United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT June 14, 2004
_______________________
Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 03-30941 Clerk
_______________________
SIDNEY J. ARNOLD, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
TOWN OF SLAUGHTER, LOUISIANA; KENNETH STEWART; WILLIAM POCHE;
MARTIN ROBERTS,
Defendants-Appellees
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 01-CV-902-D
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Before DEMOSS, STEWART and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Sidney J. Arnold, Jr. appeals from the district court’s
determination that his excessive force and false arrest claims
were improper challenges to his state-court conviction for
resisting an officer. Because the district court properly
granted summary judgment on this basis, we affirm.
This case began with a traffic stop in Slaughter, Louisiana,
on October 29, 2000. On that night, two Slaughter police
officers, Appellants Kenneth Stewart and William Poche, stopped a
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
car for driving without headlights and running a stop sign. The
car’s driver, David Bonner, pulled into Arnold’s driveway.
Stewart and Poche then stopped their police cruiser in the street
in front of Arnold’s house. Two other police cars, including one
driven by Appellant Martin Roberts, eventually arrived at the
scene.
While Bonner was parked in the driveway, Arnold emerged from
his house. Arnold claims that he went outside to get his young
son, who was looking at the police lights. The parties disagree
about what happened next. The officers state that Arnold started
a confrontation by making threats, being belligerent, and taking
a swing at one of them. Arnold contends, however, that he never
threatened any of the officers or confronted them; he merely
picked up his son. Under both versions, Stewart scuffled with
Arnold, causing both men to fall down. During the fall, Arnold
broke one of the bones in his neck.
Arnold was arrested and charged with public intimidation of
police officers and possession of marijuana.1 He pleaded not
guilty to these charges, which were eventually dropped.
Subsequently, Arnold was charged with resisting an officer.
1
There is conflicting evidence regarding the exact charges
upon which Arnold was originally arrested. Stewart testified
that he arrested Arnold for possession of marijuana, disturbing
the peace, and interfering with an investigation. The summons
issued the date of the arrest indicates that Arnold was arrested
for possession of marijuana and public intimidation. Arnold
pleaded not guilty to the latter two charges.
2
Following a bench trial in May 2001, he was convicted and
sentenced. Arnold did not appeal, and his conviction has not
been overturned.
On October 25, 2001, approximately five months after his
conviction, Arnold brought this lawsuit against Stewart, Poche,
Roberts, and the Town of Slaughter. This suit contains claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for false arrest,
unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, and excessive force. Following discovery, the
officers and the town moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), barred Arnold’s
claims. The individual officers also argued that they were
entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted the
motion, determining that Heck prevented Arnold from pursuing any
of his claims. We review this summary judgment ruling de novo.
Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003).
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who has
been convicted of a crime cannot bring a § 1983 claim challenging
the constitutionality of his conviction unless that conviction
has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into
question by federal habeas corpus. 512 U.S. at 486-87. Heck
bars claims for “unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment” as
well as claims “for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid.” Id.
at 486. Thus, unless his conviction has been overturned, a
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plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim if prevailing on that claim
would imply that his conviction was invalid.
How Heck applies to excessive force claims is not always
clear. By proving an excessive force claim, a plaintiff will not
invariably invalidate his conviction. See Hudson v. Hughes, 98
F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996). Other circuits have emphasized
the conceptual difference between an excessive force claim and a
challenge to a conviction. Both the Ninth and Third Circuits
have indicated that an excessive force claim would not
necessarily challenge a plaintiff’s conviction for assault during
a stop. Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1997);
Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996).
While recognizing this distinction, this circuit has
recognized that certain convictions will prevent a plaintiff from
bringing an excessive force claim. For example, we have held
that a Texas conviction for aggravated assault on a police
officer bars claims for excessive force related to the same
conduct. Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000);
Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1999). We
reached this holding after determining that Texas law permits an
officer to use any force – even deadly force – to protect against
an aggravated assault. Sappington, 195 F.3d at 237. Because any
force was justified in response to an assault, a finding that the
officers used excessive force would necessarily mean that the
plaintiff had not committed aggravated assault. Id. And thus a
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judgment would call into question the plaintiff’s conviction.
Id. Likewise, we have also held that a Louisiana conviction for
battery of an officer – a crime for which justification is an
affirmative defense – prevents the plaintiff from suing for
excessive force in connection with the incident. Hudson, 98 F.3d
at 873. If the plaintiff proved his excessive force claim, he
would essentially be proving that his battery was justified,
which would undermine his conviction. Id. As these cases show,
the Heck determination depends on the nature of the offense and
of the claim. Cf. Hudson, 98 F.3d at 873 (noting that, because
of the nature of the plaintiff’s offense, the conceptual
difference between an excessive force claim and a challenge to a
conviction “may be applicable in many section 1983 claims of
excessive force, [but] it does not help [plaintiff] today”).
In this case, Arnold was convicted of resisting an officer,
in violation of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.08. This statute provides
that:
A. Resisting an officer is the intentional interference
with, opposition or resistance to, or obstruction of an
individual acting in his official capacity and authorized
by law to make a lawful arrest or seizure of property or
to serve any lawful process or court order when the
offender knows or has reason to know that the person
arresting, seizing property, or serving process is acting
in his official capacity.
B. (1) The phrase "obstruction of" as used herein shall,
in addition to its common meaning, signification, and
connotation mean the following:
(a) Flight by one sought to be arrested before the
arresting officer can restrain him and after notice is
given that he is under arrest.
(b) Any violence toward or any resistance or opposition
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to the arresting officer after the arrested party is
actually placed under arrest and before he is
incarcerated in jail.
(c) Refusal by the arrested party to give his name and
make his identity known to the arresting officer or
providing false information regarding the identity of the
arrested party to the arresting officer.
(d) Congregation with others on a public street and
refusal to move on when ordered by the officer.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.08.
While the statute provides many ways of committing the
offense, the judge in the criminal trial found that Arnold
resisted an officer by being hostile and threatening and by
initiating confrontation:
Mr. Arnold was hostile, he was belligerent, he made
threats, and by doing that he interfered with the
officers performing a duty with respect to the arrest of
the motorist . . . And he refused their requests to go
back inside and it was only after that . . . that they
placed him under arrest. He compounded the . . . problem
by . . . initiating a physical confrontation with
Lieutenant Stewart after Lieutenant Stewart attempted to
prevent him from escaping, from fleeing from the arrest
site. I will find Mr. Arnold guilty of resisting an
officer.
Despite the state court’s findings, Arnold’s current lawsuit
contends that he did nothing to provoke Stewart’s actions.
Arnold’s complaint does not state that Arnold made any threats or
initiated any physical confrontation. Moreover, during his
deposition in this case, Arnold testified that he never attempted
to strike any of the officers, never threatened any of them and,
in fact, never resisted their attempts to arrest him.2
2
Arnold’s summary judgment evidence is consistent with his
deposition testimony. For example, the affidavit of witness Dee
6
Thus, Arnold’s claims are not that the police used excessive
force after he stopped resisting arrest or even that the officers
used excessive and unreasonable force to stop his resistance.
Instead, Arnold claims that he did nothing wrong, but was
viciously attacked for no reason. He provides no alternative
pleading or theory of recovery.
In this way, Arnold’s claims are distinguishable from
excessive force claims that survive Heck’s bar. For example,
Arnold’s case differs from Nelson, where the Third Circuit
permitted the plaintiff to show that the defendant used excessive
force, but prohibited him from contradicting the criminal jury’s
finding that some substantial force was justified. Nelson, 109
F.3d at 146. Similarly, in Smithart, the plaintiff – who was
convicted of driving his truck at officers – contended that the
defendant officers arrested him, handcuffed him, and then beat
him, and thus “used force . . . out of proportion to the threat
which [plaintiff] posed to the defendants.” Smithart, 79 F.3d at
952. Smithart’s claim did not challenge the finding that the
plaintiff drove his truck at the defendants. In both Smithart
and Nelson, a plaintiff could proceed with a claim that did not
contradict the criminal jury’s fact finding. In contrast,
Arnold’s suit squarely challenges the factual determination that
underlies his conviction for resisting an officer. If Arnold
Arnold contends that Stewart attacked Arnold “for no reason
whatsoever.”
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prevails, he will have established that his criminal conviction
lacks any basis. Therefore, this lawsuit challenges the validity
of Arnold’s conviction and is barred by Heck.
Arnold additionally argues, without citation, that Heck does
not apply to his claims because he was arrested for possession of
marijuana and public intimidation, but was convicted of resisting
an officer. As far as his excessive force claim is concerned,
Heck does not require exact identity of the arresting offense and
the offense of conviction. Cf. Hudson, 98 F.3d at 872 (Heck
barred false arrest and excessive claims of plaintiff, who was
arrested for burglary, but prosecuted for battery of an officer
and felon in possession of a firearm). Further, to obtain
Arnold’s conviction for resisting an officer, the prosecution had
to prove that the officers were making a lawful arrest. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14.08. The state trial judge appeared to find that
Arnold resisted and interfered with two different lawful arrests
– his own and Bonner’s. Thus, by claiming false arrest, Arnold
argues that, contrary to one finding underlying his conviction,
his arrest was unlawful. This claim, then, also violates Heck.
Arnold has not briefed his other claims. He has therefore
abandoned them. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir.
1994).
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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