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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.L. A/K/A J.S.L., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.L., MOTHER No. 3558 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered November 24, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court, at No(s): AP#0000514-2014
FN-002680-2012
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2015
J.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered November 24, 2014, in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which involuntarily
terminated her parental rights to her minor daughter, J.L., a/k/a, J.S.L.
(“Child”), born in September 2006, and changed Child’s permanency goal to
adoption. We affirm.1
On September 30, 2012, the Philadelphia Department of Human
Services (“DHS”) received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) report
alleging that Child and Mother were residing in a home that lacked running
water and electricity and that received gas from an illegal gas hook up. The
GPS report also alleged that Child was not enrolled in school. Finally, it was
reported that Mother was often under the influence of drugs, using her
1
The trial court also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of C.W.,
Child’s father (“Father”) to Child. Father has not filed an appeal of that
decision.
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welfare check to purchase controlled substances such as Xanax and
Percocet. The report noted that Mother and Child’s Maternal Grandmother,
T.L. (“Maternal Grandmother”) shared custody of Child. The GPS report
found a lack of supervision on the part of Mother.
On October 1, 2012, DHS visited Mother’s home. The DHS social
worker observed that the home lacked not only gas and water service, but
was filthy and had a foul odor from pet waste. DHS also found that four
additional adults were residing in the home with Mother and Child. DHS
implemented a Safety Plan with Mother, which stated that Mother would
enter a shelter with Child on October 2, 2012.
On October 2, 2012, DHS performed a property search and learned
that the owner of the home where Mother and Child resided was deceased.
Mother was denied entry to the shelter system until correspondence from
License and Inspection stated that the home was unfit for living, and that
Mother needed to obtain Child’s medicine to appropriately care for Child. In
addition, DHS learned that Maternal Grandmother and her husband did not
clear a criminal background records check.
On October 3, 2012, DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody
(“OPC”) for Child, and placed her in the care of a family friend, H.D. A
shelter hearing was held on October 4, 2012. Mother appeared at the
hearing, and the trial court ordered the temporary commitment of Child to
DHS. At the time of the hearing, the whereabouts of Father were unknown.
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On October 11, 2012, the trial court adjudicated Child dependent, and
ordered her committed to DHS’s care and custody. Mother was ordered by
the trial court to go to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for drug screens,
dual diagnosis, and an assessment. The court also ordered Mother and
Father to attend the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) program. The
court further ordered Mother and Maternal Grandmother to attend bi-weekly
supervised visits with Child.
On November 12, 2012, DHS referred Mother to the ARC program.
On January 7, 2013, DHS held a Family Service Plan (“FSP”) meeting. The
FSP objectives set up for Mother were: (1) to provide Child with nutritious
meals; (2) to receive a proper medical evaluation for Child; (3) to stay
employed and seek job counseling and referrals; and (4) to visit and
maintain regular contact with Child.
On January 22, 2013, CEU conducted a Chemical Dependency
Evaluation for Mother, and a detoxification treatment program was
recommended. Mother received drug abuse treatment at the facility. In
April 2013, Child was reunited with Mother. On April 16, 2013, CEU
completed a Chemical Dependency Evaluation of Mother, and recommended
no treatment at the time.
A permanency hearing was held on June 19, 2013, and the trial court
confirmed custody of Child with Mother. DHS offered aftercare services in
the home for one year.
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On August 7, 2013, Mother was arrested and charged with forgery,
theft, and other similar crimes. On September 12, 2013, DHS received
allegations that Mother was no longer residing in the family home. The
North East Treatment Center (“NET”) had not had a successful visit with
Mother and Child since August 2013. The report alleged that Mother was
residing with her ex-paramour; that Mother had been fired from her job for
stealing; and, that Child lacked proper hygiene and nutritious meals. In
addition, Child had gained a significant amount of weight, and it was
reported that Mother gave Child a “white pill” every night before she went to
bed.
On September 18, 2013, DHS and NET social workers visited Mother’s
new residence. DHS observed that the home had a foul odor. The lights did
not work and there was exposed wiring from the electrical outlets in the
hallway. DHS also visited the James Sullivan Elementary School where Child
was enrolled. Child told the social worker that she was afraid to return
home. Child was told by Mother not to disclose any information to DHS.
DHS learned that Child witnessed eleven physical altercations between
Mother’s current paramour and her ex-paramour in the home. Child also
reported that Mother forced her to take Tylenol PM before bedtime and
physically abused her with a key.
DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody (“OPC”) for Child who
was again placed with H.D. DHS had once again received allegations of
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Mother’s drug use and DHS was aware that Mother had a history of being
transient, and lacked stable housing. The whereabouts of Father were still
unknown to DHS.
An adjudication hearing was held on October 1, 2013. Following the
hearing, the trial court adjudicated Child dependent, and ordered Child
committed to DHS for a second time. Mother was referred to CEU for a drug
screen, dual diagnosis assessment, and monitoring. Mother was required to
submit to three drug screens. Mother was also referred to ARC programs for
parenting education classes, housing programs, and anger management.
On October 21, 2013, DHS held an FSP meeting. The objectives for
Mother were: (1) to comply with ARC for parenting, housing, and anger
management; (2) to maintain suitable housing; (3) to seek employment, job
counseling, and maintain financial stability; (4) to participate in CEU for drug
screens and dual diagnosis assessment and monitoring; (5) to complete a
Parenting Capacity Evaluation; and (6) to comply with supervised visits. On
December 17, 2013, DHS referred Mother for a Parenting Capacity
Evaluation at Assessment and Treatment Alternatives (“ATA”), which was
cancelled because Mother did not confirm it. On December 26, 2013, CEU
completed a report of Non-Compliance regarding Mother. Mother did not
comply with the drug abuse assessment; failed to submit to a drug screen
on October 1, 2013; and failed to appear at the scheduled appointments at
Girard Medical Center on several occasions.
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The court held permanency hearings. At each hearing, the record
reflected Mother’s lack of compliance with court-ordered drug treatments
and the lack of stable housing.
On February 10, 2014, DHS filed Petitions to Terminate Mother’s
Parental Rights and to Change the Permanency Goal to Adoption. An
evidentiary hearing was held on November 24, 2014. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the trial court granted DHS’s Petition to Terminate Mother’s
Parental Rights and Petition to Change the Permanency Goal to Adoption.
This timely appeal followed.
We review this appeal according to the following standard.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
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parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the
parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a).
Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511). The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of
parental rights are valid. See In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super.
2009).
Instantly, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant
to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). This Court need only agree
with any one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a), in addition to Section
2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. See In re
B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we conclude
that the trial court properly terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing
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of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose
of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has
refused or failed to perform parental duties.
...
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall
not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1) and (b).
With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), “the moving party must produce
clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six
months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled
intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform
parental duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing
In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. Super. 2006)). Further,
[o]nce the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the
court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s
explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment
contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the
effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to
Section 2511(b).
Id. (quoting In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa.
1998)).
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On appeal, Mother argues that DHS failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that her parental rights should be terminated. Mother
emphasizes that she substantially met her FSP goals and tried to perform
her parental duties.
The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that Mother
demonstrated a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to Child
and failed to perform her parental duties. Trial Court Opinion, 1/20/15, at 5.
The testimony of Tracy O’Donnell, the social worker, stated that Mother did
not often visit with Child. Moreover, Mother has had no contact with Child
since November 2013.
The testimony of the social worker established that Mother failed to
comply with the permanency goals for Child. Mother did not successfully
complete her drug and alcohol treatment, and was discharged from the
program for non-compliance. Mother also did not complete an anger
management program. Moreover, Mother did not complete her mental
health treatment program, and was discharged from the program for non-
compliance. Finally, Mother failed to offer proof of employment or job
training.
In addition, the trial court determined that Mother failed to maintain
contact with Child necessary to maintain a parental relationship. The trial
court also concluded that Mother demonstrated a settled purpose of
relinquishing her parental claim to Child. Thus, the competent evidence
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supports the trial court ruling that DHS met its burden under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(1).
Having determined that the trial court properly terminated Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), we now review the order
pursuant to Section 2511(b). With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court
has explained the requisite analysis as follows:
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884
A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,
“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.”
In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern
the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that
bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a
bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no
bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super.
2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis
necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
Id. at 63.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
In this case, Child has been in foster care for over twenty-four months.
The testimony of the social worker established that there is no parental bond
between Mother and Child. Child told her social worker, Tracy O’Donnell,
that she has no interest in a relationship with Mother, and does not refer to
Mother as “mom.” N.T., Hearing, 11/24/14, 12-13. Testimony at the
hearing revealed that Child has bonded with her foster parents, and desires
to be adopted by them. Ms. O’Donnell testified that Child refers to her foster
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parents as “mom” and “dad,” and has a very strong relationship with them.
Id. There was sufficient and competent evidence to support the trial court’s
findings with regard to the lack of a bond between Mother and Child that will
be harmed if severed. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764. Thus, we discern
no abuse of discretion by the trial court in terminating Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).
We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by
changing the Children’s permanency goal to adoption. Our standard of
review is as follows.
In cases involving a court’s order changing the placement
goal . . . to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of
discretion. To hold that the trial court abused its discretion, we
must determine its judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that
the court disregarded the law, or that its action was a result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. While this Court is bound by
the facts determined in the trial court, we are not tied to the
court’s inferences, deductions and conclusions; we have a
responsibility to ensure that the record represents a
comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied
the appropriate legal principles to that record. Therefore, our
scope of review is broad.
In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted). See
also In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).
This matter is controlled by the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et
seq., which was amended in 1998 to conform to the federal Adoption and
Safe Families Act (“ASFA”), 42 U.S.C. § 671 et seq. See In re M.S., 980
A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. Super. 2009). We have recognized that “[b]oth statutes
are compatible pieces of legislation seeking to benefit the best interest of the
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child, not the parent. . . . ASFA promotes the reunification of foster care
children with their natural parents when feasible. . . . Pennsylvania’s
Juvenile Act focuses upon reunification of the family, which means that the
unity of the family shall be preserved ‘whenever possible.’” Id. (citing 42
Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1)). As such, child welfare agencies are required to make
reasonable efforts to return a foster child to his or her biological parent.
See In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2006). When those efforts
fail, the agency “must redirect its efforts toward placing the child in an
adoptive home.” Id. (citation omitted).
At permanency review hearings for dependent children removed from
the parental home, a trial court must consider the following factors.
(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.—
At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the
following:
(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of
the placement.
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of
compliance with the permanency plan developed for the
child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the
circumstances which necessitated the original placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current
placement goal for the child.
(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the
child might be achieved.
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(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize
the permanency plan in effect.
(6) Whether the child is safe.
....
(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of
the last 22 months or the court has determined that
aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable
efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the
child from the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to
preserve and reunify the family need not be made or
continue to be made, whether the county agency has filed
or sought to join a petition to terminate parental rights
and to identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified
family to adopt the child . . . .
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(1)-(6), (9). “These statutory mandates clearly place
the trial court’s focus on the best interests of the child.” In re S.B., 943
A.2d at 978 (citation omitted). We have stated, “[s]afety, permanency, and
well-being of the child must take precedence over all other considerations.”
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the burden is on the
child welfare agency “to prove the change in goal would be in the child’s best
interest.” In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2009).
In this case, during Mother’s hearing, Ms. O’Donnell, the case
manager, opined that it would be in the best interest of Child to change her
permanency goal from reunification to adoption. See N.T., Hearing,
11/24/14, at 13-14. Given Mother’s repeated failure to make progress in
achieving her family service plan objectives, and considering that Mother
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appears unlikely to ever complete these objectives, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by changing Child’s goals.
Accordingly, we affirm the order involuntarily terminating Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b), and changing
Child’s permanency goal to adoption.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/29/2015
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