Michael Glenn Huddleston v. State

Michael Glenn Huddleston v. State of Texas

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-99-296-CR

     MICHAEL GLENN HUDDLESTON,

                                                                         Appellant

     v.

     THE STATE OF TEXAS,

                                                                         Appellee

From the 282nd District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court # F98-41626S

                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

O P I N I O N

                                                                                                                

      Appellant Huddleston appeals his conviction for possession of methamphetamine (4 grams or more but less than 200 grams) for which he was sentenced to 10 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division, probated for 10 years and a $1000. fine.

      Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence (the methamphetamine) which was heard and denied by the trial court.

      Thereafter, Appellant pled nolo contendere, signed a judicial confession that he possessed the methamphetamine exactly as charged in the indictment, and preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

      Appellant appeals on one point of error:

      “The trial court erred in overruling Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence because an investigative stop must be based on articulable facts supporting suspicions of criminal activity.”

      Determination of reasonable suspicion and probable cause are reviewed de novo on appeal, looking at the totality of the circumstances, while giving deference to the fact findings of the trial court. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Loserth v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Appellate courts should afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of the historical facts that the record supports, especially when the trial court’s findings are based on evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. When the trial court does not make express findings of fact, the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Loserth, p. 774.

      Officer Stephen Davis first came in contact with Appellant during an unrelated traffic stop of a motorist who had methamphetamine on his person. The motorist claimed that Appellant had given him the methamphetamine. About ten days later, Officer Davis drove onto the parking lot of the Total Truck Stop in Seagoville and saw a person sitting slouched down in a Porsche, under an overhead light. Officer Davis drove around the parking lot and when he came back, he recognized the person in the Porsche as Appellant. He remembered the motorist from the traffic stop stating that he had received his drugs from Appellant. Appellant then pulled out of the lot onto the service road and Officer Davis followed him. While Officer Davis followed, Appellant made two turns without signaling. After Appellant’s second failure to signal, Officer Davis pulled him over. When Officer Davis exited his vehicle to approach Appellant, he again noticed Appellant slouching over in his vehicle. Officer Davis had concerns for his safety, so he called for backup. Officer Honeycutt arrived at the scene. Officer Davis ran Appellant’s license and discovered a past criminal history. At that point, Officer Davis requested Appellant to step out of his car. The Officer then asked Appellant if he would consent to the search of his car. Appellant said, “Yes.” Officer Honeycutt searched the vehicle and found a bottle with masking tape around it, under a washcloth on the passenger seat. Officer Honeycutt asked Appellant if he could open the bottle and Appellant said, “Yes.” Inside the bottle was a powdery substance, later identified as methamphetamine. Appellant was then Mirandized and arrested.

      Appellant contends the police did not have specific articulable facts to warrant an investigative stop of Appellant. Officer Davis, however, stopped Appellant based on his violation of the traffic laws, and the drugs were discovered during a consensual search.

      A driver’s failure to properly signal before making a turn provides an objective basis for an officer to stop a vehicle. Tex. Transp. Code § 545.104. Officer Davis’ stop of Appellant was legal. The fact that Officer Davis may have thought Appellant was involved in criminal activity when he stopped Appellant for the traffic violations does not render the stop improper. This was not an investigative stop, but a stop based on traffic violations. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Appellant consented to the search of his vehicle. The evidence shows this consent was voluntary. Appellant did not present any evidence to rebut the voluntariness of his consent.

      The entirety of the evidence supports the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress.

      Appellant’s point of error and all contentions made thereunder are overruled.

      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                         FRANK G. McDONALD

                                                                         Chief Justice (Retired)

Before Chief Justice Davis,

      Justice Gray, and

      Chief Justice McDonald (Retired)

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed March 21, 2001

Do not publish

Yes.

 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you went to the police to report that you thought Al [Simpson] was there, correct?

 

WITNESS: Yes.

 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: The police came, and Al [Simpson] wasn’t there, was he? 

 

WITNESS: He was gone.

 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: So -- but -- well, my point is, you saw shoes, but you didn’t see Al [Simpson] that day; is that a fair statement?

 

WITNESS: I seen -- I seen somebody laying back there with no shirt on.

 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: When Ms. Gilliam asked you, you said you saw shoes in the bedroom.

 

WITNESS: Yes.

 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.

 

WITNESS: It wasn’t no woman’s shoes; it was men’s.

 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: But they were shoes.   

 

            In Page, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that “[i]dentity can be raised by defense cross-examination, such as when the identifying witness is impeached on a material detail of the identification.”  Page, 137 S.W.3d at 78.  A material detail is “relevant to the reliability of the identification.”  Id. at 79.  “[D]efense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim suggested that his 265 pound client was not her 200 pound assailant.”  Id. at 78.  This was sufficient to raise the issue of identity.  See id. at 76.

            Defense counsel’s cross-examination suggested that Simpson may not have been the man whose shoes S.S. observed in A.S.’s bedroom.  Given that A.S.’ refused to testify, whether the shoes belonged to Simpson is a material detail of S.S.’s identification of Simpson, which defense counsel’s cross-examination called into question.[2]  See Page, 137 S.W.3d at 78-79.  As the Court of Appeals questioned in Page, “If it was not about identity, what was it about?”  Id. at 79.

Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that the issue of identity was in dispute or by including “identity” as a purpose for the jury’s consideration of extraneous offense evidence.  We overrule Simpson’s first and second issues.  The judgment is affirmed.

 

 

FELIPE REYNA

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Vance, and

Justice Reyna

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed July 9, 2008

Do not publish

[CRPM]

 

 

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[1]               Simpson does not challenge the admissibility of this evidence.  Moreover, he did not object on Rule 403 or Rule 404 grounds at the time this evidence was admitted.

[2]               A.S. refused to answer many of the State’s questions regarding her relationship with Simpson and eventually left the courtroom after stating that she would not answer the State’s questions.