J-S09027-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES EARL HOUSE,
Appellant No. 1241 WDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 9, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0002720-1999
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES, and ALLEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2015
James Earl House appeals from the July 9, 2014 order finding him
ineligible for PCRA relief and dismissing his petition. We affirm.
The events giving rise to Appellant’s underlying convictions occurred
on April 7, 1999.
Appellant was called by his cousin and asked to “take care of the
dudes that I’ve been having problems with that broke my
windows out.” In response, [A]ppellant, Markcail Williams, and
two others confronted the victim, Eddie Outlaw, and his siblings.
While Williams shot at and chased the victim’s siblings, Appellant
shot at and eventually hit the victim twice while the victim tried
to escape. The victim died as a result of the injuries. A number
of persons witnessed the incident.
Commonwealth v. House, 788 A.2d 1029 (Pa.Super. 2001) (unpublished
memorandum at 1).
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On March 31, 2000, a jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree
murder, aggravated assault, carrying a firearm without a license, conspiracy
to commit simple assault and possession of an instrument of crime. He was
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment on the murder count, a consecutive
term of five years imprisonment on the firearms charge, and a consecutive
term of one to two years of imprisonment on the conspiracy conviction. At
the time of the offenses, Appellant was a juvenile.
This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on September 10, 2001,
and Appellant did not seek allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court.
Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on December 27, 2001, counsel
was appointed, and counsel filed an amended petition. Relief was denied on
October 25, 2002. Appellant filed three subsequent PCRA petitions that did
not afford him relief. On July 11, 2012, Appellant filed the instant petition,
his fifth. The court appointed counsel and counsel filed a supplemental
petition for post-conviction relief. Shortly thereafter, Appellant sought and
was granted a stay of the PCRA decision pending the outcome of a certiorari
petition in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013).
Following denial of certiorari on June 9, 2014, the court lifted the stay and
dismissed the petition. Appellant timely appealed. He raises one issue for
our review:
[I] Did the PCRA Court err in denying Mr. House’s PCRA petition
since Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Life Without Parole Sentencing
Scheme for Juvenile Offenders Convicted of Murder is
Unconstitutional under the United States and Pennsylvania
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Constitutions and Pursuant to Miller; and should the United
States Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in the case of
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, apply retroactively to all
cases on collateral review.
Appellant’s brief at 1.
In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, an appellate court examines
“the PCRA court’s findings of fact to determine whether they are supported
by the record, and reviews its conclusions of law to determine whether they
are free from legal error. The scope of review is limited to the findings of
the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.” Commonwealth v.
Freeland, 2014 WL 6982658, *4 (Pa.Super. 2014).
Preliminarily, we must determine whether Appellant’s PCRA petition is
timely filed as it implicates our jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v.
Lawson, 90 A.3d 1 (Pa.Super. 2014). In order for a collateral petition to be
timely under the PCRA, it must be filed within one year of the date when the
petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
Appellant’s petition, filed more than ten years after his sentence became
final, is patently untimely. However, there are three exceptions to the time-
bar of the PCRA. Those exceptions include interference by government
officials, newly-discovered facts that were unknown to the petitioner and
which could not have been ascertained with due diligence, or a new
constitutional right held to apply retroactively. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i-
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iii). Any claim based on an exception to the time-bar must be filed within
sixty days of the date it could have first been presented.
Appellant has not expressly invoked an exception to the PCRA’s time
bar. Even if we were to treat his reliance upon Miller v. Alabama, 132
S.Ct. 2455 (decided June 25, 2012), as a basis to circumvent the time-bar,
he would not be entitled to relief. In Miller, the United States Supreme
Court held that mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles
violated the Eighth Amendment. However, Miller does not function as a
newly-recognized constitutional right for purposes of the timeliness
exception in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), because our High Court held in
Cunningham, supra, that it did not apply retroactively. Thus, Appellant’s
petition is untimely and dismissal was proper.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/13/2015
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