USCA1 Opinion
June 25, 1996
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-2141
EDWARD LOTHER,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
GEORGE A. VOSE, JR., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
Edward Lother on brief pro se. _____________
Jeffrey B. Pine, Attorney General, Thomas A. Palombo, Special ________________ __________________
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Attorney General, and David _____
J. Gentile, Senior Legal Counsel, R.I. Department of Corrections, on __________
brief for appellees.
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. Having carefully examined the record in ___________
this case, we affirm the dismissal of appellant Lother's
complaint, albeit for somewhat different reasons than those
articulated below.
First, since both the Morris rules and the Rhode Island
Administrative Procedure Acts are state laws, the alleged
violation of either, in and of itself, is not a sufficient
predicate to sustain a damage action under federal law.
Complaints of such violations therefore should be directed to
state court. Furthermore, insofar as appellant seeks
injunctive or declaratory relief for alleged violations of
the Morris rules, he is precluded by our prior holding that
inmates may not bring individual section 1983 actions for
injunctive or declaratory relief which are based on consent
decree violations. See Martel v. Fridovich, 14 F.3d 1, 3 n.4 ___ ______ _________
(1st Cir. 1993).
Second, Lother's allegation that his being required to
provide a urine sample violated his Fourth Amendment rights
is without merit. Urine tests of inmates may be searches for
Fourth Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Lucero v. Gunter, 52 ___ ____ ______ ______
F.3d 874, 877 (10th Cir. 1995); Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d ______ _____
308, 312 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 950 (1993); _____ ______
Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1986). ______ _______
Prisoners therefore may have a right not to be required to
submit to unreasonable requests for urine tests. However,
Lother claims only that the test in this case was conducted
-2-
without a superior officer present. That fact may indicate a
violation of the Morris rules; standing alone, however, it
does not raise Fourth Amendment concerns.
Finally, even if we assume without deciding that Lother
retains a liberty interest in preserving the good time
credits he has earned or in not being deprived of his
visitation privileges, Lother has still failed to allege
sufficient facts to sustain a claim that his right to due
process has been violated. Even read liberally, his
complaint at most alleges that the disciplinary board which
found him guilty of the drug violation "used inappropriate
criteria to substanciate [sic] [the] discipline report."
While due process requires that a disciplinary board's
finding of guilt be supported by "some evidence" in the
record, Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Walpole v. __________________________________________________
Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985), Lother has only alleged ____
that the drug test which led to the challenged disciplinary
action was unsupported by a second test. Since he has not
alleged that the test itself was false, he has not denied
that "some evidence" exists to support the board's finding of
guilt.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1. ________ ___
-3-