Cinelli v. Petrella

USCA1 Opinion









February 16, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 95-1724

DOMENIC CINELLI,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

JAMES C. PETRELLA, DAVID NOURY AND JOHN DOE,

Defendants, Appellees.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Robert W. Lovegreen, U.S. Magistrate Judge] _____________________

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Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________

Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________

and Skinner,* Senior District Judge. _____________________

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Vincent A. Indeglia, with whom Michael J. Lepizzera was on brief ___________________ ____________________
for appellant.
David J. Gentile for appellees. ________________



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*Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.












Per Curiam. Pro se plaintiff Domenic Cinelli, a former __________ ___ __

inmate at the Adult Correctional Institution in Cranston, Rhode

Island, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

1983, alleging that two prison guards, James Petrella and David

Noury, entered his cell and beat him without cause. In addition

to the 1983 claim, the complaint alleged pendent state-law

claims for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. Since shortly after the complaint was filed,

Cinelli has been ably represented by counsel.

The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate

judge, see 28 U.S.C. 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, and waived ___

jury trial. After a bench trial, the magistrate judge disposed

of all claims on the merits, and judgment was entered for the

defendants. Cinelli filed a timely motion for new trial pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(2). Following hearing, the magistrate

judge denied the motion for new trial. On appeal, Cinelli

challenges the denial of the motion for new trial as an abuse of

discretion. See Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. ___ ________________________ ___________________

of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 810-11 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 ___________ _____ ______

U.S. 955 (1988). After careful review, we affirm the well-

reasoned decision of the magistrate judge.

Cinelli first argues that the magistrate judge erred in

failing to consider an equal protection claim under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The

magistrate judge determined that Cinelli neither pleaded, argued,

nor established an equal protection claim. The original


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complaint, which was never amended, simply cited to 1983 and

alleged that the defendants had deprived him of "a constitutional

right, privilege, or immunity." Cf. Ayala Serrano v. Lebron ___ _____________ ______

Gonzalez, 909 F.2d 8, 10-12 (1st Cir. 1990) (counsel amended pro ________ ___

se 1983 complaint with specific allegations). There is no __

mention of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, let alone any

other constitutional basis for an equal protection claim. The

Cinelli pretrial memorandum likewise failed to mention any such

equal protection claim. See Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 ___ _________ __________________

F.2d 983, 998-99 (1st Cir. 1990) (failure to raise defense in

pretrial memorandum and failure to object to pretrial order

constitutes waiver), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 912 (1991). _____ ______

In contrast, Cinelli did brief the 1983 claim (based

on the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment), as well as the pendent claims for assault, battery,

and intentional infliction of emotional distress. All these

claims, and none other, were tried to the magistrate judge, and

it was not until those claims were rejected on the merits that

Cinelli attempted to raise an equal protection claim. In these

circumstances, there was no abuse of discretion in denying

Cinelli the opportunity to raise an entirely new theory of

recovery which should have been raised before trial. Kattan by _________

Thomas v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 276 (D.C. Cir. ______ _____________________

1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1398 (1994).1 _____ ______
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1In all events, the belated equal protection theory offered
little prospect of success. Cinelli contends that Noury singled
him out and "intentionally treated him differently than other

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Cinelli also argues that the evidence unequivocally

established that Petrella and Noury violated the Eighth Amendment

and committed the torts of assault, battery, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. A new trial is appropriate if

"the outcome is against the clear weight of the evidence such

that upholding the verdict will result in a miscarriage of

justice." Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 598 (1st ______ ____________________

Cir. 1987). Our review of the record, and the thorough

explication provided by the magistrate judge, persuade us that

there was no miscarriage of justice. Rather, the magistrate

judge, as the factfinder, supportably resolved all pending claims

after weighing the evidence and assessing the credibility of the

witnesses.

The district court judgment is affirmed. No costs. _______________________________________ ________


















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prisoners" for the sole reason that Cinelli had commenced a civil
rights action against him. There was no timely allegation of
invidious discrimination to support an equal protection claim. _________________
See Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurants of Massachusetts, Inc., 67 ___ ______ ______________________________________________
F.3d 341, 353-54 (1st Cir. 1995).

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