131 Nev., Advance Opinion I
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
LEWIS HELFSTEIN; MADALYN No. 65409
HELFSTEIN; SUMMIT LASER
PRODUCTS, INC.; AND SUMMIT
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
Petitioners,
vs. F LED
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, DEC 0 3 2015
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ■ 7: 17,, AN
CO!'RT
CLARK; THE HONORABLE ELISSA F.
CLERK
CADISH, DISTRICT JUDGE; AND THE
HONORABLE ELIZABETH GOFF
GONZALEZ, DISTRICT JUDGE,
Respondents,
and
IRA AND EDYTHE SEAVER FAMILY
TRUST; IRA SEAVER; AND CIRCLE
CONSULTING CORPORATION,
Real Parties in Interest.
Original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
challenging district court orders setting an evidentiary hearing on a
motion to set aside a settlement agreement pursuant to NRCP 60(b) and
denying a motion to dismiss.
Petition granted.
Foley & Oakes, PC, and J. Michael Oakes, Las Vegas,
for Petitioners.
Holley, Driggs, Walch, Fine, Wray, Puzey & Thompson and Jeffrey R.
Albregts, Las Vegas,
for Real Parties in Interest.
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BEFORE PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS and CHERRY, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, CHERRY, J.:
To resolve this original writ petition, petitioner asks us to
consider whether NRCP 60(b) can be used to set aside a voluntary
dismissal or a settlement agreement. While NRCP 60(b) imposes a 6-
month time limit, real parties in interest filed their NRCP 60(b) motion 40
months after filing the voluntary dismissal. Without reaching whether
NRCP 60(b) may be used to set aside a voluntary dismissal or a settlement
order, we hold that NRCP 60(b)'s 6-month limitation begins running when
the order, judgment, or proceeding at issue is filed. Thus, even if NRCP
60(b) applies, the motion is time-barred. We therefore grant the petition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Real parties in interest Ira Seaver, the Ira Seaver and Edythe
Seaver Family Trust, and Circle Consulting Corporation (collectively,
Seaver) filed a complaint in the district court against petitioners Lewis
and Madalyn Helfstein; Summit Laser Products, Inc.; and Summit
Technologies, LLC (collectively, the Helfsteins) and against Uninet
Imaging, Inc., and Nestor Saporiti (collectively, Uninet). Seaver alleged
contract and tort-based causes of action arising out of agreements between
the Helfsteins and Seaver following Uninet's purchase of the Helfsteins'
Summit companies. When Uninet purchased Summit, Uninet refused to
be liable for the consulting agreement between the Helfsteins and Seaver.
Seaver objected to the purchase agreement, but the Helfsteins proceeded
with the sale.
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Prior to answering the complaint, the Helfsteins settled with
Seaver, and Seaver voluntarily dismissed their claims against the
lfsteins Fourteen months after voluntarily dismissing the Helfsteins
from the suit, Seaver filed a notice of rescission. In the notice, Seaver
alleged that the Helfsteins fraudulently induced them to settle and that
the Helfsteins failed to inform them of material facts or produce relevant
documents, which the Helfsteins were obligated to produce pursuant to
their fiduciary duties and discovery obligations.
Without the Helfsteins as a party to the litigation, 2 Seaver and
Uninet tried the claims between them at a bench trial, and the district
court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law that resolved those
claims. One year after the bench trial and 26 months after filing the
notice of rescission, Seaver filed an NRCP 60(b) motion to set aside the
settlement agreement, and, implicitly, the voluntary dismissal and sought
to proceed on their claims against the Helfsteins. The Helfsteins opposed
the motion claiming, inter alia, that the motion was procedurally
'The voluntary dismissal stated that the action was dismissed
pursuant to NRCP 41(a)(1)(ii). However, the dismissal is not a stipulation
and should have stated that the action was dismissed pursuant to NRCP
41(a)(1)(i).
2After the Helfsteins settled with Seaver, Uninet answered the
complaint, filed a counterclaim, and filed a cross-claim against the
Helfsteins. The Helfsteins moved to, inter alia, compel arbitration. That
motion was ultimately granted, completely dismissing the Helfsteins from
the underlying action. Helfstein v. UI Supplies, Docket No. 56383 (Order
of Reversal and Remand, April 7, 2011) (reversing the district court's order
denying the motion to compel arbitration and remanding the matter to the
district court to enter an order compelling arbitration and dismissing
Uninet's causes of action against the Helfsteins).
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improper. At the hearing on Seaver's motion, the district court ordered an
evidentiary hearing and permitted discovery. The Helfsteins subsequently
filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction
over them and that the NRCP 60(b) motion was procedurally improper.
The district court denied the motion. Finally, the Helfsteins moved to
have Judge Gonzalez disqualified from the case, which the district court
chief judge heard and denied. The Helfsteins then filed the instant
petition. The district court stayed the evidentiary hearing pending this
court's resolution of this writ petition.
DISCUSSION
The Helfsteins' petition seeks the following relief: (1) that this
court order the district court to deny as untimely Seaver's motion to set
aside the settlement agreement and proceed on the original complaint; (2)
that this court order the district court to grant their motion to dismiss
Seaver's original complaint against them because the lower court does not
have personal jurisdiction over them; and (3) if this court denies their
requests for the preceding relief, that this court order the district court to
grant their motion to disqualify Judge Gonzalez. The Helfsteins
additionally argue that NRCP 60(b) cannot be used to set aside a
voluntary dismissal or a settlement agreement.
Writ relief
"A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires . . . or to control an arbitrary or capricious
exercise of discretion." Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist.
Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008); see also NRS 34.160;
Humphries v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 85, 312 P.3d
484, 486 (2013). A writ of prohibition may be warranted when a district
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court acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction. NRS 34.320; Club Vista
Fin. Servs. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 21, 276 P.3d
246, 249 (2012); see also Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev.
674, 677, 679, 818 P.2d 849, 851, 853 (1991).
Where there is no "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law," extraordinary relief may be available. NRS
34.170; NRS 34.330; see Oxbow Constr., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 86, 335 P.3d 1234, 1238 (2014). A petitioner
bears the burden of demonstrating that the extraordinary remedy of
mandamus or prohibition is warranted. Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004). Determining whether
to consider a petition for extraordinary relief is solely within this court's
discretion. Smith, 107 Nev. at 677, 818 P.2d at 851.
This court has consistently held that an appeal is generally an
adequate remedy precluding writ relief Pan, 120 Nev. at 224, 88 P.3d at
841; see also Bradford u. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev., Adv. Op.
60, 308 P.3d 122, 123 (2013). Because an appeal is ordinarily an adequate
remedy, this court generally declines to consider writ petitions challenging
interlocutory district court orders. Oxbow Constr., 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 86,
335 P.3d at 1238. But we may consider writ petitions when an important
issue of law needs clarification and considerations of sound judicial
economy are served. Renown Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist.
Court, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 80, 335 P.3d 199, 202 (2014). We elect to
consider this writ petition because consideration of the writ petition will
serve judicial economy.
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Standard of review
In the context of writ petitions, we review district court orders
for an arbitrary or capricious abuse of discretion. Ina Game Tech., 124
Nev. at 197, 179 P.3d at 558. However, we review questions of law, such
as the interpretation of and interplay between NRCP 41(a)(1) and 60(b),
de novo, even in the context of writ petitions. Moseley v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 654, 662, 188 P.3d 1136, 1142 (2008).
NRCP 41(a)(I) and NRCP 60(b)
Seaver settled with the Helfsteins and filed a voluntary
dismissal pursuant to NRCP 41(a)(1)(i). Nevertheless, more than three
years after filing the voluntary dismissal, Seaver filed a motion to set
aside the settlement agreement and voluntary dismissal pursuant to
NRCP 60(b). The district court did not grant the motion, but it ordered an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Helfsteins fraudulently
induced Seaver to settle.
NRCP 60(b) permits a court to set aside a final judgment,
order, or proceeding in certain circumstances:
On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may relieve a party or a party's legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reason[ ]: . . . (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct
of an adverse party. . . . The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time, . . not more than 6
months after the proceeding was taken or the date
that written notice of entry of the judgment or
order was served.
(Emphasis added.) The primary "purpose of Rule 60(b) is to redress any
injustices that may have resulted because of excusable neglect or the
wrongs of an opposing party." Nev. Indus, Dev., Inc. v. Benedetti, 103 Nev.
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360, 364, 741 P.2d 802, 805 (1987). We have not previously considered
whether a settlement agreement or an NRCP 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal
qualifies as a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" that may be set aside
under NRCP 60(b). However, we need not reach this issue here.
An NRCP 60(b) motion must be made "not more than 6
months after the proceeding was taken or the date that written notice of
entry of the judgment or order was served." This 6-month period begins to
run from the date of the challenged proceeding or upon service of "written
notice of entry" of the challenged judgment or order; nothing in NRCP
60(b) bases the 6-month time frame on a subsequent judgment, order or
proceeding. See Union Petrochemical Corp. of Nev. v. Scott, 96 Nev. 337,
338-39, 609 P.2d 323, 323-24 (1980). We have also previously held that an
NRCP 60(b) "motion must be made within a reasonable time and that the
six-month period represents the extreme limit of reasonableness."
Stoecklein v. Johnson Elec., Inc., 109 Nev. 268, 272, 849 P.2d 305, 308
(1993). Accordingly, assuming that an NRCP 60(b) challenge may also be
made to a settlement agreement, such a challenge is also time-barred here
because it was made well after 6 months had elapsed.
In this matter, Seaver voluntarily dismissed the Helfsteins on
November 23, 2009, and filed his NRCP 60(b) motion 40 months later, far
beyond the 6-month time limit Thus, if a voluntary dismissal is a final
judgment, order, or proceeding from which a party may receive relief
through NRCP 60(b), then the filing of the voluntary dismissal starts the
6-month clock. Because Seaver filed the motion more than three years
after he voluntarily dismissed the Helfsteins from the suit, we conclude
that Seaver's NRCP 60(b) motion is time-barred and that the district court
erred in scheduling an evidentiary hearing.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we grant the Helfsteins' writ petition. 3 The clerk
of this court shall issue a writ of prohibition instructing the district court
to vacate its previous order regarding Seaver's NRCP 60(b) motion and
enter a new order denying the motion.
, J.
W,e,concur:
J.
Parraguirre
Douglas
3 Inlight of our decision, we decline to reach the remaining issues in
the Helfsteins' petition.
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