16-3804
Jiang v. Sessions
BIA
Bukszpan, IJ
A077 994 189
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
31st day of May, two thousand eighteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT D. SACK,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
DIAN BIAO JIANG, AKA LONG DINH
HOANG,
Petitioner,
v. 16-3804
NAC
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, Esq., New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Justin Markel,
Senior Litigation Counsel; Nancy E.
Friedman, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Dian Biao Jiang, a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an October 18, 2016
decision of the BIA affirming an April 27, 2015 decision of an
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Jiang’s motion to reopen. In
re Dian Biao Jiang, No. A077 994 189 (B.I.A. Oct. 18, 2016),
aff’g No. A077 994 189 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 27, 2015).
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
and procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both
the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.”
Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.
2006). The applicable standards of review are well
established. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69
(2d Cir. 2008).
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In his motion to reopen, Jiang asserted that he had
converted to Christianity in the United States and that
conditions for Christians had worsened in China excusing the
untimely filing of his motion and demonstrating his prima facie
eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). It is undisputed
that Jiang’s 2015 motion to reopen was untimely filed 12 years
after his 2003 removal order. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). However, the
time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply
if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is
based on changed country conditions arising in the country of
nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered,
if such evidence is material and was not available and would
not have been discovered or presented at the previous
proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.23(b)(4)(i). The agency did not err in finding that
Jiang failed to demonstrate such conditions.
“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to
reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions
that would justify reopening, [the agency] compare[s] the
evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to
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those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”
In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007). As the
agency found, reports of the U.S. Department of State
demonstrate that the Chinese government has viewed unfavorably
and mistreated unregistered Christian groups since before
Jiang’s 2003 proceedings. Jiang’s evidence further
demonstrates that the treatment of unregistered religious
groups varies widely from region to region, and it does not
reveal increased persecution of such groups in Jiang’s home
province. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 142, 149; cf. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(ii) (“An applicant does not have a well-founded
fear of persecution if the applicant could avoid persecution
by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of
nationality . . . .”).
Accordingly, because the agency reasonably found that
Jiang did not demonstrate a material change in conditions in
China, it did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion
to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
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is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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