MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Sep 18 2015, 8:50 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ellen M. O’Connor Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Katherine Modesitt Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jonathan Finley, September 18, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1503-CR-88
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable William J. Nelson,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
The Honorable Cheryl Rivera,
Judge Pro Tempore
Trial Court Cause No.
49F18-1309-FD-58730
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1503-CR-88 | September 18, 2015 Page 1 of 5
[1] Defendant Jonathan Finley appeals his conviction of Class D Felony Theft,1
arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Finding the
evidence sufficient, we affirm.
Facts
[2] While on his routine patrol in Marion County in the evening hours of
September 4, 2013, Police Officer Brian Robertson drove by Team 100 Motor
Sports Automotive Dealership. The business had closed, but Officer Robertson
noticed that one of the Cadillacs had an open trunk, and decided to investigate.
He dimmed his lights and approached the vehicle, where he saw a man—later
identified as Finley—leaning into the trunk, “his arms and such . . . moving like
he was working with tools.” Tr. 15.
[3] Officer Robertson observed the Cadillac’s stereo head gear lying on the ground
next to Finley’s foot. Officer Robertson also found the Cadillac’s rear-view
mirror, a quarter-inch chrome ratchet, a ten-millimeter socket, and an extension
for the socket inside the Cadillac’s trunk.
[4] Officer Robertson Mirandized2 Finley and began making inquiries. Finley said
that he did not know how the stereo got outside the vehicle and that the tools
did not belong to him. He consented to a search of his minivan, which was
parked just outside the dealership. Officer Robertson noticed that the minivan’s
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-4-2.
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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sliding door was open, and inside, on the driver’s side rear passenger seat, he
found a socket set. Several tools were missing from the set, including a quarter-
inch ratchet, a ten-millimeter socket, and an extension.
[5] On September 9, 2013, the State charged Finley with class D felony theft. On
December 22, 2014, the trial court held a bench trial and found him guilty as
charged. On February 2, 2015, the trial court sentenced him to 545 days, with
180 days to be served on home detention and 365 days to be served on
probation. Finley now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Finley makes one argument on appeal: that there is insufficient evidence to
support his conviction. Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is
well-settled:
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the trial court’s decision. It is
the fact-finder’s role, and not ours, to assess witness credibility
and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to
support a conviction. When we are confronted with conflicting
evidence, we consider it most favorably to the trial court's
ruling. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Therefore, it is not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; rather, the
evidence is sufficient if an inference reasonably may be drawn
from it to support the trial court's decision.
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Brummett v. State, 10 N.E.3d 78, 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted). To
convict Finley of theft, the State needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Finley knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over
property of another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part
of its value or use. I.C. § 35-42-4-2(a).
[7] In support of his argument, Finley directs our attention to his trial testimony.
Specifically, he testified that he likes to look at used cars on the lot after hours
so he will not be harassed by salespeople. Tr. 31. Finley claims that on the
night in question, he saw two people leaving the car lot as he arrived. Id. at 31-
32. He further claims that he popped open the trunk to check out its size, saw
the missing panel, and leaned into the trunk to conduct a more thorough
investigation. Id. at 32-33. Finally, he says that the tools were not his, and the
missing pieces in his socket set were hidden under the top layer of the socket
set. Id. at 34-35.
[8] But all of this evidence was already presented to the factfinder, who deemed it
not credible. It is not our role to assess the credibility of these statements. Our
role is limited to determining whether the State’s evidence could lead a
reasonable factfinder to find all the elements established beyond a reasonable
doubt.
[9] The State presented the following evidence. Officer Robertson saw the Cadillac
with its trunk open. Tr. 13. He pulled up and found Finley partially inside the
trunk working with tools. Id. at 14. Officer Robertson found three tools from a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1503-CR-88 | September 18, 2015 Page 4 of 5
socket set inside the trunk of the vehicle. Id. at 17. He found the precise
corresponding components missing from the socket set inside Finley’s vehicle.
Id. at 19. Finally, the owner of the dealership had not authorized Finley to
remove parts from the vehicle. Id. at 27.
[10] From this evidence, a reasonable fact-finder could find that Finley exerted
control over the stereo and the rear-view mirror; that he did so knowingly; that
this property was of another person; that his doing so was unauthorized; and
that he had the intent to deprive the other person of its value. The fact-finder
would not have been unreasonable in finding Finley’s alternative explanation—
that he was investigating the inside of the trunk with tools that were not his but
exactly matched his socket set—to strain credulity. In sum, the evidence is
more than sufficient to sustain the verdict.
[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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