J-S70002-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SHAWN MCAFEE
Appellant No. 3010 EDA 2012
Appeal from the PCRA Order September 20, 2012
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0016133-2008
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 29, 2014
Shawn McAfee appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas
of Philadelphia County dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 Upon review, we affirm.
This Court previously summarized the facts of the case as follows.
On June 3, 2008, around 8:40 p.m., Police Officer James
Kuzowsky and Sergeant Patrick McDonald, who were in full
uniform in a marked police vehicle, were on patrol around the
1000 block of West Huntingdon Street in Philadelphia, when
Officer Kuzowsky observed [McAfee] operating a black Jeep.
[N.T., 4/30/09, at 5-7]. When [McAfee] failed to signal before
making a right hand turn, the officers stopped him for a violation
of the Vehicle Code. Id. at 8. Officer Kuzowsky approached
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S70002-14
[McAfee’s] vehicle on foot, after which he instructed [McAfee] to
roll down his heavily tinted windows for the officers’ safety. Id.
When the officers asked for [McAfee’s] driver’s license,
registration, and proof of insurance, [McAfee] “proceeded to be
very nervous, very agitated, and hostile, [asking] why was he
being pulled over [and stating that] [h]e was being pulled over
for no reason.” Id. at 9. While attempting to find his
documentation, [McAfee] opened the vehicle’s center console, in
which Officer Kuzowsky observed “a large amount of money
loose … and in numerous bundles, rubber bands, and different
stacks.” Id.
After observing the money, Sergeant McDonald asked [McAfee]
if there were any weapons in the vehicle, after which [McAfee]
became “even more nervous[,] fidgety,” and “hostile.” Id. at
12, 38-39. [McAfee] became so agitated as to start moving
back and forth between the passenger and driver’s side of the
vehicle. Id. [McAfee] was removed from the vehicle for the
officers’ safety, at which point Officer Kuzowsky observed large
bulges in his pants pockets[,] which the officer immediately
identified as consistent with the bundles of currency observed in
[McAfee’s] vehicle. Id. at 12-13. Sergeant McDonald then
patted down [McAfee] and recovered numerous large bundles of
money from [McAfee’s] pants pockets. Id. at 12-13, 17.
At this point, based on [McAfee’s] suspicious behavior and the
large amount of money both on his person and in plain view
inside his vehicle, Officer Kuzowsky suspected that there were
narcotics and weapons inside the vehicle and radioed for a
narcotics detecting dog, which arrived about fifteen minutes
later. Id. at 13. The dog approached the vehicle and “went
crazy,” indicating that it detected the odor of narcotics on both
sides of the vehicle. Id. at 14-15. At this point, [McAfee] was
taken to a police station while police conducted further
investigation, which included towing [McAfee’s] car to a lot while
police obtained a warrant to search it. Id. at 15-16, 41. Police
Officer Brian Myers testified that, on June 3, 2008, he executed
a search warrant for [McAfee’s] vehicle, pursuant to which he
recovered three clear jars of suspected PCP, a loaded nine
millimeter handgun, and $26,998.00 in cash. Id. at 44-47.
Commonwealth v. McAfee, 32 A.3d 272, 272 (Pa. Super. 2011).
-2-
J-S70002-14
On April 30, 2009, following a non-jury trial, the court convicted
McAfee of possession of a firearm by a prohibited individual, 2 carrying a
firearm without a license,3 carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia,4 and
knowing or intentional possession of a controlled substance.5 The court
sentenced McAfee on December 17, 2009, and imposed an aggregate
sentence of 7½ to 15 years’ incarceration, to be followed by 5 years of
probation. McAfee appealed his judgment of sentence, alleging the trial
court erred in dismissing his motion to suppress evidence seized by the
police following a lawful traffic stop and vehicle search. This Court affirmed
McAfee’s sentence on July 18, 2011. Id.
On November 17, 2011, McAfee filed a pro se PCRA petition. McAfee
filed an amended petition on February 28, 2012. On April 19, 2012, PCRA
counsel filed an addendum to the amended petition. Subsequently, the
PCRA court dismissed McAfee’s petition, without a hearing, on September
20, 2012. This timely appeal followed, in which McAfee claims that the PCRA
court erred when it dismissed his petition alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel.
____________________________________________
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 6105.
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 6106.
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 6108.
5
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
-3-
J-S70002-14
This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a PCRA
petition is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by
evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5
A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted). In evaluating a
PCRA court’s decision, our scope of review is limited to the findings of the
PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party at the trial level. Id. We may affirm a PCRA court’s
decision on any grounds if it is supported by the record. Id.
“To plead and prove ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner must
establish: (1) that the underlying issue has arguable merit; (2) counsel’s
actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice
resulted from counsel's act or failure to act.” Commonwealth v. Chmiel,
30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (Pa. 2011). Where the petitioner “fails to plead or meet
any elements of the above-cited test, his claim must fail.” Burkett, supra.
McAfee first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his firearm
convictions. Illegal possession of a firearm may be shown by constructive
possession. Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super.
2004)
Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct
to deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement.
Constructive possession is an inference arising from a set of
facts that possession of the contraband was more likely than not.
We have defined constructive possession as conscious dominion.
We subsequently defined conscious dominion as the power to
control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control.
-4-
J-S70002-14
To aid application, we have held that constructive possession
may be established by the totality of the circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 820 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal
quotation and citations omitted).
The PCRA court explained its reasoning for finding the evidence
sufficient to prove constructive possession as follows:
[McAfee] was acting nervous, fidgety, and hostile with police
when he was being investigated for a traffic violation.
Recovered from [McAfee’s] person and scattered about the car
was $26,998.00 in cash. [McAfee] was the sole occupant of the
car. [McAfee] clearly knew that cash was in the car. When the
Officers questioned him about the existence of a weapon in the
car, for their safety, [McAfee] became even more visibly
agitated. Clearly, anyone who is carrying that enormous amount
of cash around would want a means to protect himself and the
cash – such as a loaded nine millimeter handgun. See
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 21 A.3d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super.
2011) (rejected sufficiency challenge to firearms offenses,
although gun was concealed in a car in which Cruz had no
ownership interest, where Cruz was the sole occupant and
appeared to show consciousness of guilt).
PCRA Court Opinion, 7/15/13, at 5. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to establish that
McAfee was in constructive possession of the firearm. See Hopkins, supra.
McAfee also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for
knowing or intentional possession of a controlled substance. McAfee claims
he had no knowledge of the existence of the concealed drugs and, therefore,
possession could not be established.
-5-
J-S70002-14
Here, McAfee was the sole occupant of the vehicle and was therefore
in exclusive control of the vehicle and its contents. Based on McAfee’s
suspicious behavior and the large amount of cash divided into bundles in a
manner characteristic of narcotics trafficking, the officers suspected there
were narcotics and weapons inside the vehicle and radioed for a narcotics
detecting dog. When the dog approached the vehicle, it “went crazy,”
indicating that it detected the odor of narcotics on both sides of the vehicle.
When viewed in their totality, the facts and circumstances support the
court’s finding that McAfee was in constructive possession of the drugs. See
Hopkins, supra.
Accordingly, McAfee’s claims that the Commonwealth’s evidence was
insufficient to prove constructive possession of the firearm and drugs are
meritless. Because counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
pursue a meritless claim, we decline McAfee’s request for relief.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/29/2014
-6-