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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-15071
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:11-cv-01124-MEF-WC
LORRAINE A. THROWER,
DANA STARLING,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
JOEL ZIEGLER, Warden,
MICHAEL HAMRICK,
Institutional Duty Officer (IDO),
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
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(March 28, 2013)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
Appellants Lorraine Thrower and Dana Starling, appearing pro se, appeal
the dismissal of their actions for violation of the First and Fifth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971). Thrower and Starling alleged
that Joel Ziegler and Michael Hamrick, two federal prison officials, impermissibly
curtailed their visit to an inmate in violation of prison policy. The complaint was
dismissed because qualified immunity afforded the officials protection from suit.
We review “de novo a district court’s disposition of a summary judgment
motion based on qualified immunity, applying the same legal standards as the
district court.” Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir. 2003). We
resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the plaintiffs, leaving only the legal
question of whether the defendant is then entitled to qualified immunity. Id.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil suits in their
individual capacities when they perform discretionary functions. Andujar v.
Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 2007). This protection attaches unless
the officials’ conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). Thus, qualified
immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
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the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L. Ed. 2d
271 (1986). Once the official demonstrates his actions were within the scope of his
discretionary authority, the plaintiff can only overcome qualified immunity by
showing that “(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right
was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Hollowman ex rel.
Hollowman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir 2004). We exercise
discretion in deciding which prong to address first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 236, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009).
We conclude from the record that Ziegler and Hamrick are entitled to
qualified immunity. Here, there is no dispute that terminating a prison visit is
within Hamrick’s or Ziegler’s authority. While Thrower and Starling couch their
arguments in general terms of the First and Fifth Amendments, their real objection
is that the officials violated a prison visitation policy. See Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 639–40, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987) (directing
courts to focus on particular violations and not resolve qualified immunity
questions as they pertain to “extremely abstract rights”). Despite the allegedly
mandatory language of the policy, “inmates do not have an absolute right to
visitation.” Caraballo–Sandoval v. Honsted, 35 F.3d 521, 525 (11th Cir. 1994);
see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–82, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299, 132 L. Ed. 2d
418 (1995) (concluding that looking to whether regulatory language is mandatory
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is not sensible in the context of prison regulations). Officials, especially in the
prison context, do not lose qualified immunity by mere violation of some
administrative provision. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194, 104 S. Ct. 3012,
3019, 82 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1984). Thus, Ziegler and Hamrick’s action did not violate
any clearly established rights.
We decline to adopt a public policy exception to qualified immunity for
Thrower’s and Starling’s particular circumstances, as the doctrine of qualified
immunity reflects a careful balance “struck across the board” of civil litigation.
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 642, 107 S. Ct. at 3040.
After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we hold that the
district court properly determined that qualified immunity protects Hamrick and
Ziegler from suit. Thrower and Starling did not demonstrate a clearly established
right to visit an inmate under these circumstance, and thus we do not reach the
issue of whether a constitutional violation occurred. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of dismissal.
AFFIRMED.
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