This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0836
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Charles Chuck Jackson,
Appellant
Filed April 20, 2015
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge
Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-07-11909
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James P. Spencer, Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
Appellant challenges the validity of his Alford plea to third-degree controlled-
substance crime, arguing that the factual basis for the plea is insufficient and that the
district court failed to make necessary findings regarding the sufficiency of the evidence.
We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Charles Chuck Jackson was charged with second-degree controlled-
substance crime for allegedly selling 3.5 grams of cocaine to a police informant during a
controlled purchase in 2007. In January 2014, Jackson appeared for a contested omnibus
hearing and challenged the probable cause for the charge given that the informant
involved with the controlled purchase was deceased. When the district court inquired as
to how the state would prove the charge, the prosecutor responded:
It is a recorded controlled buy. The steps that the
officers took at the time were properly documented. We do
have photocopies of the buy money and all that stuff. The
[informant’s] statements . . . that’s all recorded. There’s a
buy. The video recording shows accurately Mr. Jackson’s
face through the controlled buy.
The district court stated that it was satisfied that the charge was supported by probable
cause, and Jackson agreed to accept the state’s plea offer and enter an Alford plea to an
amended charge of third-degree controlled-substance crime for possession of three or
more grams of cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine. Jackson signed a plea petition
during a brief break in the proceeding. He then affirmed on the record that he read and
understood the plea petition, was pleading voluntarily and of his own free will, and was
giving up his rights to an attorney and a trial. He pleaded guilty to third-degree
controlled-substance crime, and the district court and prosecutor questioned him
regarding the basis for the plea.
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Jackson affirmed that he received discovery material from the state that included
police reports and a video recording and “may be introduced at trial in the State’s case in
chief against [him] for a charge of second degree controlled substance crime.” He agreed
that “if this was all presented to a jury[,] it’s a strong likelihood that they would find that
the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt [all] of the elements for a second degree
controlled substance crime” and that “if the evidence that’s in those police reports gets
presented to a jury, . . . there’s a substantial likelihood the jury would find [him] guilty of
the charged offense, controlled substance in the second degree.” He further agreed that
“on or about June 8th of 2007 within the county of Olmsted . . . the jury could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] did sell three grams or more of a substance
containing cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine.” He affirmed that “to avoid [a trial and
conviction on the second-degree offense, he] want[ed] to take the State’s offer today
[and] plead[] to the third degree possession charge.” The district court stated that it
would “accept this plea as voluntarily, intelligently, and accurately made.” Jackson filed
this appeal following sentencing.
DECISION
Jackson argues on appeal that his Alford plea is inaccurate and invalid and must be
vacated. He did not move to withdraw the plea or challenge the validity of the plea in
district court. But, a defendant may appeal directly from a judgment of conviction and
contend that a plea is invalid. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989).
Assessment of the validity of a plea presents an issue of law, which is reviewed de novo.
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010).
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To be valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. “The
accuracy requirement protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense
than that for which he could be convicted if he insisted on his right to trial.” Id. An
accurate plea is one that is supported by a proper factual basis, such that there are
“sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that [the] defendant’s conduct falls
within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346,
349 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted).
An Alford plea is a guilty plea in which a defendant maintains his innocence but
chooses to plead guilty because he reasonably believes, and the record reflects, that the
state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 37-38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167-68 (1970) (upholding plea to lesser offense when the
defendant maintained innocence but the state had a strong case against him for more
serious offense); see also State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977)
(recognizing the use of Alford pleas in Minnesota). The defendant must agree that the
evidence the state is likely to offer at trial is sufficient to convict. State v. Theis, 742
N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007). An Alford plea must be supported by a “strong” factual
basis and is subject to careful scrutiny due to the inherent conflict in pleading guilty
while maintaining innocence. Id. at 648-49.
Jackson first argues that the factual basis for his plea is insufficient because he
acknowledged that there is a substantial likelihood that a jury would find him guilty of
the charged crime—second-degree controlled-substance crime for sale of a controlled
substance—but did not make the same acknowledgement for the crime to which he
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actually pleaded guilty—third-degree controlled-substance crime for possession of a
controlled substance. But third-degree controlled-substance crime is a lesser-included
offense of second-degree controlled-substance crime. See Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd.
1(1) (2006) (defining “included offense” as, inter alia, “[a] lesser degree of the same
crime”); see also State v. Traxler, 583 N.W.2d 556, 562 (Minn. 1998) (treating fifth-
degree controlled-substance crime for possession of a controlled substance as a lesser-
included offense of first-degree controlled-substance crime for sale of a controlled
substance). In the context of an Alford plea, a defendant’s acknowledgement of a
substantial likelihood that he would be convicted of a greater offense if the case went to
trial is a sufficient acknowledgement that he would also be convicted of a lesser-included
offense. See, e.g., Alford, 400 U.S. at 37-39, 91 S. Ct. at 167-68 (affirming the
acceptance of a plea to second-degree murder when the state had a strong case of first-
degree murder and the defendant wished to avoid the possibility of the death penalty);
Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 760 (affirming the acceptance of an Alford plea when the
defendant “expressed a desire to plead guilty to second-degree murder because of the
strength of the prosecution’s case and the possibility that if he went to trial he might be
convicted of first-degree murder”). Jackson sufficiently acknowledged a substantial
likelihood that he would be found guilty of third-degree controlled-substance crime if his
case went to trial.
Jackson next argues that the evidence supporting an Alford plea must be entered
on the record and that, because no evidence or summary of evidence was submitted at the
hearing, his plea is invalid. A factual basis for an Alford plea should “be based on
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evidence discussed with the defendant on the record at the plea hearing.” Theis, 742
N.W.2d at 649.
This discussion may occur through an interrogation of the
defendant about the underlying conduct and the evidence that
would likely be presented at trial, the introduction at the plea
hearing of witness statements or other documents, . . . the
presentation of abbreviated testimony from witnesses likely to
testify at trial, or a stipulation by both parties to a factual
statement in one or more documents submitted to the court at
the plea hearing.
Id. (citations omitted). During the hearing, the prosecutor stated that the charged offense
arose from a controlled buy that was documented by the police with photographs and a
video recording. The prosecutor explained that the informant’s statements during the
transaction were recorded and that “[t]he video recording shows accurately Mr. Jackson’s
face through the controlled buy.” Jackson affirmed that he received discovery material
including police reports and a video recording, that this evidence could be introduced
against him at trial, and that there was a substantial likelihood that he would be found
guilty based on the evidence. The factual basis for the Alford plea was supported by a
sufficient discussion of the key evidence that would have been presented at trial.
Finally, Jackson contends that his plea must be vacated because the district court
failed to independently conclude that there is a strong probability based on the evidence
that he would be found guilty if the case went to trial. A district court may accept an
Alford plea “if the court, on the basis of its interrogatories of the accused and its analysis
of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, concludes that the evidence would
support a jury verdict of guilty, and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and
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understandingly entered.” Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 761; see also Theis, 742 N.W.2d at
649 (“The strong factual basis and the defendant’s agreement that the evidence is
sufficient to support his conviction provide the court with a basis to independently
conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the
charge to which he pleaded guilty, notwithstanding his claims of innocence.” (emphasis
omitted)). The district court stated that the plea was “accurately made,” and thus the
district court necessarily determined that the plea was supported by a proper factual basis
and that there were sufficient facts on record to support a conclusion that Jackson’s
conduct fell within the amended charge. See Iverson, 664 N.W.2d at 349 (stating that an
accurate plea is one that is supported by a proper factual basis). Our de novo review of
the plea hearing confirms that Jackson’s Alford plea to third-degree controlled-substance
crime is supported by a strong factual basis and therefore accurate.
Affirmed.
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