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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-12440
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cr-00225-RAL-MAP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STORMY GIDDENS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(April 8, 2015)
Before MARTIN, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Stormy Giddens, Jr., appeals his sentence of one year and 364 days, which
the district court imposed after the revocation of his second term of supervised
release. Mr. Giddens originally pled guilty in 2008 to selling, exchanging,
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transferring, and delivering counterfeited and altered obligations of the United
States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 473.
On appeal, Mr. Giddens argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), which governs
the revocation of supervised release, violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
under the principles set out in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and Int’l Union, United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994), because it permits defendants to
receive a sentence of imprisonment and a new term of supervised release upon
findings made by a judge, not a jury, and by a preponderance of the evidence, not
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although we generally review a district court’s revocation of supervised
release for an abuse of discretion, we review de novo a constitutional challenge to a
statute. See United States v. Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010).
In relevant part, § 3583(e)(3) states that a district court may “revoke a term of
supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the
term of supervised release . . . if the court . . . finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” In
Cunningham, we held that Ҥ 3583(e)(3) does not violate the Fifth or Sixth
Amendments because the violation of supervised release need only be proven by a
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preponderance of the evidence, and there is no right to trial by jury in a supervised
release revocation hearing.” Cunningham, 607 F.3d at 1268.
Mr. Giddens concedes that our decision in Cunningham forecloses his
argument. See Appellant’s Brief at 11 n.2 (“Mr. Giddens recognizes that this
Court rejected the argument in Cunningham. Thus, Mr. Giddens is presenting this
issue primarily for en banc or certiorari review.”). We are bound to follow our
prior binding precedent unless and until it is overruled by this Court en banc or by
the Supreme Court. See United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th
Cir. 2008). Because Cunningham has not been overruled by our Court en banc or
by the Supreme Court, we affirm the district court’s revocation of Mr. Giddens’
term of supervised release.
AFFIRMED.
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