[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ JANUARY 29, 2009
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 08-12243 CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00167-CR-01-JOF-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FLORENTINO CASTENADA-PALAEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(January 29, 2009)
Before BLACK, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Florentino Castenada-Palaez appeals his 36-month sentence for illegal
reentry into the United States following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a) and (b)(1). On appeal, Castenada-Palaez argues the district court
committed procedural error by considering two of his previous convictions from
California and Utah in deciding to impose a nine-month upward variance from the
advisory Guidelines range. He also argues his sentence is substantively
unreasonable.
I.
We review a sentence imposed by a district court for reasonableness, using
an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
In determining whether a sentence is reasonable, we “must first ensure that the
district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate
(or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id.
A defendant’s failure to object to a factual statement made in the PSI
constitutes an admission for the purpose of sentencing. United States v. Wade, 458
F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2096 (2007). “Vague
assertions of inaccuracies in the report are insufficient; instead, the defendant must
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make clear and focused objections to specific factual allegations made in the
report.” United States v. Owen, 858 F.2d 1514, 1517 (11th Cir. 1988).
In this case, the district court followed the proper procedures in sentencing
Castenada-Palaez. The court correctly calculated the Guidelines range. Because
the court gave Castenada-Palaez an above-Guidelines sentence, it did not treat the
Guidelines as mandatory. The court gave an explanation for its sentence, and its
discussion shows it considered the § 3553(a) factors. The court also did not rely
on any clearly erroneous facts in sentencing Castenada-Palaez. Even assuming it
would have been improper for the district court to rely on Castenada-Palaez’s
California conviction, the record shows the district court did not consider it. The
court prefaced its remarks with the words, “[w]ithout further debating what to do
with one California charge.” With respect to Castenada-Palaez’s Utah conviction,
the district court did not have to consider Castenada-Palaez’s objection to the PSI’s
description because it was not sufficiently detailed and Castenada-Palaez did not
make clear what facts he was disputing. See Owen, 858 F.2d at 1517. The district
court thus did not commit any procedural error in sentencing Castenada-Palaez.
II.
In determining whether the sentence imposed by the district court is
substantively reasonable, we consider several factors, including: (1) the nature and
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circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,
(2) the need to deter criminal conduct, (3) the need to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant, and (4) the advisory Guidelines range. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). The party challenging the sentence has the burden of proving it is
unreasonable. United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2006).
We conclude Castenada-Palaez’s sentence is substantively reasonable.
Castenada-Palaez had prior convictions for assault, family violence battery, and
battery. He also had a prior felony conviction for illegal reentry. Therefore, a
nine-month upward variance was appropriate given Castenada-Palaez’s history and
characteristics. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Castenada-Palaez’s sentence also
serves the goal of deterrence and helps to protect the public from other crimes. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C). Furthermore, although Castenada-Palaez’s
sentence is higher than his Guidelines range of 21 to 27 months, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by giving the other § 3553(a) factors more weight than
the Guidelines range, and the sentence is well below the maximum permitted by
statute. Accordingly, we hold Castenada-Palaez’s 36-month sentence is
substantively reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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