J-S32001-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ESTATE OF ROSALIND T. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
SNYDER, AN ALLEGED : PENNSYLVANIA
INCAPACITATED PERSON UNDER :
LIMITED GUARDIANSHIP OF C. :
BARBARA LEMUNYON :
:
:
APPEAL OF: ROSALIND T. SNYDER : No. 3138 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order September 20, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 2014-0465
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JULY 21, 2017
Appellant, Rosalind T. Snyder, appeals from the order entered in the
Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, which reaffirmed Appellant’s status as
a partially incapacitated person and confirmed the position of Appellee, C.
Barbara LeMunyon, as Appellant’s limited guardian. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
The trial court opinion sets forth the relevant facts and procedural
history of this case. Therefore, we will only briefly summarize them.
Appellant is an octogenarian who was living with her ex-husband, Reginald
Snyder, and her son, Daniel Snyder. On December 22, 2014, the court
adjudicated Appellant as a partially incapacitated person and appointed
Appellee as limited guardian of Appellant’s person and estate. Appellee’s
duties as limited guardian included oversight of Appellant’s living conditions,
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*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S32001-17
finances, and medical needs. On October 13, 2015, Appellee filed a petition
for review, alleging Appellant’s homeowner’s insurance had lapsed because
of the deteriorated condition of the home. Appellee further stated that
Appellant and her son were not cooperating with Appellee in allowing
Appellee access to the home to perform her assigned duties and arrange for
repairs. Appellee requested plenary guardianship powers so she could better
protect Appellant and her property.
On June 23, 2016, the trial court held an initial hearing on the petition
for review, focusing on Appellant’s lack of homeowner’s insurance and the
property’s deteriorated state. Appellant testified at this hearing, did not
demonstrate an understanding of the importance of homeowner’s insurance,
and incorrectly stated she was presently covered by insurance. Appellant
also stated she recently burned her hand while reaching into her broken
dishwasher. After the hearing, the court authorized Appellee to spend up to
$8,000.00 to repair Appellant’s home in order to obtain homeowner’s
insurance, granted Appellee regular and periodic access to Appellant and her
home without interference, and determined that an independent expert
would review Appellant’s cognitive status.
On August 11, 2016, the second part of the review hearing took place.
At this hearing, the court heard cognitive status testimony from Appellant’s
primary care physician, Dr. Bruce Lieberman, and the court-appointed
psychiatric evaluator, Dr. Euhna Kim. Dr. Lieberman stated he did not
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notice any change in Appellant’s mental status beyond that of normal aging
and found no sign of dementia. In contrast, Dr. Kim testified that, after a
forty-five minute evaluation of Appellant, he concluded Appellant suffers
from a moderate level of progressive dementia and is in need of plenary
guardianship. Appellee also testified at this hearing, regarding the repairs
made to Appellant’s home and the reinstated homeowner’s insurance.
Appellee further requested additional funding for more repairs, as well as a
lockbox for easier access to Appellant’s home.
On August 26, 2016, the court issued an adjudication and decree
reasserting Appellant’s status as a partially incapacitated person and
confirming Appellee’s position as limited guardian. The court also authorized
the use of a lockbox, the expenditure of an additional $3,000.00 on repairs,
the disposal or repair of Appellant’s broken dishwasher, an evaluation of
Appellant’s driving abilities, and further oversight of Appellant’s medications.
Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on September 20, 2016. On
September 26, 2016, the court issued an order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b), directing Appellant to file her statement of errors complained of on
appeal within 21 days and noting that any issues not included in her
statement would be waived. Appellant’s former court-appointed counsel
personally hand-delivered a copy of the order to Appellant’s son on October
7, 2016. Appellant failed to comply.
In her brief, Appellant raises ten issues for our review:
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[WHETHER THE] SUPERIOR COURT FAILED TO ENTER
JUDGMENT FOR…APPELLANT WHEN…APPELLEE DID NOT
FILE A BRIEF IN OPPOSITION WITHIN THE REQUIRED
TIME LIMIT[?]
[WHETHER THE ORPHANS’ COURT] ERRED WHEN [IT]
FAILED TO INVESTIGATE DAVID SNYDER’S CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND[?] DAVID SNYDER IS…APPELLANT’S
ESTRANGED SON AND THE PERSON WHO INITIATED THIS
ACTION IN 2014 FOLLOWING THE HOUSE FIRE. DAVID IS
NO LONGER PARTY TO THIS LAWSUIT WHICH NEVER
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PROCEED IN THE FIRST
PLACE.
[WHETHER THE ORPHANS’ COURT] ERRED WHEN [IT]
FAILED TO INVESTIGATE THE MAY 28, 2014 FIRE AT THE
SNYDER HOME OR TO ORDER REPORTS FROM THE FIRE
MARSHALL AND THE INSURANCE INVESTIGATOR TO BE
MADE PART OF THE RECORD[?]
[WHETHER THE ORPHANS’ COURT] FAILED TO ISSUE AN
OPINION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE[?] [THE ORPHANS’ COURT] IMPROPERLY
IGNORED EVIDENCE GIVEN BY [APPELLANT]’S PRIMARY
CARE PHYSICIAN IN RENDERING [ITS] DECISION.
[WHETHER THE ORPHANS’ COURT] RECEIVED A PAYMENT
IN KIND FROM STATE REPRESENTATIVE KATHY WATSON
IN THE FORM OF A CAMPAIGN MAILING ON HIS BEHALF[?]
THIS VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS.
[WHETHER] THE SUPERIOR COURT [ERRED BECAUSE IT]
HAS NEVER READ DR. LIEBERMAN’S REPORT[?]
[APPELLANT] HAS BEEN UNDER DR. LIEBERMAN’S CARE
FOR MORE THAN 11 YEARS.
[WHETHER] IN TESTIFYING THAT [APPELLANT] HAS
DEMENTIA, DR. KIM FAILED TO EXERCISE DUE DILIGENCE
IN HIS EXAMINATION AND FINDINGS[?] HE FAILED TO
PRESENT CLEAR AND CONCISE EVIDENCE OF DEMENTIA
AND HIS TESTIMONY DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIRED
STANDARD OF EVIDENCE.
[WHETHER] DR. KIM IMPROPERLY REFERRED TO DR.
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MOYER’S DISCREDITED REPORT IN HIS TESTIMONY[?]
[DR. KIM] FAILED TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT
EXAMINATION OF…APPELLANT. IN HIS TESTIMONY, DR.
KIM FIRST CITES DR. MOYER’S REPORT WHICH STATES
[APPELLANT] FAILED THE MATH TEST AND THEN
CONTRADICTS THAT REPORT BY SAYING THAT
[APPELLANT] PASSED THE MATH TEST.
[WHETHER]…APPELLEE, [C. BARBARA LEMUNYON],
EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN SELLING [APPELLANT]’S
HOME WITHOUT PRESENTING EVIDENCE THAT
[APPELLANT] IS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN THE HOME[?]
[WHETHER THE ORPHANS’ COURT] ORDERED A TEST OF
[APPELLANT]’S ABILITY TO DRIVE EVEN THOUGH THERE
ARE NO TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS THAT WOULD INDICATE
THAT [APPELLANT] IS UNFIT TO DRIVE[?] [A]PPELLANT’S
ATTORNEY GAVE [THE ORPHANS’ COURT] A COPY OF
[APPELLANT]’S DRIVER’S LICENSE AND THE COURT [WAS]
AWARE OF [APPELLANT]’S DRIVING RECORD.
(Appellant’s Brief at 12-13).
As a prefatory matter, an appellant must timely comply whenever the
trial court orders a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 719
A.2d 306 (1998). “[F]ailure to comply with the minimal requirements of
Rule 1925(b) will result in automatic waiver of the issues raised.”
Greater Erie Indus. Development Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc.,
88 A.3d 222, 224 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc) (emphasis in original). “[O]ur
Supreme Court does not countenance anything less than stringent
application of waiver pursuant to Rule 1925(b).” Id. In civil cases, the Rule
requires: (1) the trial court must issue a Rule 1925(b) order directing an
appellant to file a response within twenty-one days of that order; (2) the
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trial court must file the order with the prothonotary; (3) the prothonotary
must enter the order on the docket; (4) the prothonotary must give written
notice of the entry of the order to each party, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236;
and (5) the prothonotary must record Rule 236 notice on the docket. See
Forest Highlands Community Ass’n v. Hammer, 879 A.2d 223, 227
(Pa.Super. 2005).
Instantly, Appellant filed her notice of appeal on September 20, 2016.
On September 26, 2016, the court entered an order, with Rule 236 notice,
directing Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal within twenty-one days of entry of the order.
Appellant was served with the order on October 7, 2016. Therefore,
Appellant’s statement was due on or before October 28, 2016, at the latest.
Appellant did not comply.
The trial court issued its opinion on November 21, 2016, concluding
Appellant had waived her issues for failure to file a court-ordered Rule
1925(b) statement, despite successful service upon Appellant “via her son
and her former court-appointed counsel on October 7, 2016.” (See Trial
Court Opinion, dated November 21, 2016, at 6). Given that the trial court
directed Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement and strictly followed the
proper filing and notice procedures, and given that Appellant failed to
comply with the court’s order, we agree with the court that Appellant waived
her issues for appellate review.
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Moreover, the court substantiated its decision on the merits to
continue the limited guardianship. (See id. at 6-8) (finding expert
testimony of court-appointed psychiatric evaluator, Dr. Kim, particularly
compelling, due to Dr. Kim’s expertise in geriatric psychiatry, greater time
spent with Appellant focusing strictly on her cognitive status, and more in-
depth testing conducted; totality of evidence adduced at trial established
Appellant is at very least partially incapacitated and remains in need of
limited guardian of both her person and estate; adjudication and decision
under review continues to provide Appellant with certain degree of
independence while addressing concerns about her finances and physical
welfare). Accordingly, we affirm.1 See generally In re K.L.S., 594 Pa.
194, 197 n.3, 934 A.2d 1244, 1246 n.3 (2007) (stating where issues are
waived on appeal, we should affirm rather than quash appeal).
Order affirmed.
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1
Due to our disposition, we deny Appellant’s open motion for an addendum
to her Brief, her open motion to introduce new evidence on a possible
conflict of interest, and her open application for relief in the form of a motion
to introduce new evidence.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/21/2017
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Circulated 06/27/2017 10:51 AM