IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2014-KA-00539-COA
BRYMON HAMP, JR. A/K/A BRYMON SHIELD APPELLANT
HAMP, JR. A/K/A BOOJACK A/K/A BRYMON
HAMP A/K/A BRYMON A. HAMP A/K/A
BRYMON S. HAMP A/K/A BRYMON SHILED
HAMP A/K/A BRYMON SHIELD HAMP
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/23/2014
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHARLES E. WEBSTER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: COAHOMA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: R. STEWART SMITH JR.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: BRENDA FAY MITCHELL
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CONVICTED OF COUNT I, CAPITAL
MURDER, AND SENTENCED AS A
HABITUAL OFFENDER TO LIFE; AND
COUNT II, FELONY FLEEING, AND
SENTENCED AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER
TO FIVE YEARS, TO RUN
CONSECUTIVELY TO THE SENTENCE IN
COUNT I, ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY
FOR PAROLE OR PROBATION
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 12/13/2016
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE LEE, C.J., JAMES AND GREENLEE, JJ.
LEE, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In this appeal, we must decide whether the Circuit Court of Coahoma County erred
in denying Brymon Hamp Jr.’s motion to suppress.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On July 29, 2010, a concerned citizen reported that something had happened to Gerald
Simmons at his nearby liquor store in Friars Point, Mississippi. The chief of police of Friars
Point, Tracy Vance, went to the store and found the door open, Simmons lying on the floor
semi-conscious and with gashes to his head, and blood spatter throughout the store. The cash
register was open, and no bills were in the cash-register drawer. Shortly thereafter, Simmons
was transported to the hospital.
¶3. While Chief Vance was at Simmons’s store, he received a phone call from an
anonymous caller. The caller stated Jerry Carr and another person “supposed to been hit [sic]
Simmons,” and they were driving a “black box Chevy.” Chief Vance relayed this
information to the Coahoma County dispatcher and Investigator Neal Mitchell with the
Coahoma County Sheriff’s Department.
¶4. Investigator Mitchell went to the hospital, where he attempted to interview Simmons,
who was in and out of consciousness. According to Investigator Mitchell, Simmons’s son
was present during the interview and suggested that two individuals assaulted Simmons.
Then Simmons, during a moment of consciousness, stated that possibly two young, black
males had assaulted him.
¶5. Investigator Herbert Thomas was at the hospital while Investigator Mitchell
interviewed Simmons. Investigator Thomas also received a phone call from an anonymous
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caller. According to Investigator Thomas, the caller stated: “The people y’all are looking
for [are] BooJack, Bootchie[,] and Yount. They’re going to be in a black faded box Chevy
headed toward . . . Clarksdale.” Investigator Thomas knew Bootchie and Yount were
nicknames for Carr and Tyonda Tenner, respectively. At the time, Investigator Thomas did
not know that BooJack was Hamp’s nickname. Investigator Thomas relayed the information
to Sergeant Oliver Mitchell. And a be-on-the-lookout (“BOLO”) was issued.
¶6. Deputy Dewayne Harvey with the Coahoma County Sheriff’s Department spotted a
vehicle matching the description in the BOLO, with Carr in the passenger seat and another
person driving. Deputy Harvey intended to stop the vehicle as soon as it reached a more
populated area. As Deputy Harvey began following the vehicle, the driver—later determined
to be Hamp—increased speed. Deputy Harvey testified that the vehicle “got up to a high rate
of speed[,] . . . maybe 60, 65 [miles per hour,]” before he turned his blue lights on. At that
point, Deputy Harvey turned on his blue lights and attempted to pull the vehicle over. A
pursuit ensued, which lasted approximately ten minutes. According to Deputy Harvey, the
vehicle reached speeds as high as 85 miles per hour on a two-lane road. However, Deputy
Harvey did not have a radar in his vehicle. The vehicle also ran several stop signs and nearly
collided with another vehicle. After Deputy Harvey called for backup, the vehicle was
eventually pulled over. The officers detained Hamp and Carr and recovered $304 from
Hamp and $282 from Carr. Investigator Thomas noticed a blood stain on Hamp’s shoe, so
Hamp’s shoes and later his clothes were seized. In the vehicle, a bottle of vodka was on the
front seat and a case of gin was on the back seat.
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¶7. Hamp filed a pretrial motion to exclude the physical evidence that was obtained as a
result of the investigatory stop on July 29. Defense counsel argued that the investigatory stop
was based on information from anonymous informants, that the tips bore no indicia of
reliability, and that the officers did not investigate the veracity of the information. After a
hearing on the motion, the trial court found that the circumstances surrounding the
investigatory stop did not warrant suppression of the items that were seized.
¶8. At trial, Dr. Feng Li testified that Simmons died on August 6, 2010. According to Dr.
Li, Simmons’s death was caused by blunt force trauma to the head, and the manner of death
was homicide. The items seized during the investigatory stop were then introduced into
evidence. Expert testimony established that Hamp’s shoe and shorts tested positive for
blood, and the blood samples matched Simmons’s DNA profile.
¶9. Tenner testified that Hamp lived in her apartment, and as part of their living
arrangement, Hamp was responsible for paying the gas bill. Tenner testified that, on July 29,
Hamp promised that he would get the money to pay the bill. Later that afternoon, Hamp and
Carr returned with $900 and a case of gin. Hamp gave Tenner $300 for the gas bill. And
Hamp stated that he and Carr hit Simmons in the back of the head with a gun and robbed his
liquor store.
¶10. Hamp was convicted of Count I, capital murder, and Count II, felony fleeing. Hamp
was sentenced as a habitual offender to life for Count I and five years for Count II, to run
consecutively to the sentence in Count I, without the possibility of parole or probation, all
in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Hamp filed a motion for a new
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trial or, in the alternative, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was denied. Hamp
appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11. A mixed standard of review is applied to Fourth Amendment suppression-of-evidence
inquiries. Cooper v. State, 145 So. 3d 1219, 1224 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
Determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be
reviewed de novo. However, this Court is restricted to a de novo review of the
trial judge’s decision based on historical facts reviewed under the substantial
evidence and clearly erroneous standards. Further, the Court reviews a trial
court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence following a motion to suppress
under the abuse-of-discretion standard.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶12. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3, Section 23
of the Mississippi Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Miss. Const. art. 3, § 23.
¶13. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “before conducting an investigatory, or
Terry[1] stop, officers are required to have ‘reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and
articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in a felony or some objective
manifestation that the person stopped is[,] or is about to be[,] engaged in criminal activity.’”
Cooper v. State, 145 So. 3d 1164, 1168 (¶11) (Miss. 2014) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Williamson v. State, 876 So. 2d 353, 355 (¶12) (Miss. 2004)). “Reasonable suspicion can
arise from an officer’s personal observations, a tip by a trusted police informant, or by
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Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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anonymous tip.” Id. (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270-71 (2000)). But information
by anonymous tip must have some indication that it is reliable. Id.
¶14. The United States Supreme Court has previously stated that “an anonymous tip alone
seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.” Id. at (¶12) (quoting
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328-29 (1990)). However, the United States Supreme
Court has also stated that “there are situations in which an anonymous tip suitably
corroborated, exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to
make the investigatory stop.” Id. (emphasis in orginal) (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 270).
“Reasonable suspicion is dependent upon the content of the information possessed by the
detaining officer as well as its degree of reliability. Both factors—quantity and quality—are
considered in the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” Williamson, 876 So. 2d at 355 (¶11)
(quoting Floyd v. State, 749 So. 2d 110, 118 (¶30) (Miss. 1999)).
¶15. Hamp cites to J.L. for support. In J.L., law enforcement received a tip that a “young
black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.”
J.L., 529 U.S. at 268. Upon arriving at the bus stop, officers observed three black males, and
one—J.L.—was wearing a plaid shirt. Id. The officers frisked J.L. and recovered a gun. Id.
In determining that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to make the initial stop, the
United States Supreme Court stated: “All the police had to go on in this case was the bare
report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about
the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L.” Id. at 271.
¶16. In contrast, in White, 496 U.S. at 327, the police received an anonymous tip that a
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specific individual would be traveling in a vehicle matching a specific description and
heading to a specific location. And that the individual possessed cocaine. Id. After
corroborating certain details, the police officer stopped the vehicle and discovered the
cocaine. Id. at 331. The United States Supreme Court noted that the tip accurately described
the future behavior of the specific individual, thereby demonstrating “a special familiarity
with [the] respondent’s affairs,” implying that the tipster “had access to reliable information
about that individual’s illegal activities.” Id. at 332.
¶17. Here, the tips received stated that certain named individuals would be traveling in a
specific car heading to a particular location. And that these individuals were involved in the
robbery. Deputy Harvey was patrolling an area where he thought he might see the car in
question. When Deputy Harvey saw the car matching the description in the BOLO, he
noticed Carr in the passenger seat. And Deputy Harvey testified that he was familiar with
Carr. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that the tips demonstrated the
tipsters’ reliability and basis of knowledge to support a finding of reasonable suspicion
before Deputy Harvey stopped Hamp.
¶18. When a crime has been committed, the supreme court has acknowledged that a police
officer has a duty to seek out those who commit reported crimes and investigate complaints
made of purported illegal activity. Dies v. State, 926 So. 2d 910, 919 (¶24) (Miss. 2006)
(citation omitted). “The Fourth Amendment does not require police who lack the
information necessary for probable cause to simply shrug their shoulders and allow a crime
or a criminal escape to occur. Rather, it allows for investigatory stops to encourage the
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police to pursue their reasonable suspicions.” Id. (citation omitted).
¶19. We further find that Hamp’s flight gave rise to reasonable suspicion sufficient for
Deputy Harvey to follow in pursuit. See Cooper, 145 So. 3d at 1172 (¶29). “[H]eadlong
flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative
of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119, 124 (2000)). “Furthermore, nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in
determining reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 1172-73 (¶29).
¶20. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COAHOMA COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF COUNT I, CAPITAL MURDER, AND SENTENCE AS A
HABITUAL OFFENDER OF LIFE; AND COUNT II, FELONY FLEEING, AND
SENTENCE AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER OF FIVE YEARS, WITH THE
SENTENCE TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO THE SENTENCE IN COUNT I, ALL
IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR PROBATION, IS AFFIRMED. ALL
COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO COAHOMA COUNTY.
GRIFFIS, P.J., ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, JAMES AND GREENLEE, JJ.,
CONCUR. IRVING, P.J., BARNES AND WILSON, JJ., CONCUR IN PART AND IN
THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
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