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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LATOYA MONIQUE FAULKS,
Appellant No. 542 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 18, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-41-CR-0000118-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 12, 2015
Appellant, Latoya Monique Faulks, appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed following her bench conviction of endangering the welfare
of a child (EWOC) and leaving an unattended child in a motor vehicle.1
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her EWOC
conviction. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On December 5, 2013, Appellant parked her vehicle in a handicapped
parking space outside of the Family Dollar Store in Williamsport. 2 The store
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1) and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701.1(a), respectively.
2
The outside temperature was approximately fifty degrees Fahrenheit. (See
N.T. Trial, 9/22/14, at 15).
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is located in a high-crime, high-traffic area, and there is a bus stop in its
parking lot. Appellant exited her vehicle, leaving her five-month-old son
sleeping in a car seat in the backseat unattended. Appellant left the
vehicle’s engine running with the keys in the car, the heat on, and the
driver’s side window half-down. Videotape surveillance footage shows
Appellant entering the store at approximately 9:14 a.m. She went to the
back of the store to retrieve lightbulbs while having a loud disagreement on
her cell phone.
Customer Nicole Heart exited the Family Dollar Store and observed
Appellant’s son in the vehicle. She waited outside of the car for
approximately three minutes and then called 911. Police Officer Jennifer
Bowers responded as Appellant was leaving the store at approximately 9:23
a.m. When the officer approached Appellant to question her, Appellant
laughed at her. Appellant initially told Officer Bowers that she was in the
store for five minutes, but then reduced the time-period to two minutes.
On September 22, 2014, Appellant proceeded to a bench trial, and the
trial court found her guilty of the above-mentioned offenses. On November
18, 2014, the court sentenced Appellant to a term of eighteen months’
probation. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on December 1,
2014.3 The court heard argument on the motion on December 19, 2014,
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3
The tenth day to file post-sentence motions fell on Friday, November 28,
2014, the day after Thanksgiving and a county holiday. Because Appellant
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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and entered an order and supporting opinion denying it on March 23, 2015.
This timely appeal followed.4
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
1. Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Appellant] committed the
offense of endangering the welfare of children?
(Appellant’s Brief, at 4) (most capitalization omitted).5
In her issue on appeal, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth
failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain her EWOC conviction. (See
id. at 8-15). Appellant argues that she did not violate a duty of care,
protection, or support to her son, and that she was not aware that her
actions placed him in circumstances that threatened his welfare. (See id. at
9). Appellant claims that she went into the dollar store to purchase
medicine for her son because he was ill, and that the location and duration
of her absence fail to establish that she knowingly placed his welfare in
danger. (See id. at 9-10). This issue does not merit relief.
Our standard of review is as follows:
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
filed her motion on the following Monday, it was timely. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. §
1908.
4
Pursuant to the trial court’s order, Appellant filed a timely concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal on April 7, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). The court filed an opinion on May 15, 2015, in which it relied on its
previous opinion entered March 23, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
5
The Commonwealth did not file a brief.
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The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial
in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying
the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the
facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need
not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts
regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or
none of the evidence. Furthermore, when reviewing a
sufficiency claim, our Court is required to give the prosecution
the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence.
However, the inferences must flow from facts and
circumstances proven in the record, and must be of such volume
and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence and
satisfy the jury of an accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trier of fact cannot base a conviction on conjecture and
speculation and a verdict which is premised on suspicion will fail
even under the limited scrutiny of appellate review.
Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 64 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal
denied, 101 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
The EWOC statute states, in pertinent part:
(a) Offense defined.—
(1) A parent, guardian or other person supervising the welfare of
a child under 18 years of age, or a person that employs or
supervises such a person, commits an offense if he knowingly
endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care,
protection or support.
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1).
The Pennsylvania courts have established a three-part test that
must be satisfied to prove EWOC:
1) [T]he accused [was] aware of his/her duty to protect the
child;
2) [T]he accused [was] aware that the child [was] in
circumstances that could threaten the child’s physical or
psychological welfare; and
3) [T]he accused has either failed to act or has taken action
so lame or meager that such actions cannot reasonably be
expected to protect the child’s welfare.
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 57 A.3d 191, 197 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
omitted).
“In reviewing EWOC, Pennsylvania courts have long recognized that
the legislature attempted to prohibit a broad range of conduct in order to
safeguard the welfare and security of our children.” Id. at 198 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he common sense of
the community should be considered when interpreting the language of the
statute.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Officer Bowers testified that the Family Dollar Store is located in
a high crime area where “[t]here [have] been multiple shootings . . . drug
deals, burglaries, thefts and other violent crimes.” (N.T. Trial, 9/22/14, at
20). She stated that, when she arrived at the scene, she observed
Appellant’s son in the vehicle and “[t]he driver’s side window was halfway
down, the keys were left in the vehicle, the vehicle was left running [and the
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doors were] [u]nlocked.” (Id. at 14). She further testified that she did not
recall Appellant ever advising her that the child was ill, and that if Appellant
had told her that, she would have included the information in her report.
(See id. at 32). She also indicated that a customer would not be able to see
Appellant’s vehicle while purchasing lightbulbs in the store. (See id. at 18-
19).
Nicole Heart testified regarding the location where Appellant parked
her vehicle, and stated that a customer would not have been able to see it
while walking around in the store or standing in the checkout line. (See id.
at 8-9). Heart also testified that, while Appellant was in the store, she was
talking loudly and belligerently on her cell phone, and did not appear to be in
a rush. (See id. at 6, 10).
Appellant testified that, although she lives down the street from the
store, she was not aware of the criminal nature of the neighborhood, and
that she considers it safe. (See id. at 28). She explained that she parked
her vehicle in the handicapped parking space so that she could see it while
she was “rushing” in the store to purchase medicine for her son. (Id. at 27;
see id. at 25-26). She testified that she left her car window partially down
and that she did this “so [she could] reach into the car to unlock the door[.]”
(Id. at 27-28; see id. at 31). She conceded that it would have been
possible for “somebody else to put their hand inside of [her] car and unlock
the door[.]” (Id. at 31). She also acknowledged that it was “very cold” that
day. (Id. at 30).
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After review of the record, under our standard of review, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, together with all
reasonable inferences, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the
court to convict Appellant of EWOC. See Kearney, supra at 64.
Specifically, there was sufficient evidence for the court to find that Appellant
knowingly violated her duty of care to her child when she left him
unattended and out of her line of sight for a ten-minute period in a busy,
high-crime area in an unlocked, running vehicle. The trial court did not
credit Appellant’s version of events, and it was within its province as fact-
finder to assess the credibility of the witnesses and accept all, part, or none
of the evidence. See id. Appellant’s sole issue on appeal does not merit
relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/12/2015
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