NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 27 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PERLA A. HERNANDEZ, No. 15-15563
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01500-JCM-VCF
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE,
INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Perla A. Hernandez appeals pro se from the district court’s judgement
dismissing her action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”) and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034,
1040-41 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Hernandez’s FDCPA claims because
Hernandez failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Wells Fargo is a “debt
collector,” and because the alleged communications were not attempts to collect a
debt as defined by the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (defining “debt
collector”); Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 720 F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir.
2013) (establishing that debt collection is part of a defendant’s business is
insufficient to state an FDCPA claim); Ho v. ReconTrust Co., NA, 858 F.3d 568,
572 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A]ctions taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure . . . are
not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the FDCPA.”); Dowers v.
Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “while
the FDCPA regulates security interest enforcement activity, it does so only through
Section 1692f(6),” and that “[a]s for the remaining FDCPA provisions, ‘debt
collection’ refers only to the collection of a money debt”).
The district court properly dismissed Hernandez’s remaining claims because
Hernandez failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief.
See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se
pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations
sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b),
2 15-15563
1681s-2(b); Hall v. SSF, Inc., 930 P.2d 94, 98 (Nev. 1996) (elements of claims for
negligent hiring, and negligent training and supervision); PETA v. Bobby Berosini,
Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1279 (Nev. 1995) (elements of invasion of privacy claim),
overruled on other grounds by City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v.
Hecht, 940 P.2d 134, 138 (Nev. 1997)..
We do not consider matters not properly raised before the district court, or
matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See
Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We do not consider documents not presented to the district court because
they are not part of the record on appeal. See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870,
874 (9th Cir. 1990).
AFFIRMED.
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