United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 5, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-30109
Summary Calendar
JOHN VEAZEY; TONYA VEAZEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
ASCENSION PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.,
Defendants,
ASCENSION PARISH SCHOOL BOARD,
Defendant-Appellee.
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 98-CV-377-C
______________________
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
John and Tonya Veazey appeal the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the Ascension Parish School Board in this case,
which was brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities in
Education Act (IDEA) and the Louisiana Exceptional Children’s Act
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
(LECA).1 The Veazeys argue that the Ascension Parish School Board
violated the substantive and procedural requirements of these acts
by transferring their deaf minor son, Buddy, from his neighborhood
school three miles from their home to a “cluster” school seven
miles from their home. This transfer required Buddy to ride a
special school bus used to transport disabled children instead of
a regular school bus, and required him to share a transliterator
with another hearing impaired student instead of having a private
transliterator.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.2 “When an
action is brought under the IDEA, our inquiry is two-fold: (1)
whether ‘the [IEP] developed through the Act’s procedures [is]
reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits’; and (2) whether the school district has ‘complied with
the procedures set forth in the [IDEA].’”3 “If these requirements
are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by
Congress and the courts can require no more.”4
1
The Veazeys cite to but do not substantively argue LECA.
Thus, we will only consider their claims under the IDEA. See L&A
Contracting Co. v. S. Concrete Servs., Inc., 17 F.3d 106, 113 (5th
Cir. 1994) (finding that an issue inadequately briefed is
considered abandoned on appeal).
2
Threadgill v. Prudential Sec. Group, Inc., 145 F.3d 286, 292
(5th Cir. 1998).
3
White, 343 F.3d at 378 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07)
(alterations made in White).
4
Id. (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The gravamen of the Veazeys’ complaint is that the School
Board’s decision to transfer Buddy to the “cluster” school
constituted a change in his “educational placement,” requiring the
Board to provide them with prior written notice.5 Because notice
was provided only after the decision to transfer Buddy was made,
the Veazeys contend that their rights under the IDEA were violated.
The Veazeys have not shown that the School Board’s actions
were improper. First, a change in the particular school site at
which a disabled student’s “individualized education program” (IEP)
is implemented does not constitute a change in “educational
placement.”6 Second, Buddy’s IEP did not require the provision of
a personal transliterator. Third, requiring Buddy to ride the
special bus for disabled children instead of the regular bus did
not effect a fundamental change in his IEP.7 Lastly, we can find
no evidence that these changes in any way alter the fact that
Buddy’s IEP is reasonably calculated to enable him to receive
educational benefits by providing him with the “requisite basic
5
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3).
6
See White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 379
(5th Cir. 2003) (“‘Educational placement’, as used in the IDEA,
means educational program – not the particular institution where
that program is implemented.”).
7
See Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 206 (5th Cir. 1992)
(“An educational placement, for the purposes of the EAHCA [IDEA’s
predecessor], is not changed unless a fundamental change in, or
elimination of, a basic element of the educational program has
occurred.”); DeLeon v. Susquehanna Comty. Sch. Dist., 747 F.2d 149,
154 (3rd Cir. 1984) (finding that a change in method of
transportation did not constitute a change in placement).
floor of opportunity.”8
Accordingly, the Veazeys have not shown that the district
court erred in granting the School Board’s motion for summary
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
8
White, 343 F.3d at 378.