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Opinion filed January 10, 2008
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________
No. 11-06-00155-CR
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CEROMIE LAEDWARD COLEMAN, Appellant
V.
STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 385th District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR31345
O P I N I O N
Ceromie Laedward Coleman appeals from a guilty verdict for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Appellant was indicted for knowingly and intentionally operating a 2001 Ford pickup without the effective consent of the owner, Araseli Barrera. Appellant pleaded not guilty and proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to three years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. We affirm.
Issue on Appeal
Appellant raises one issue on appeal. He asserts that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.
Standard of Review
To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, the appellate court reviews all of the evidence in a neutral light. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (overruling in part Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 10-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Then, the reviewing court determines whether the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the conflicting evidence. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15; Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 10-11.
Discussion
A person commits the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle if he intentionally or knowingly operates another=s boat, plane, or motor‑propelled vehicle without the effective consent of the owner. Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 31.07(a) (Vernon 2003). An owner is a person who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor. Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 1.07(a)(35)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2007). Effective consent is consent by a person legally authorized to act for the owner. Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 31.01(3) (Vernon Supp. 2007). The accused must be aware that the operation of the vehicle is without the owner=s consent. Gardner v. State, 780 S.W.2d 259, 262‑63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Edwards v. State, 178 S.W.3d 139, 145 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
Appellant testified that he worked as a salesman at All American Dodge. He testified that he knew Barrera when he worked with her at Green Tree Country Club. On October 6, 2005, Barrera came to All American Dodge in order to trade in her Ford Mustang and 2001 Ford pickup for a new vehicle. However, Barrera was unable to make a deal with All American Dodge. Appellant testified that, because he and his wife were sharing a vehicle at that time, he was interested in purchasing Barrera=s Ford pickup. He further testified that he reached an agreement with Barrera that he would keep the vehicle until 4:00 p.m. the next day, October 7, 2005, to attempt to obtain financing to buy it.
Appellant testified that later that night he found out his son had car trouble when he was returning to Midland from Dallas. Appellant testified that he spent the night waiting for his son to return. He testified that his son got home around 5:00 a.m. on October 7 and that he worked on his son=s car all of the next day. Appellant testified that he did not use the vehicle in accordance with the agreement with Barrera. He did not show it to anyone who would be able to help him with financing, he only used the vehicle for personal business. Appellant further testified that he did not make any attempt to contact Barrera regarding her vehicle until after 8:00 p.m. just before he was arrested. This was over four hours after he agreed to contact her regarding whether or not he would be able to purchase the vehicle.
Barrera testified that she met with appellant on October 6, 2005, at All American Dodge to discuss trading in her Ford Mustang and Ford pickup. She was unable to make a deal with All American Dodge. She testified appellant told her that he knew someone who would lend him the money to purchase the Ford pickup. Barrera testified that, based on that information, she left the vehicle with appellant in order for him to attempt to obtain financing. She testified that appellant agreed that he would contact her at the Green Tree Country Club before 10:00 the next morning and that she would pick up the vehicle at All American Dodge after she got off work. Barrera testified that she gave appellant authority to take the vehicle to show it to the person who might loan him money but that she did not give him authority to conduct personal business in the vehicle. She testified that the next day she was unable to contact appellant and that appellant never contacted her. Barrera testified that after she got off work she went to All American Dodge but that appellant was not there with her vehicle. She was told that appellant had not shown up to work that day. Barrera testified that, after she was unable to locate appellant and her vehicle at All American Dodge, she went to appellant=s home around 6:00 p.m. She testified that appellant was not home but that appellant=s wife drove her around Midland in an attempt to find him. When they were unable to locate him, appellant=s wife drove Barrera to the police station to report the vehicle stolen. Barrera testified that later that night the police called her and told her that they found her vehicle. Officer Juan M. Garza testified that on October 7, 2005, around 8:30 p.m. he observed a black pickup fitting the description of a vehicle reported stolen. He pulled in behind the vehicle that had been stopped at a house. Officer Garza testified that appellant got out of the vehicle and began walking toward the house. Officer Garza testified that he took appellant into custody. Officer Garza also testified that, after reading appellant his rights, appellant told him that he had borrowed Barrera=s vehicle and that he was supposed to return it that day but that he had failed to do so.
In this case, there is evidence that appellant knew he was using Barrera=s vehicle outside of the parameters of her consent. While appellant testified that he was attempting to contact Barrera when he was arrested, this was over four hours after the time he told her he would contact her. Further, the jury was free to discredit appellant=s testimony. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony, and it is also the exclusive province of the jury to reconcile conflicts in the evidence. Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 111. Considering all the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that the verdict is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Appellant=s issue on appeal is overruled.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court=s judgment.
RICK STRANGE
JUSTICE
January 10, 2008
Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
McCall, J., and Strange, J.