In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 16‐1023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
MARCUS SHEROD HARRIS,
Defendant‐Appellant,
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
Case No. 13 CR 952 — Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 4, 2016 — DECIDED DECEMBER 7, 2016
____________________
Before FLAUM and KANNE, Circuit Judges, and MAGNUS‐
STINSON, District Judge.
MAGNUS‐STINSON, District Judge. Marcus Harris commit‐
ted three armed robberies in 2013, two in Indiana and one in
Illinois. He was arrested and charged in state court for one of
Of the Southern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.
2 No. 16‐1023
the Indiana robberies. While the Indiana case was pending,
federal authorities sent Harris a target letter concerning the
Illinois robbery. Harris requested and was appointed a federal
public defender, but his federal public defender failed to ad‐
vise Harris or his state defense attorney of the progress of the
federal proceedings before his guilty plea and sentencing in
Indiana state court. He was later charged by federal indict‐
ment and pled guilty in federal court to the Illinois robbery,
and stipulated to the uncharged Indiana robbery as relevant
offense conduct.
At his federal sentencing, the parties agreed that Harris’
federal public defender’s failure to update him about the fed‐
eral proceedings prejudiced Harris because had he not been
convicted in state court, and had all of the robberies been
charged in one federal proceeding, his sentencing guideline
range in his federal court case would have been lower. The
parties agreed to a hypothetical guideline range to compen‐
sate for the federal public defender’s error. Harris claims that
the district court committed procedural error when it failed to
accept the hypothetical guideline range or to explain why it
rejected it. We disagree and affirm his sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2013, Harris committed three armed robberies as a
member of an organized group of armed robbers: 1) on Janu‐
ary 28, 2013, he robbed a T‐Mobile store in Schererville, Indi‐
ana; 2) on January 31, 2013, he robbed a Sprint store in Addi‐
son, Illinois; 3) and on February 4, 2013, he robbed an AT&T
store in LaPorte, Indiana. Shortly after the last robbery, he was
arrested by Indiana authorities and charged in state court for
the robbery in LaPorte. While in state custody, Harris received
a target letter from federal authorities informing him that he
No. 16‐1023 3
might be charged in federal court for the robbery in Addison.
In early March 2013, Harris requested and was appointed a
federal public defender to represent him with respect to any
federal charges. The parties agreed that his federal public de‐
fender failed to advise him or his state defense attorney of the
progress of the federal proceedings.1
Harris pled guilty in state court on December 20, 2013, and
was sentenced to ten years in prison on January 24, 2014. On
February 6, 2014, Harris was charged by federal indictment
for the robbery in Addison and for brandishing a firearm dur‐
ing the robbery. On January 8, 2015, he pled guilty to Count 2
for robbery and Count 3 for brandishing a firearm. As part of
the plea agreement, he stipulated that he committed the rob‐
bery in Schererville and agreed to its consideration as relevant
conduct for purposes of the sentencing guidelines.
On December 10, 2015, the district court conducted Harris’
sentencing. Harris’ counsel pointed out that the parties agreed
to a lower sentencing guideline range because they recom‐
mended grouping Harris’ conviction in state court as though
it were part of his federal case rather than as a separate state
court conviction. This hypothetical guideline calculation
would have resulted in an adjusted offense level of 28 and a
criminal history category of III, which would have given the
district court a hypothetical sentencing guideline range of 97
to 121 months for Count 2. The parties agreed that this hypo‐
thetical sentencing guideline range was a way to ameliorate
1 A criminal complaint was filed in federal court on December 6, 2013, and
it detailed three robberies, including the robbery in Addison. It named two
codefendants and referenced several potential unnamed codefendants.
Harris was later identified as one of the unnamed codefendants when he
was charged by federal indictment on February 6, 2014.
4 No. 16‐1023
the federal public defender’s failure to notify Harris or his
state defense attorney about the federal proceedings. The par‐
ties also raised other considerations, including that Harris
had already served three years of his state court sentence and
that his federal sentence should run concurrently with his
state court sentence.
After considering the parties’ recommendation, the dis‐
trict court determined that because Harris did plead guilty in
state court, that conviction was part of his criminal history ra‐
ther than a grouped offense in his federal case. Given this fact,
the district court calculated an adjusted offense level of 272
and a criminal history category of IV, which resulted in a
guideline range of 100 to 125 months for Count 2 with a man‐
datory consecutive sentence of 84 months for Count 3. Reject‐
ing the Government’s recommendation of 204 months, the
district court calculated a sentence of 196 months—112
months for Count 2 and 84 months consecutive for Count 3—
but it reduced the sentence by 36 months to give Harris credit
for the three years that he served in state custody. The district
court sentenced Harris to a total of 160 months in federal cus‐
tody to run concurrently with his state court sentence.
II. ANALYSIS
Harris argues that the district court erred when it failed to
adopt the hypothetical sentencing guideline range or explain
why it rejected it. Harris reiterates that the parties agreed to
this recommendation because of the error by Harris’ federal
public defender.
2 The District Court applied the 2015 Sentencing Guidelines, which re‐
sulted in a lower offense level.
No. 16‐1023 5
In response, the Government claims that the district court
did address this issue and that it gave Harris every consider‐
ation that he requested in his sentence. The Government as‐
serts that the district court’s treatment of Harris’ Indiana con‐
viction as a prior conviction and not as a stipulated offense
was proper under the Guidelines.
We review de novo a district court’s sentencing procedures.
United States v. Howard, 729 F.3d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 2013). The
district court commits procedural error by not adequately ex‐
plaining its choice of sentence. United States v. Spiller, 732 F.3d
767, 769 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Schlueter, 634
F.3d 965, 966–67 (7th Cir. 2011)). It must show that it exercised
its discretion by commenting on a defendant’s principal argu‐
ments that are “not so weak as not to merit discussion;” how‐
ever, “little explanation is necessary when a court decides to
impose a sentence within the Guidelines range.” Howard, 729
F.3d at 664 (citations omitted).
At the outset of Harris’ sentencing hearing, the district
court acknowledged the parties’ hypothetical guideline calcu‐
lation. The district court noted, however, that because Harris
had in fact been convicted in state court, his adjusted offense
level was 27 and his correct criminal history category was IV,
which resulted in a sentencing guideline range of 100 to 125
months. The district court further explained that whether it
followed the parties’ recommendation or not, it was aware of
the difference and indicated that it was under no obligation to
adopt the hypothetical sentencing guideline range because
the state court conviction had actually occurred. Thus, the dis‐
trict court sufficiently considered the issue and committed no
error. See United States v. Gary, 613 F.3d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“The district court is required only to consider the argument,
6 No. 16‐1023
at least to the extent it pointed to anything unusual about …
[the] circumstances, and to provide a sufficient explanation of
its treatment of the issue.”).
In addition, the district court afforded Harris considerable
leniency in determining his sentence. After considering the
parties’ arguments and the sentencing factors pursuant 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court concluded that the proper
sentence for Harris was 196 months. It then subtracted 36
months to account for the three years that Harris had served
in state custody, which resulted in a sentence of 160 months.
It further ordered the sentence to run concurrently with his
state court sentence. The sentence imposed was below both
the hypothetical and actual guideline ranges. We therefore
conclude that the district court committed no error, ade‐
quately addressed Harris’ arguments, and sufficiently ex‐
plained its below guidelines sentence.
Harris further claims that after the district court imposed
his sentence, it failed to ask whether it addressed the parties’
main arguments as directed by United States v. Garcia‐Segura,
717 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2013). In Garcia‐Segura, we encouraged
district courts to inquire whether defense counsel is satisfied
that the court has addressed the defense’s principal argu‐
ments after imposing a sentence but before advising the de‐
fendant of his right to appeal. Id. at 569. Although the district
court did not make this specific inquiry, it did inquire of each
party whether the court had omitted anything. Harris clearly
understood the import of this inquiry, as he responded by ask‐
ing if the court would order that the sentence begin immedi‐
ately and if the court would recommend a facility near Chi‐
cago. The district court affirmatively responded to both re‐
No. 16‐1023 7
quests. We find no error, as Harris was both given an oppor‐
tunity to respond, and did respond, following the district
court’s determination of his sentence.
In any event, the district court’s shorthand question here
would be harmless error—if any—given that Harris was able
to appeal the sentencing issue rather than having it deemed
waived. See United States v. Cruz, 787 F.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir.
2015) (“[Defendant’s] arguments were waived when, at the
end of the sentencing hearing, the judge asked if he had ad‐
dressed all of the arguments, and [Defendant’s] lawyer an‐
swered yes.”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons noted above, we AFFIRM Harris’ sentence.