MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 01 2017, 5:47 am
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APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Chanse T. Starr Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Bunker Hill, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Chanse T. Starr, June 1, 2017
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A03-1608-CR-1866
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Frances C. Gull,
Appellee-Respondent Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
02D06-1111-FC-361
02D06-1111-FC-358
02D06-1106-FD-844
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1608-CR-1866 | June 1, 2017 Page 1 of 4
[1] Chanse Starr appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for jail time credit
and petition to dismiss probation. Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] In 2012, Starr entered into a plea agreement resolving three causes. Under the
agreement, as later modified, Starr pleaded guilty to Class C felony corrupt
business influence under cause FC-358, Class C felony corrupt business
influence under cause FC-361, and admitted to being an habitual offender
under cause FC-361.1 Pursuant to the plea agreement, Starr was sentenced to
concurrent four-year terms for the two Class C felony convictions, with an
eight-year habitual offender enhancement. The plea agreement also required
the trial court to suspend six years of that sentence.
[3] At the March 14, 2012, sentencing hearing, Starr’s attorney informed the trial
court that Starr had been continuously incarcerated since November 10, 2011,
and agreed that part of his credit time was to be applied to an unrelated
misdemeanor cause. Counsel calculated that Starr was entitled to 117 days of
jail credit toward the offenses to which he was pleading guilty. Appellant’s
App. Vol. II p. 8-9, 10. Starr agreed that 117 days of jail time credit should
apply to these offenses, with the balance being applied to a misdemeanor cause.
1
The charges under cause FD-844 were dismissed.
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The trial court awarded Starr 117 days of jail time credit in causes FC-358 and
FC-361.
[4] On July 20, 2016, Starr filed a motion for jail time credit and a petition to
dismiss probation. The trial court denied both motions on July 22, 2016, and
Starr now appeals.2
Discussion and Decision
I. Jail Time Credit
[5] Presentence jail time credit is a matter of statutory right rather than a matter of
judicial discretion. Weaver v. State, 725 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
A motion for jail time credit must “identif[y] a sufficient factual basis for [the
inmate’s] eligibility.” Id.
[6] Here, both Starr and his attorney represented to the trial court that part of his
accumulated jail time credit had been applied to an unrelated misdemeanor
cause and that the balance to be applied to these causes totaled 117 days.
Nothing in the record or Starr’s argument leads us to question this calculation.
Furthermore, the dates he suggests should be used to calculate his jail time
credit are not supported by the chronological case summaries of these causes.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 44, 56. Moreover, while Starr argues that he was
entitled to good time credit, nothing in the record indicates that he was denied
2
Starr filed a timely notice of appeal on August 10, 2016. This Court accepted a belated filing of his brief on
March 24, 2017.
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such credit. Under these circumstances, Starr has failed to identify a sufficient
factual basis for his eligibility for additional jail time credit, and the trial court
did not err by denying the motion.
II. Petition to Dismiss Probation
[7] Starr voluntarily entered into a plea agreement, which provided that six years of
his agreed-upon sentence would be suspended to probation. He now seeks to
dismiss that probation. But he may not collaterally attack a sentence provided
for in a plea agreement: “it is a long-standing principle that the validity of a
guilty plea can only be challenged by way of a petition for post-conviction
relief, not by direct appeal or motion to correct error.” Allen v. State, 865
N.E.2d 686, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Furthermore, he fails to provide a
cogent argument in support of his theory that he cannot be required to serve an
executed sentence in a different cause with a sentence ordered to be served
consecutively to the present sentence before beginning his present probation.
We find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of Starr’s petition to dismiss
probation.
[8] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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