FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 26 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JACK CANTRELL, No. 09-16284
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:07-cv-02106-FJM
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JOSEPH M. ARPAIO, Sheriff; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2010 **
Before: SCHROEDER, PREGERSON, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Jack Cantrell, a former Arizona pretrial detainee, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
PDM/Research
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment,
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and its dismissal for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d
443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record,
Vestar Dev. II, LLC v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 2001),
and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Cantrell’s
excessive force claim against Defendant Burke because Cantrell failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Burke’s actions of handcuffing
Cantrell and raising his arms were objectively unreasonable in light of the
circumstances. See Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that for a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claims, the question is
whether the defendant’s actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts
and circumstances, without regard to underlying intent or motivation); see also
Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that the “nature and quality of the intrusion” on a pretrial detainee’s
rights is considered when evaluating an excessive force claim).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Cantrell’s Eighth
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Amendment claims regarding his fear of his cellmate, and alleging that the
conditions of his confinement constituted deliberate indifference to his health and
safety, because Cantrell did not demonstrate the “subjective prong” of deliberate
indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994) (“[A] prison
official cannot be found liable [for deliberate indifference] unless the official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”).
The district court properly dismissed the claims against Sheriff Arpaio for
failure to state a claim because Cantrell failed to allege that Arpaio enacted or
enforced a particular policy, custom, or practice that resulted in denial of Cantrell’s
constitutional rights. See Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746-47
(9th Cir. 1986); see also Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
(explaining that a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face”). Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Cantrell’s motion to amend his complaint to reallege the same allegations
against Arpaio. See Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004)
(setting forth standard of review and explaining that “[f]utility alone can justify the
denial of a motion to amend”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Cantrell’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
PDM/Research 3 09-16284