In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 16‐2683
JOHN W. DAWKINS,
Applicant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
____________________
On Motion for an Order Authorizing
the District Court to Entertain a Second or Successive
Motion for Collateral Review
____________________
SUBMITTED JUNE 24, 2016 — DECIDED JULY 15, 2016
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and HAMILTON, Cir‐
cuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. John Dawkins has filed an application pursu‐
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), seeking authorization to file a
successive motion to vacate under § 2255. Dawkins, who was
sentenced as a career offender, wants to challenge his sen‐
tence under Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015),
which held that the residual clause of the Armed Career
2 No. 16‐2683
Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally
vague. We assume for purposes of this opinion that Johnson
also invalidates the similar residual clause in the career‐of‐
fender guideline.
Dawkins was convicted of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a), and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of vi‐
olence, id. § 924(c). He was sentenced as a career offender to
262 months’ imprisonment. His classification as a career of‐
fender rests on Illinois convictions for aggravated vehicular
hijacking, 720 ILCS 5/18‐4 (1993), and residential burglary, 720
ILCS 5/19‐3 (1985). He previously has been denied permission
to file a successive § 2255 motion under Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). See Dawkins v. United States, 809
F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2016). In denying the previous application,
we concluded that residential burglary in Illinois is equivalent
to generic burglary of a dwelling, which is enumerated as a
crime of violence in the sentencing guidelines. See id. at 956;
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
Dawkins again asks permission to challenge his sentence
under Johnson, but this time he also relies on the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Mathis v. United States, No. 15‐6092,
2016 WL 3434400 (U.S. June 23, 2016). In Mathis, the Supreme
Court considered Iowa’s burglary statute, which forbids en‐
tering “an occupied structure” without permission with the
intent to commit a felony. IOWA CODE § 713.1. “Occupied
structure” is defined by Iowa as “any building, structure, ap‐
purtenances to buildings and structures, land, water or air ve‐
hicle, or similar place adapted for overnight accommodation
of persons, or occupied by persons for the purpose of carrying
on business or other activity therein, or for the storage or safe‐
keeping of anything of value.” Id. § 702.12. The Supreme
No. 16‐2683 3
Court first explained that the statute is broader than “generic
burglary,” which is enumerated as a violent felony in the
Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
See Mathis, 2016 WL 3434400, at *5. The Court next considered
how Iowa courts interpret this statute and determined that
the different locations are not alternative elements creating
separate crimes, but instead are simply alternative means of
violating a single locational element. See id. at *5, 10. So, the
Court concluded, the district court’s reliance on a conviction
for Iowa burglary cannot be saved by looking to charging pa‐
pers and considering whether the defendant actually burglar‐
ized a building or dwelling; the statute is nondivisible and
categorically not a violent felony. See id. at *4, 12.
Dawkins contends that Illinois’s burglary statutes are sim‐
ilarly nondivisible and broader than generic burglary. He
points out that the general burglary statute applies to entries
into “a building, housetrailer, watercraft, aircraft, motor vehi‐
cle, railroad car, or any part thereof,” 720 ILCS 5/19‐1, and res‐
idential burglary can be committed by entering into a “house,
apartment, mobile home, trailer, or other living quarters,” id.
5/2‐6(b) (emphasis added). But even if Mathis does make a dis‐
trict court’s reliance on Illinois burglary suspect for purposes
of the career‐offender guideline or ACCA, which we do not
decide now, Dawkins asks for permission to bring this claim
as part of a larger claim under Johnson. He has already been
denied permission to file a successive § 2255 motion based on
Johnson, so this claim is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). See
Brannigan v. United States, 249 F.3d 584, 586–89 (7th Cir. 2001);
Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 470, 471–72 (7th Cir. 1997).
Dawkins argues in his reply that Mathis provides an inde‐
pendent basis for authorization. He cites Alexander v. United
4 No. 16‐2683
States, 121 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 1997), for the proposition that any
intervening change in the law would allow a successive ap‐
plication. This proposition clearly is not true, and Alexander
does not say otherwise; only new rules of constitutional law,
made retroactive by the Supreme Court, can provide a basis
for authorization. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h)(2), 2244(b)(2)(A);
Alexander, 121 F.3d at 314–15 (denying application because
applicant did “not point to any new rule made retroactive by
the Supreme Court and [did] not have new evidence showing
his innocence”). Mathis did not announce such a rule; it is a
case of statutory interpretation. An independent claim based
on Mathis must be brought, if at all, in a petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241. See Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 594–96 (7th
Cir. 2013); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611–12 (7th Cir. 1998).
We note that any § 2241 petition would need to be filed in the
district where the petitioner is in custody. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a); FED. R. APP. P. 22(a).
Accordingly, we DENY authorization and DISMISS
Dawkins’s application.