IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
r.a co al
••••4
NICHOLAS E. BOONE, and all others
similarly situated, C.... "lc)
No. 76611-2-1
Appellant, • p—orn
DIVISION ONE (OM r-1
V.
• aco
CITY OF SEATTLE, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Respondent. FILED: July 9, 2018
SPEARMAN, J. — Nicholas E. Boone exceeded the speed limit in a school
zone and received a notice of infraction. He paid the ticket without contest and
the municipal court entered a judgment against him. Boone brought a class
action lawsuit in superior court seeking (1) a declaration that the school zone was
improperly signed and (2) restitution of fines paid. The superior court dismissed
Boone's restitution claim, ruling that plaintiffs could only seek a refund of fines
paid in municipal court through a motion in that court to vacate the judgment. It
also dismissed his claim for declaratory relief as moot because the allegedly
improper signs had already been changed and no monetary relief was available.
We conclude that the trial court did not err. It is well settled that the
municipal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over traffic infraction cases; that
No. 76611-2/2
the exclusive means to vacate a municipal court judgment is through a motion in
that court; and that a claim may properly be dismissed as moot if the court
cannot provide effective relief. Affirmed.
FACTS
In February 2014, a traffic safety camera recorded Boone driving 27 miles
per hour(mph) in a school zone. A sign at the school zone listed the speed limit
as 20 mph "WHEN LIGHTS ARE FLASHING." Clerk's Papers(CP)at 691.
Boone paid the ticket without contest and the municipal court entered a judgment
of infraction against him.
In June 2014, the Seattle Times ran an article about a school speed zone
case. In City of Seattle v. Hunt, No. 13-2-25366-6 SEA, a driver contested his
notice of infraction, arguing that signage at the speed zone did not provide
adequate notice and he could not see or read the signs in time to slow down.
Hunt argued in part that the WHEN LIGHTS ARE FLASHING sign did not comply
with the federal Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices(MUTCD). The
municipal court rejected this argument but, on appeal, the superior court
reversed, ruling that the sign failed to comply with the MUTCD. The day after the
Seattle Times ran its article on the Hunt case, Boone sent the City a notice of
claim, a prerequisite to this action.
The City's position was that the signs complied with the MUTCD and Hunt
was wrongly decided.1 Nevertheless, following the publicity around Hunt the City
1 The City was unable to appeal as a matter of right because the amount in controversy • -
did not meet the statutory minimum. RCW 2.06.030. See also RCW 2.04.010.
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No. 76611-2/3
changed the signs to read "WHEN FLASHING." CP at 380, 748. The City's traffic
engineer stated that he had the signs replaced because he did not want drivers
who learned about the Hunt decision to believe they could disregard school zone
speed limits. The signs were replaced on August 9, 2014.
On August 18, Boone filed the complaint in this action in King County
Superior Court. He proposed to represent a class of plaintiffs who received
infractions at school zones with signs reading WHEN LIGHTS ARE FLASHING.
Boone alleged that the City had improperly collected over $10 million dollars
through fines in these school zones. He sought declaratory relief and restitution
of fines paid. Boone filed a motion for class certification. The trial court granted
class certification as to Boone's declaratory claim but reserved ruling on
certification of Boone's restitution claim.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Boone relied on
Hunt to argue that the signage was improper and his declaratory claim should be
granted as a matter of law. Boone reserved the issue of remedy or relief,
asserting that equitable relief in the form of restitution would flow from a
declaration that the City systematically used improper signs.
The City argued that its signs complied with all applicable laws and
Boone's entire complaint should be dismissed on this ground. Alternatively, the
City asked the court to dismiss Boone's restitution claim. The City argued that,
because this claim amounted to an attack on the judgment of the municipal court,
it could only be brought in municipal court. And, the City contended that even if
the wording of the City's sign was technically incorrect, equitable relief in the form
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No. 76611-2/4
of restitution was not available to Boone because he had not suffered an
injustice. It pointed out that Boone did not dispute speeding in the school zone or
claim that he did not see or could not read the sign.
In its oral ruling, the superior court first noted that there was no dispute
that it had jurisdiction over Boone's declaratory claim. But because it found
disputed issues of material fact, it denied the parties' motion for summary
judgment on that claim. Id. at 81. As to the restitution claim, the court ruled that
the issue was not properly before it and found no basis to aggregate the
proposed plaintiffs' claims on this issue. The court's order states that Boone's
refund claim is barred as res judicata in superior court and "[p]laintiffs' refund
claims must be brought in municipal court. .. ." CP at 779.
Boone moved for a jury trial on his declaratory claim and a trial date was
set. Before trial, however, the City moved to dismiss the claim as moot. The City
argued that the language on the signs had been changed before Boone filed his
complaint and any dispute over whether the former signs complied with the law
was purely academic. And, the City asserted, because the exclusive means for
plaintiffs to obtain a refund was through a motion in municipal court, no monetary
relief would flow from a declaratory judgment. The court granted the City's motion
and dismissed Boone's declaratory claim.
DISCUSSION
Boone appeals the dismissal of his claims. We review the trial court's
ruling on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment de novo,
engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. Becker v. Community Health
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No. 76611-2/5
Systems, Inc., 184 Wn.2d 252, 359 P.3d 746(2015); Hadley v. Maxwell, 144
Wn.2d 306, 310, 27 P.3d 600(2001). Boone first contends it was error to dismiss
his restitution claim, which he also describes as a claim for disgorgement or a
refund. The superior court dismissed this claim for lack of jurisdiction.2
Traffic infractions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal
court. RCW 3.50.020. Infraction proceedings are governed by the Infraction
Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (IRLJ). IRLJ 1.1(a). The issuance of a
notice of infraction initiates an infraction case. IRLJ 2.2(a). A person who
receives a notice of infraction may pay the penalty without contest, request a
hearing to contest that the infraction occurred, or request a hearing to explain
mitigating circumstances. IRLJ 1.1(b). When the person pays the fine without
contest, the court enters "a judgment that the defendant has committed the
infraction." IRLJ 2.4(b)(1). A judgment of infraction is a final decision. IRLJ 1.2(e).
To obtain relief from judgment, a party must bring a motion under CRLJ 60(b).
IRLJ 6.7(a). Under that rule, the court may grant relief from judgment in a number
of circumstances, including where the judgment is void. CRLJ 60(b).
We considered the rules for courts of limited jurisdiction in in Doe v. Fife
Mun. Court, 74 Wn. App. 444, 874 P.2d 182(1994). In Doe, courts of limited
jurisdiction in Pierce County imposed court costs as a condition of deferred
prosecution on alcohol related criminal offenses. Doe, 74 Wn. App. at 446. The
Does paid the costs but separately filed suit in superior court seeking an
2 The superior court ruled that plaintiffs must bring refund claims through a motion to
vacate in municipal court and the claim was res judicata in superior court.
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No. 76611-2/6
injunction and refund. Id. at 447. The trial court denied the claim for injunctive
relief on the grounds that an appellate court had already put the limited courts on
notice that they did not have authority to assess court costs. Id. at 448. As to the
refund claim, the court ruled that the Does were barred from recovery because
they did not appeal the orders in the limited courts or move for relief from
judgment under the appropriate rule. Id. at 448.
On appeal, the Does argued that their municipal court orders were void and
therefore subject to collateral attack in the superior court. Id. at 449. We agreed
that those portions of the orders that imposed costs were void. Id. at 451. We
held, however, that a motion in the limited court under the applicable rule provided
the "sole mechanism for a party to move to vacate a void judgment... ."3 Id. at
453. Because the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was in the courts of limited
jurisdiction, their superior court action was barred. Id. at 455.
The same is true in this case. If, as Boone asserts, the City lacked
authority to issue citations at improperly signed school zones, the municipal court
judgment is void. The exclusive means to vacate a void judgment is through a
motion under CRLJ 60(b). The trial court did not err in ruling that Boone and
similarly situated plaintiffs had to bring refund claims in municipal court.
Boone raises several theories to argue against this result. He first argues
that his claim for monetary relief is based on his claim for a declaratory judgment
and is thus within the jurisdiction of the superior court. But the cases Boone relies
3 The Doe court examined the criminal rules for courts of limited jurisdiction (CrRLJ). This
case involves the civil rules for courts of limited jurisdiction (CRLJ). The rules concerning vacating
a judgment are identical in all relevant respects. See CrRLJ 7.8, CRLJ 60.
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No. 76611-2/7
on are inapposite. Because there was no prior judgment at issue in Nelson v.
Appleway Chevrolet, Inc., 160 Wn.2d 173, 157 P.3d 847(2007) or Orwick v. City
of Seattle, 103 Wn.2d 249,692 P.2d 793(1984)those cases are of no help to
Boone.
Boone next argues that the trial court erred by relying on Doe. Boone
argues that Doe is limited to the particular circumstances of that case and should
not be applied here to require an entire certified class of plaintiffs to bring actions
in municipal court. He asserts that the trial court misapplied Doe by ordering him
to vacate his judgment in municipal court before it would hear his declaratory
claim. This is unjust, according to Boone, because he cannot vacate his
municipal court judgment until the superior court declares that the City's signs
were improper. Boone asserts that Doe stands for the proposition that plaintiffs
may obtain a declaratory judgment in superior court and then seek to vacate their
municipal court judgments.
Boone misconstrues Doe. In Doe, we held that, even where a municipal
court judgment is void, the exclusive means to vacate that judgment is through a
motion in municipal court. Doe, 74 Wn. App. at 455. The Doe court did not
address jurisdiction over declaratory claims or the order of actions in superior
and municipal court.
Boone also misconstrues the proceedings below. There was no dispute
below that the trial court had jurisdiction over Boone's declaratory claim. The
court did not require Boone to vacate the municipal court judgment before it
would hear his claim for declaratory relief. And, because the trial court expressly
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No. 76611-2/8
did not certify a class as to Boone's restitution claim, the court did not require an
entire certified class to bring actions in municipal court.
Finally, Boone argues that the City is collaterally estopped from arguing
that a plaintiff cannot seek a refund in superior court without vacating a fine
imposed in municipal court. Collateral estoppel bars a party from relitigating an
issue where the party was involved in previous litigation addressing identical
issues, the litigation resulted in a final judgment on the merits, and applying
collateral estoppel will not work an injustice. Hadley, 144 Wn.2d at 311. Boone
relies on Todd v. City of Auburn, C09-1232JCC, 2010 WL 774135(W.D. Wash.
2010).
In Todd, a class of plaintiffs brought an action against several
municipalities, including the City of Seattle, and two private camera companies to
invalidate citations issued by automated traffic cameras. Todd, 2010 WL 774135
at *1. The plaintiffs raised a number of theories, including federal constitutional
issues, to argue that the fines were excessive and the contracts with the private
companies were unlawful. Id. at *1-*2. The federal district court rejected the
cities' argument that jurisdiction was proper only in Seattle Municipal Court based
on RCW 35.20.010(1). Instead, it found jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' claims
concerned alleged system wide violations of statutory requirements and because
the municipal court did not have authority to hear the plaintiffs' federal
constitutional claims. Id. at *2.
Boone asserts that, because the Todd court found jurisdiction over the
claims in that case, the City is estopped from arguing lack of jurisdiction in this
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No. 76611-2/9
case. The argument is without merit. Although Boone also asserts an issue
regarding automated traffic cameras, the similarity with Todd ends there. Boone's
claims do not rise to the level of "system-wide violations of statutory requirements
in the enforcement of municipal ordinances." Id. Nor does he assert any federal
constitutional claims. Because the claims are not identical, Todd did not estop
the City from arguing in this case that Boone's refund claim is within the
jurisdiction of the municipal court.
The superior court properly dismissed Boone's claim for a refund of the
fine paid as part of his municipal court judgment. Such a claim may only be
brought through a motion to vacate in municipal court. Because of our resolution
of this issue, we do not reach the parties' arguments concerning res judicata as
an alternative grounds to dismiss the claim.
Boone next challenges the denial of his motion for summary judgment on
his declaratory claim. The denial of a motion for summary judgment, however, is
not generally appealable. Sea-Pac Co., Inc., v. United Food and Commercial
Workers Local Union 44, 103 Wn.2d 800, 801-02, 699 P.2d 217(1985). Boone
makes no argument for discretionary review. We decline to consider the issue.
Next, Boone challenges the dismissal of his declaratory claim. Claims for
declaratory relief must meet "the traditional limiting doctrines of standing,
mootness, and ripeness, as well as the federal case-or-controversy requirement."
To-Ro Trade Shows v. Collins, 144 Wn.2d 403, 411,27 P.3d 1149(2001). A
declaratory judgment is only proper where "the court will be rendering a final
judgment on an actual dispute between opposing parties with a genuine stake in
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No. 76611-2/10
the resolution." Id. (citing Diversified Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Ripley, 82 Wn.2d811,
81, 514 P.2d 137 (1973)). A case is moot if a court cannot provide effective relief.
Orwick, 103 Wn.2d at 253.
In this case, the City moved to dismiss Boone's declaratory claim as moot,
arguing that the allegedly improper signs had been changed and a declaration
that the former signs were improper would not provide any meaningful relief. The
trial court granted the motion. Boone contends this was error. He asserts that the
superior court has jurisdiction over a declaratory claim even when no relief is
available.4
Boone relies on New Cinpular Wireless PCS, LLC v. City of Clyde Hill, 185
Wn.2d 594, 374 P.3d 151 (2016). The issue in that case was whether a
declaratory action was proper to challenge a city's action or whether relief was
only available through a writ of review. Id. at 598. The New Cingular court held
that, in the circumstances of that case, either avenue of relief was available. Id.
at 607. In concluding that there was no statutory or constitutional bar to seeking a
declaratory judgment, the court quoted RCW 7.24.010, which states in part that
"[c]ourts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare
rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed." Id. at 606-07(quoting RCW 7.24.010).
4 Boone also argues that the City's motion was barred by judicial estoppel and a King
County local rule. Because Boone did not raise these arguments below, they are waived on
appeal. RAP 2.5(a).
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No. 76611-2/11
Boone relies on this quote to argue that the inability to provide relief does
not render a declaratory action moot.5 He is mistaken. Mootness was not at issue
in New Cinqular. The court may only hear a declaratory claim when the
traditional limiting doctrines, including mootness, are satisfied. To-Ro Trade
Shows, 144 Wn.2d at 411.
Boone next asserts that his declaratory claim is not moot because
equitable relief in the form of disgorgement will flow from a declaratory judgment.
He argues that the City's voluntary change to its signs does not remedy its prior
conduct in issuing infractions at improperly signed school zones. Id. at 56.
Boone relies on Nelson, in which the Supreme Court held that restitution
was available where a company charged customers a tax in violation of statute.
Nelson, 160 Wn. 2d at 188. Nelson, however, does not involve a judgment.
Boone seeks disgorgement of the penalty paid as part of his municipal court
judgment. This claim may only be brought in municipal court. Boone fails to show
any separate ground for relief in equity.
Finally, Boone argues that a declaratory judgment is necessary because
the City's voluntary change to its signs is not sufficient to ensure that the City
complies with the MUTCD in all respects. But Boone asserts that the purpose of
his declaratory claim was to recoup fines, not to order the City to change its
5 Boone also relies on New Cinqular to assert that Doe was wrongly decided. He argues
that, under New Cingular, a party may challenge a city's action through a declaratory claim in
superior court rather than through a motion in municipal court. The argument is without merit.
New Cingular does not concern a judgment entered in municipal court. And the plaintiff in New
Cinqular contested the city's notice of violation and exhausted administrative remedies before
seeking judicial review. New Cingular, 185 Wn.2d at 598-99.
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No. 76611-2/12
signs. Because no monetary relief is available, the claim is moot. Any further
allegations concerning the City's compliance with the MUTCD are not part of an
actual controversy between parties with a genuine claim for relief. See To-Ro
Trade Shows, 144 Wn.2d at 411.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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