Hall, Leonard James

PD-1191-15
PD-1191-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 9/15/2015 3:50:42 PM
Accepted 9/16/2015 12:53:34 PM
NO. PD-_______________ ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

Leonard James Hall, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
*************
APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
***************
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH, TEXAS

NO. 02-15-00094-CR

TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1352061D

R. Scott Walker
STATE BAR # 24004972
222 W. Exchange Avenue
Fort Worth, TX 76164
September 16, 2015
(817) 478-9999
(817) 977-0163 FACSIMILE
scott@lawyerwalker.com
Attorney for Appellant

Oral Argument Requested
1
 IDENTITY OF TRIAL JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL

The following is a complete list of all
parties, the trial judge, as well as the names and
addresses of all counsel.

Trial Judge: Hon. Mollie Westfall

Appellant: Leonard James Hall

Trial Counsel: Dan Pitzer
Attorney at Law
204 N. Main Street
Mansfield, Texas 76063

Appellate R. Scott Walker
Attorney for Appellant: Attorney at Law
222 W. Exchange Avenue
Fort Worth, Texas 76164

Appellee: The State of Texas

Trial Attorney for Rebecca D. McIntire
Appellee: Tarrant County Assistant
District Attorney
401 W. Belknap
Fort Worth, Texas 76196

Appellate Attorney for Sharen Wilson
Appellee: Tarrant County
District Attorney
401 W. Belknap
Fort Worth, Texas 76196

2
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL . . . . . . . . 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . 4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE. . . 6
QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ARGUMENT (WAIVER OF DISPROPORTIONALITY OF
SENTENCE COMPLAINTS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . 15
APPENDIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

3
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Davis v. State,
905 S.W.2d 655, (Tex.App.--Texarkana
1995, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Ex Parte Beck,
922 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). . . . . 9

Ex Parte Torres,
943 S.W. 2d 469 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) . . . . 10

Ex Parte McIver,
586 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) . . . . . 9

Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48,(2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Kim v. State,
283 S.W.3d 473 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth,
2009, pet ref’d). . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 12

Pruitt v. State,
737 S.W. 2d 622 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth, pet.
Ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d
637 (1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

State v. Aguilera,
165 S.W. 3d 695 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). . . . . 8

State v. Savage,
933 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.App. 1996) . . . . . 9

4
 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Oral argument of this case is hereby requested
on behalf of Appellant.

All references to Texas statutes, rules, etc.
are references to the latest edition published by
West Publishing Company, unless otherwise
indicated.

LEONARD JAMES HALL, Appellant-Applying for Review

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

************

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

************

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF

TEXAS:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal has resulted from a probation
revocation for aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon. On March 20, 2015, appellant pled not true
to the allegations in the Petition to Proceed to
Adjudication. (C.R. Vol. 1, p. 58, R.R. v. 1, p.
1-10). After evidence was presented, the trial
judge found all but one of the allegations to be
5
true and set punishment at seven years confinement.
(C.R. Vol. 1, p. 58).

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE

The Court of Appeals rendered its decision and

delivered its written non-published memorandum

opinion on August 27, 2015. The deadline for

filing a Petition for Discretionary Review is

September 26, 2015.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether disproportionate sentencing is waived

if not presented to the trial court or in a motion

for new trial.

ARGUMENT

The Second Court of Appeals, in this case and

in many others, has held that a disproportionality

complaint is forfeited when there is no complaint

during the trial or in a motion for new trial. The

Court of Criminal Appeals has consistantly declined

to rule on this issue. This is an important issue

that begs to be heard by this Honorable Court.

6
 It is well-established under Texas Law that a

sentence imposed by a judge within the statutory

range is not an abuse of discretion. This court

does not have the jurisdiction to review the

reasonableness of punishment assessed by a trial

court of this State if it is within the range of

punishment prescribed by statute for the offense,

unless it is so plainly disproportionate to the

offense as to shock the sense of humankind and thus

constitute cruel and unusual punishment prohibited

by the United States and Texas Constitutions. See

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001,

77 L.Ed.2d 637, 649 (1983), Davis v. State, 905

S.W.2d 655, 664 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1995, pet.

ref’d). In the instant case, the trial judge set

sentence at seven years, when the maximum for the

offense was 20 years.

In the instant case, there was no

disproportionality complaint during the trial or in

a subsequent motion for new trial. Again, the

Second Court of Appeals has consistently held that

proportionality complaints are forfeited when there
7
is no complaint during the trial or in a subsequent

motion for new trial. Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d

473, 475 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2009, pet ref’d).

However, Justice Dauphinot has, on several

occasions, dissented as to that issue.

In Kim, Justice Dauphinot very carefully

delineates the practical problems with the majority

holding. In a criminal case, pronouncing sentence

in open court in the presence of the defendant ends

the trial; that act triggers the running of the

appellate timetable. State v. Aguilera, 165 S.w.

3d 695, 698 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005), Pruitt v. State,

737 S.W. 2d 622, 623 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth, pet.

Ref’d). Unlike a civil case, in which there is

usually a delay between pronouncing the verdict in

open court and signing the judgment, there is no

lag time in a criminal case between the

pronouncement of sentence and its execution. Once a

defendant begins serving the sentence, it is too

late to change it. Although there has been some

suggestion that a judge may immediately change the

sentence, there is no provision in the code of
8
criminal procedure for offering evidence of

disproportionality after sentencing, as the

admission of additional evidence after

pronouncement would effectively create a second

punishment phase. A defendant cannot object in

advance that a sentence is disproportionate because

until the sentence is pronounced, the defendant

does not know that it will be objectionable.

Justice Dauphinot also asks, “Does the majority

contend that a defendant must ask for re-

sentencing?” How?” There is no judgment,

notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) in a criminal

case. State v. Savage, 933 S.W.2d 497, 499

(Tex.App. 1996). There is no provision in the rules

of appellate procedure or the code of criminal

procedure that permits an oral motion for new

trial, and it would probably be malpractice to

lodge one on the sentencing issue at trial and

fore-go raising other issues later in a traditional

motion for new trial.

While a party in a civil case must file a

motion for new trial, in order to lodge a factual
9
sufficiency issue on appeal of a jury verdict, in

criminal cases the motion for new trial is

expressly not a prerequisite to raising the

complaint on appeal; rather, it is merely a vehicle

to provide an adequate record in support of that

claim.

The problem a defendant faces in raising a

proportionality claim under the Eighth Amendment is

one of providing a sufficient record of

disproportionality. Such claim should not be

dismissed out of hand, for failure to raise it in

the trial court, anymore than an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim should be held

forfeited by not raising it at trial or in a motion

for new trial.

Also, as Justice Dauphinot points out, another

reason courts have given for not enforcing a

procedural bar in this context of ineffective

assistance is because there is not generally a

realistic opportunity to adequately develop the

record for appeal in post-trial motions. In this

regard, the courts have noted that a post-
10
conviction writ proceeding, rather than a motion

for new trial, is the preferred method for

gathering the facts necessary to substantiate such

a Sixth Amendment challenge. While expansion of

the record may be accomplished in a motion for new

trial, that vehicle is often inadequate because of

time constraints and because the trial record has

generally not been transcribed at this point.

Further, mounting an ineffective assistance attack

in a motion for new trial is inherently unlikely if

the trial counsel remains counsel during the time

required to file such a motion. Hence, in most

ineffective assistance claims, a writ of habeas

corpus is essential to gathering the facts

necessary to adequately evaluate such claims. The

pursuit of such a claim on direct appeal may be

fruitless. Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W. 2d 469, 475

(Tex.Crim.App. 1997).

Just as the courts have held that a defendant

can rarely sustain a complaint of ineffective

assistance of counsel or jury misconduct on direct

appeal; the Second Court of Appeals holds that a
11
criminal defendant can rarely sustain a complaint

of disproportionality on direct appeal. A defendant

cannot complain about a disproportionate sentence

before it is pronounced. Disproportionality

requires a showing beyond a defendant's not liking

the sentence. It requires evidence of

disproportionality. Even a mere objection is

problematic because the trial is over when the

sentence is pronounced, so an objection could be

lodged only after the trial has ended. What would

that proceeding be called? Disproportionality

complaints, like those of ineffective assistance,

should be reviewable in appellate proceedings

regardless of whether the complaint was brought to

the attention of the trial court. Kim v. State,

dissenting opinion, 283 S.W.3d 473, 476-479

(Tex.App.—Fort Worth, 2009, pet ref’d).

It will be noted that Justice Dauphinot is

correct that requiring an objection to the sentence

during the trial or in a motion for new trial is so

impractical that the burden on the defense to

preserve the error is virtually insurmountable. It
12
should also be noted that the recent U.S. Supreme

Court holding in Graham makes it clear that the

test in Solem is still the test today. Grahm v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 48,60 (2010).

Without minimalizing the practicality concerns

deliniated by Justice Dauphinot, there is another

basis for a holding that failure to bring a

disproportionality complaint before the trial court

is not waiver. The argument is founded on well-

settled constitutional law. The Court of Criminal

Appeals has held that a sentence outside the

statutory range is void and that the complaint can

be brought for the first time on appeal. Ex parte

Beck, 922 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), Ex

parte McIver, 586 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex.Crim.App.

1979). The analysis is that a sentence which is

outside the statutory range is an illegal sentence

which is unauthorized by law and is therefore void.

A sentence which violates the Eighth Amendment

because it is a disproportionate sentence is also

an illegal sentence which is not authorized by law.

After all, the U.S. Constitution is certainly the
13
supreme law of the land. Such a sentence is also

void, and the complaint should be reviewable when

brought for the first time on appeal. Any cases

holding otherwise should be overruled.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Leonard James

Hall, appellant, prays that the case be reversed or

for whatever other relief he has shown himself

entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

S/Scott Walker

By: R. Scott Walker
Attorney for Appellant
222 W. Exchange Avenue
Fort Worth, Texas 76164
(817) 478-9999
(817) 977-0163 FAX
State Bar No. 24004972

14
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of this petition was served by first
class mail to the Office of Criminal District
Attorney, Tarrant County Courthouse, 401 W.
Belknap, Fort Worth, Texas 76196 and to the State
Prosecuting Attorney at P.O. Box 12405, Austin,
Texas 78711 on the 16th day of September, 2015.

s/Scott Walker
Scott Walker

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this document complies with the
length requirements as set forth by the Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure in that this document
contains 2,228 words, and that the document is in
14 point type.
s/Scott Walker
Scott Walker

15
APPENDIX

16
 COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH

NO. 02-15-00094-CR

LEONARD JAMES HALL APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1352061D

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

This is an appeal from a judgment revoking deferred adjudication

community supervision and adjudicating guilt. In 2013, Appellant Leonard James

Hall pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2011).

Following this plea, the trial court placed Hall on seven years’ deferred

1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
adjudication community supervision and imposed a $700 fine. In 2015, the State

filed a petition to proceed to adjudication, alleging in five paragraphs multiple

violations by Hall of the conditions of his deferred adjudication community

supervision. Hall pleaded not true to all five alleged violations. The trial court

found that Hall had committed the violations alleged in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5;

revoked Hall’s deferred adjudication community supervision; adjudicated his guilt

of the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; and sentenced him to

seven years’ confinement. In a single issue, Hall argues that the seven-year

sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive and disproportionate. We will

affirm.

Hall concedes that he did not object to his punishment when it was

imposed, nor did he raise this complaint in a motion for new trial. We have held

on numerous occasions that this type of claim must be preserved at the trial court

level. See Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet.

ref’d); Acosta v. State, 160 S.W.3d 204, 211 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no

pet.); see also Cisneros v. State, No. 02-06-00103-CR, 2007 WL 80002, at *1

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 23, 2007, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (collecting cases); cf. Burt v. State, 396 S.W.3d 574, 577 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013) (“A sentencing issue may be preserved by objecting at the

punishment hearing, or when the sentence is pronounced.”). Because Hall did

2
not raise his complaint in the trial court, the complaint is forfeited. 2 We overrule

Hall’s sole issue.

Having overruled Hall’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Sue Walker
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: August 27, 2015

2
Even if we were to reach the merits of Hall’s complaint, his punishment is
within the statutory limits for the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33(a),
30.02(c)(2) (West 2011). Punishment that is imposed within the statutory limits
and based upon the sentencer’s informed normative judgment is generally not
subject to challenge for excessiveness except in “‘exceedingly rare’” situations.
Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 476 (quoting Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323–24
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006)); see also Davis v. State, 323 S.W.3d 190, 195–96 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, pet. ref’d) (stating that punishment within statutory range was
not excessive, cruel, or unusual when defendant argued that the penitentiary
could not provide treatment for his medical condition).

3
 COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH

NO. 02-15-00094-CR

Leonard James Hall § From the 371st District Court

§ of Tarrant County (1352061D)

v. § August 27, 2015

§ Opinion by Justice Walker

The State of Texas § (nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By _/s/ Sue Walker___________________
Justice Sue Walker