Nguyen, Chuong Hue v. State

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 19, 2003

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 19, 2003.

 

 

In The

 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-02-00464-CR

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CHUONG HUE NGUYEN, Appellant

 

V.

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

 

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On Appeal from the 268th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 32,590

 

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M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

            Appellant Chuong H. Nguyen was convicted by a jury of the offense of felony theft and sentenced to eight years’ confinement with a $5,000 fine.  In a multifarious point of error, appellant challenges the constitutionality of his conviction.  We affirm.

I.  Background

            Appellant owned and operated KNT Computers.  An acquaintance of the appellant, Byron Reap, was approached by the Houston Police Department about participating in a sting operation to apprehend appellant buying stolen computer parts.  Reap sought to cooperate with authorities in exchange for leniency by introducing an undercover officer to appellant.  To appellant, Reap stated that the officer had some stolen computer equipment that appellant could purchase.  Appellant agreed to purchase the stolen parts from the undercover officer, and upon doing so, he was arrested.

            Before trial, the district court granted appellant’s motion to inspect, examine and test physical evidence, but appellant claims that his efforts to examine the evidence were stifled by the police department. At trial, several witnesses, including two undercover officers as well as Reap, testified about appellant’s commission of the offense.  At the punishment phase of the trial, appellant admitted to purchasing computer parts that he knew were stolen property in an attempt to resell them for personal gain.

            This pro se appeal ensued.

II.  Waiver of Appellate Review

          In appellant’s multifarious point of error, he alleges a “[v]iolation of the due process protections provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, Sections 10, 13 and 19 of the Texas Constitution, and Articles 1.04 and 1.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.”  Under this broadly framed issue, he contends the State denied him the right to a fair trial, the right to confrontation, the right to prepare a defense, the right to effective assistance of counsel and due process of law.  The gravamen of appellant’s constitutional challenge is the assertion that had he been able to inspect, examine, and test the physical evidence used at trial, he would have been able to develop a defense.  Because appellant has not provided separate arguments or authority on his constitutional claims, we need not review each constitutional challenge independently.  Lape v. State, 893 S.W.2d 949, 954 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d).

            Considering his constitutional claims together, we must overrule appellant’s point of error because he cites no authority for this proposition.  Bell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (noting that “[i]t is not sufficient that appellant raise only a general constitutional doctrine in support of his request for relief”).  Indeed, in the entirety of his brief to this court, appellant cites not a single case in support of his legal contentions.  It is incumbent upon appellant to cite specific legal authority and to provide legal arguments based upon that authority.  Id.  Appellant’s mere references to the United States and Texas Constitutions, or to various constitutional doctrines, are insufficient to preserve error on appeal.  Id.  Thus, appellant’s conclusory arguments, in the absence of any supporting authority or case law, are inadequately briefed and therefore present nothing for our review.  See Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Atkins v. State, 919 S.W.2d 770, 774–75 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.).  Because appellant cites no state or federal case law, he has waived appellate review by inadequately briefing his points of error.  See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h).  Accordingly, appellant’s point of error is overruled.  To the extent that appellant’s brief could be read as advancing multiple points of error, they are overruled on the same grounds.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

 

 

                                                                        /s/        Eva M. Guzman

                                                                                    Justice

 

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed June 19, 2003.

Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Seymore, and Guzman.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).