant’s claim, as the written
guilty plea colloquy explained the risk of deportation. Further, Appellant
could have discovered the risk of deportation sooner with the exercise of due
diligence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/24/2014
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