COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00018-CR
NO. 02-13-00019-CR
ALEKSANDR GOUKASIAN APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1215851D, 1283325R
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Aleksandr Goukasian appeals his convictions for the unlawful
intercept or endeavor to intercept or disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic
communications; the unlawful possession of an electronic interception device;
engaging in organized criminal activity; and the fraudulent possession and use of
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
identifying information. In one point, Goukasian argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying his motion for the appointment of an interpreter.
We will affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
The day before trial on the underlying charges in this case began,
Goukasian filed a motion requesting an interpreter.2 On the day of trial and prior
to both parties introducing evidence regarding the underlying charges, the trial
court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury regarding Goukasian’s
motion for the appointment of an interpreter.
At the start of the hearing, the court noted that Goukasian’s case was filed
in October 2010, that he was indicted on March 17, 2011, that he was placed on
bond and had reported to a bond officer since that time, and that Goukasian did
not file his motion for an interpreter until the day before trial began on June 12,
2012. The court also noted that it had “received information that [Goukasian] can
speak English and actually can speak very fluent English.”
In support of his motion, Goukasian introduced evidence from a prior
federal criminal case in which he pleaded guilty and in which he had a court-
appointed interpreter. Goukasian also called Gerard Kardonsky, one of his
attorneys, to the stand. According to Kardonsky, he spoke exclusively in Russian
2
Because this appeal entails only the matter of the trial court’s denial of
Goukasian’s motion for the appointment of an interpreter, the factual and
procedural background recited herein will only detail those facts germane to this
issue.
2
to Goukasian and he was present anytime any of the non-Russian speaking
attorneys in his office counseled Goukasian. Kardonsky testified that although
Goukasian’s “conversational English is fine; his understanding of legal
terminology [is not fine.]” Kardonsky also averred that he traveled as an
interpreter with Goukasian “every time” Goukasian went to see another attorney
who was representing Goukasian in a federal proceeding.
Under cross, Kardonsky stated that Goukasian spoke English with
members on staff at his firm on a “daily basis.” Kardonsky also averred that
Goukasian had been on bond for several months without his assistance as an
interpreter. Kardonsky testified that Goukasian had lived in the United States
since 1993.
The State called Lisa Hunt, the global positioning system (GPS) officer for
Tarrant County Community Supervision and Corrections Department (CSCD).
Hunt testified that she was Goukasian’s current GPS supervisor and that he had
previously had two other GPS supervisors.3 According to Hunt, neither of the two
previous GPS supervisors nor herself spoke Russian or Armenian. 4 Hunt said
that she had personally been Goukasian’s GPS supervisor for almost eighteen
months, that she had communicated with him personally nearly 100 times, and
3
The record indicates that Goukasian was required to wear a GPS
monitoring device as a bond condition.
4
At the hearing, Goukasian’s attorney stated that although Goukasian’s
motion requested a Russian-speaking interpreter, an Armenian-speaking
interpreter would also suffice.
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that each time they communicated in English. She averred that Goukasian never
had an interpreter with him during their conversations. Hunt also said that she
was able to convey to Goukasian “technical” issues relating to how his GPS
monitoring device worked and that Goukasian had even discussed “highly
technical” issues relating to his GPS monitoring device with another employee at
CSCD. Hunt further testified that Goukasian had researched technical aspects of
his GPS monitoring device online, and Goukasian brought printouts that were in
English regarding Internet searches he had done, attempting to find a church that
he might attend. Hunt averred that on several occasions she had to remind
Goukasian that he was not allowed to bring gifts to the employees at CSCD
because such gifts could be construed as bribes. Hunt said that she had the
conversations regarding gifts with Goukasian in English and that she believed he
fully understood her.
The State also called Mary Jo Gutierrez, a senior court officer for CSCD.
Gutierrez testified that her duties included explaining bond conditions to
Goukasian. She averred that she had previously explained his bond conditions
to him in English. She also testified that at the bond hearing, Goukasian
answered questions and spoke to the trial court in English. Gutierrez described
Goukasian’s ability to communicate in English as being “very good.” According
to Gutierrez, she once explained to Goukasian his bond conditions relating to
“exclusionary zones” and that the conversation was in English and “pretty
detailed.” By Gutierrez’s account, Goukasian never once complained that he
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was unable to understand her communicating to him in English and she never
had any issues understanding his English.
The State also introduced evidence that prior to Kardonsky’s involvement
in the case, Goukasian, through previous counsel, had filed numerous motions
and had attended a bond hearing without the assistance of an interpreter.
During closing arguments at the hearing, Goukasian’s attorney argued that
although Goukasian “does speak and understand English . . . on fairly concrete
matters,” he required an interpreter to help him understand the complicated legal
aspects of his cases. At the close of the hearing, the trial court noted for the
record its own recollection of having explained Goukasian’s bond conditions to
him at the bond hearing in English. The trial court denied Goukasian’s motion for
an interpreter. Following the hearing and after a jury trial in which the jury found
Goukasian guilty of each of the State’s charges, the trial court sentenced
Goukasian to twenty years’ incarceration for the unlawful intercept of electronic
communications, two years’ incarceration for four different charges of unlawful
possession of an interception device, twenty years’ incarceration for engaging in
organized criminal activity, and twenty years’ incarceration for the fraudulent use
and possession of identifying information. The trial court entered judgments
accordingly, and this appeal followed.
III. DENIAL OF INTERPRETER
In his sole point, Goukasian argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying his request for the appointment of an interpreter at trial. We disagree.
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Providing an interpreter to an accused who does not understand English is
required by the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution as well as
section 38.30 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Abdygapparova v.
State, 243 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. ref’d); see U.S.
Const. amend. VI; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.30 (West Supp. 2014).
Under Texas law, the right to an interpreter is statutory and must be implemented
unless waived. Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993),
overruled on other grounds by Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997); Fonseca v. State, 163 S.W.3d 98, 100 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet.
ref’d). But the threshold determination of whether an interpreter is necessary is
within the trial court’s discretion. Baltierra v. State, 586 S.W.2d 553, 556–57
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Abdygapparova, 243 S.W.3d at 201.
Article 38.30 provides that if upon the filing of a motion for the appointment
of an interpreter, the trial court determines that the person charged or a witness
does not understand the English language, an interpreter must be appointed for
that person. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.30; Abdygapparova, 243 S.W.3d
at 201; Fonseca, 163 S.W.3d at 100; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 57.002(a)
(West Supp. 2014). The mere fact that an accused is fluent in another language
does not, alone, warrant the appointment of an interpreter. Flores v. State, 509
S.W.2d 580, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Abdygapparova, 243 S.W.3d at 201.
Evidence that a person is capable of communicating in English on a day-to-day
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basis is sufficient to support a trial court’s denial of an interpreter. See
Abdygapparova, 243 S.W.3d at 201.
Here, the evidence supports the trial court’s discretionary ruling. The trial
judge was in the best position to observe Goukasian’s capability of
communicating in English; indeed, the judge noted on record at the hearing that
he had previously communicated with Goukasian at his bond hearing in English.
The State introduced testimony of Goukasian’s GPS supervisor wherein she
averred that she had spoken with Goukasian nearly 100 times and that she had
even heard him discuss “highly technical” issues with a co-worker of hers in
English regarding his GPS monitoring device. The State further elicited
testimony from the senior court officer for CSCD, who stated that she had
communicated “pretty detailed” information regarding Goukasian’s bond
conditions and that Goukasian’s English was “very good.” The trial court was
also presented with evidence that Goukasian could conduct Internet searches in
English.
Furthermore, Goukasian maintained at trial, as he does now on appeal,
that while he is conversant in English and capable of understanding “concrete”
issues, he requested an interpreter for the purpose of understanding complex
legal issues. But this court has held that concerns over the inability to
understand legal terminology does not invalidate a trial court’s denial to provide
an interpreter to a defendant who has the ability to communicate in English on a
day-to-day basis. See Aguilar Lamberto v. State, No. 02-07-00070-CR, 2008 WL
7
2168122, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 22, 2008, pet. ref’d) (not designated
for publication) (“Appellant seemed most concerned with his inability to
understand legal terminology rather than the English language.”). We hold that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Goukasian’s motion for the
appointment of an interpreter. See Vargas v. State, 627 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1982, no pet.) (noting that interpreter not necessary simply
because appellant could communicate better in Spanish than in English). Thus,
we overrule Goukasian’s sole point on appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Goukasian’s sole point on appeal, we affirm the trial
court’s judgments.
/s/ Bill Meier
BILL MEIER
JUSTICE
PANEL: WALKER, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: September 18, 2014
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